Essays on Learning and Macroeconomics by Guillermo Ordonez
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
Los Angeles
Essays on Learning and Macroeconomics
A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
by
Guillermo Luis Ordo˜ nez
2008c 
 Copyright by
Guillermo Luis Ordo˜ nez




David K. Levine, Committee Co-chair
Andrew Atkeson, Committee Co-chair
University of California, Los Angeles
2008
iiTo my mom
who prepared me for this ride
To my wife, Kathy
who joined me in this ride
To my son, Diego
who born during this ride
iiiTABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Fragility of Reputation and Clustering in Risk-Taking . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.2 Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2.3 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3 Multiplicity with Complete Information about Fundamentals . . . . . 16
1.3.1 Reputation and Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3.2 Differential gains from playing safe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.3.3 Multiple Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.4 Uniqueness with Incomplete Information about Fundamentals . . . . 32
1.5 Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.6 Reputation and Risk-Taking Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.6.1 Determinants of Risk-Taking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.6.2 Risk-Taking Clustering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.6.3 Efﬁciency considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.7 Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
1.8 Some Testable Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
1.8.1 Reputation over the Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
1.8.2 Clustering in Risk-Taking Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
1.9 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
iv1.10 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
1.10.1 Proof of Proposition 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
1.10.2 Proof and Intuition Lemma 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
1.10.3 Computational Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
1.11 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2 Slow(er) Boom, Sudden Crash. Financial Frictions and Recoveries . . . 87
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.2 Stylized Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.2.1 Negative relation between asymmetry on lending rates and ﬁ-
nancial development in general . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2.2.2 Negative relation between asymmetry on lending rates and
agency costs in particular . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2.2.3 Is the asymmetry on lending rates just a reﬂection of the asym-
metry on real variables? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
2.3 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
2.3.1 Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
2.3.2 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
2.3.3 Asymmetry implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
2.3.4 Additional testable predictions of the model . . . . . . . . . 126
2.4 Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
2.4.1 What about levels? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
2.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
2.6 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
v2.6.1 Sample of Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
2.6.2 Robustness on Skewness Classiﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
2.6.3 Volatility of Lending Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
2.7 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
3 Why are Wages Smoother than Productivity? An Industry-Level Analysis152
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
3.2 Wage Smoothing: The Industry-Level Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
3.2.1 Description of data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
3.2.2 Our Measure of Wage Smoothing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
3.2.3 High-Wage Industries Have the Most Smoothing . . . . . . . 161
3.2.4 Characteristics of High and Low-Wage Industries . . . . . . . 166
3.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
3.3.1 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
3.3.2 Wage Contracting Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
3.3.3 Two-state Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
3.4 Quantitative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
3.4.1 Differences Between High and Low-Wage Industries . . . . . 176
3.4.2 Calibration & Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
3.4.3 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
3.6 Appendix - Proofs of Propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
3.6.1 Proof of Proposition 22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
vi3.6.2 Proof of Proposition 26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
3.6.3 Proof of Proposition 27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
3.6.4 Proof of Proposition 28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
3.7 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
4 On Scapegoats, Nested Activities and Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
4.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
4.2.1 Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
4.2.2 Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
4.2.3 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
4.3 Efﬁcient Equilibrium, Inefﬁcient Scapegoating . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
4.3.1 Conditions for Efﬁcient Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
4.3.2 Scapegoating Inefﬁciency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
4.3.3 The intuition Behind the Inefﬁciency of Scapegoating . . . . . 209
4.3.4 Machiavellian Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
4.4 Ways to increase the likelihood of an efﬁcient equilibrium (without
spending more money!) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
4.4.1 Efﬁciency of nested activities after successes. . . . . . . . . . 216
4.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
4.6 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
4.6.1 Proof Proposition 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
4.6.2 Proof Proposition 31 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
vii4.6.3 Extension Proof Proposition 32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
4.7 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
viiiLIST OF FIGURES
1.1 Reputation Updating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.2 Equilibria Multiplicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.3 Cutoffs and Reputation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.4 Cutoffs and fundamentals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.5 Cutoffs with and without reputation concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.6 Ex-ante probability of risk-taking - with and without reputation . . . . 53
1.7 Cutoffs - with and without reputation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
1.8 Value functions and lending rates - with and without reputation . . . . 55
1.9 Simulated probability of default - with and without reputation . . . . 56
1.10 Simulated aggregate net returns - with and without reputation . . . . . 57
1.11 Simulated individual net returns - with and without reputation . . . . 58
1.12 Aggregate idiosyncratic risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
1.13 Idiosyncratic risk across some industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
1.14 Corporate default rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
1.15 Unique ”Safe” Continuation Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
1.16 Unique ”Risky” Continuation Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
1.17 Unique Continuation Value in Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.1 Skewness on lending rates and credit to private sector / GDP (1960-1990) 94
2.2 Skewness on lending rates and credit to private sector / GDP (1990-2004) 95
2.3 Fitted skewness on lending rates and credit to private sector / GDP
(1960-1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
ix2.4 Fitted skewness on lending rates and credit to private sector / GDP
(1990-2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2.5 Lending Rates and Expected Probability of Success . . . . . . . . . . 120
2.6 Volatility of Lending Rates and Risk Free Interest Rates . . . . . . . . 148
3.1 Wage-Productivity Elasticities in Two Select US Industries. . . . . . . 160
3.2 Wage-Productivity Elasticities and Average Wages in US Industries. . 162
3.3 Displacement Costs and Industry Average Wages. . . . . . . . . . . . 178
3.4 Simulated Wage-Productivity Elasticities, Low Wage Sector, n=4. . . 181
3.5 Simulated Wage-Productivity Elasticities, High Wage Sector, n=4. . . 182
4.1 Example of conditions for Efﬁcient Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
4.2 Expected reputation after the ﬁrst round (with and without scapegoating)212
4.3 Expected reputation after the ﬁrst round (with and without activities
after successes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
xLIST OF TABLES
1.1 Reputation updating over the cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1.2 Reputation updating over the cycle (Bangia et al., 2000) . . . . . . . . 62
2.1 Asymmetry on lending rates and ﬁnancial development . . . . . . . . 93
2.2 Fitted asymmetry on lending rates and ﬁnancial development . . . . . 96
2.3 Asymmetry on lending rates by country classiﬁcation . . . . . . . . . 98
2.4 Asymmetry on lending rates and proxies for monitoring and bank-
ruptcy costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
2.5 Asymmetry on lending rates and proxies for monitoring and enforce-
ment costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
2.6 Asymmetry on lending rates before and after a main ﬁnancial liberal-
ization event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
2.7 Asymmetry on lending rates before and after a ﬁnancial liberalization
process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
2.8 Asymmetry on lending rates before and after a ﬁnancial restriction
process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
2.9 Correlation coefﬁcients between skewness on lending rates and skew-
ness on real variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
2.10 Lending rates average and ﬁnancial development . . . . . . . . . . . 127
2.11 Lending rates average and proxies for monitoring and enforcement costs128
2.12 Asymmetry on lending rates and duration of booms . . . . . . . . . . 131
2.13 Parameters used in the simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
xi2.14 Montecarlo results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
2.15 Implied monitoring costs to match real data on lending rates asymmetry 134
2.16 Real vs. Estimated lending rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
2.17 Countries included in classiﬁcation by income . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
2.18 Countries included in other classiﬁcations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
2.19 Asymmetry on lending rates by country classiﬁcation (using differ-
ences in the log deviation from trend) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
2.20 Asymmetry on lending rates spread by country classiﬁcation . . . . . 146
2.21 Data vs. Estimated Volatility in changes of lending rates . . . . . . . 147
3.1 Summary Statistics for US Wage-Productivity Elasticities, 1947-1987. 161
3.2 Correlations of Wage-Productivity Elasticities and Average Wages in
US Industries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
3.3 Regression of Wage-Productivity Elasticity on Industry Characteris-
tics, US Industries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
3.4 Cross-Industry Correlations of Wage-Productivity Elasticities and Av-
erage Wages, OECD Countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
xiiACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This dissertation is the result of my interactions with many inspiring and encouraging
people. I want to thank all of them for their generous help and support along this
journey.
First, to my co-chairs David K. Levine and Andy Atkeson. Each one, in their very
particular way, taught me the importance of asking relevant questions and approaching
the answers creatively, honestly and rigorously.
David was extremely insightful and helpful in all our conversations. Ranging from
general professional advice to minor comments on notation, he was always eager to
help. I never left his ofﬁce without a renewed optimism on my research possibilities.
His departure from UCLA never reduced his willingness to support my work. I will
always appreciate that gesture of generosity.
Andy always surprised me with his skills to summarize in simple words the core
of research ideas that I thought were very deep. I learned a lot from our discussions.
His support and pieces of advice were invaluable both during my research and during
my job market process.
To my committee members, especially Christian Hellwig, who spent many hours
helping me to polish papers, presentations and models. He showed me the importance
of being an active participant in academics and to expose my ideas in the clearest pos-
sible ways. His great pieces of advice will last during my whole career. To Bill Zame,
who was a unique source of advice and support, especially during my job market.
To Joe Ostroy, for his constructive criticism, his receptiveness, and his always deep
comments.
To my professors, who always represented an endless source of suggestions and
comments. In particular I thank Ariel Burstein, Jernej Copic, Matthias Doepke, Roger
xiiiFarmer, Hugo Hopenhayn, Hanno Lustig, Lee Ohanian, Pierre-Olivier Weill and Mark
Wright.
To my network of friends and colleagues, who share their enthusiasm for and com-
ments on my work. In particular I thank Simeon Alder, Rolf Campos, Junichi Fuji-
moto, David Lagakos, Alvaro Mezza, Oscar Mitnik, Cesar Serra, Mariano Tappata.
To my mom, Lily, and my brothers Rodrigo and Agustin for their love, support
and understanding during the long years of my education, no matter the distance or the
time zones. Without their efforts I would not be writing these pages.
And ﬁnally, to Kathy, my lovely wife, dearest friend, cheerleader, drill sergeant,
voice of reason, counselor and life raft. Thank you for always being there.
xivVITA
April, 7, 1975 Born, Cordoba, Argentina
1996–1999 Research and Teaching Assistant
Universidad Nacional de Cordoba, Argentina
1999 B.A. (Economics), Universidad Nacional de Cordoba, Argentina
1999 Distinguished Student, Economics Award and Flag Escort
Universidad Nacional de Cordoba, Argentina
1999 Research Economist, Universidad Siglo 21, Cordoba,Argentina
1999–2001 Inter-American Development Bank Fellowship
2000–2001 Research and Teaching Assistant
ILADES - Georgetown University, Chile
2001 M.A. (Economics), ILADES - Georgetown University, Chile
2001–2003 Consultant, Research Department
Inter-American Development Bank, Washington D.C.
2002 Inter-American Development Bank Prize to Distinguished Teams
2003–2007 UCLA - Pauley Foundation Fellowship
2004–2007 Research and Teaching Assistant
Department of Economics, UCLA
2005 M.A. (Economics), UCLA
xv2005 Advance to Candidacy Award, Department of Economics, UCLA
2006 Robert Ettinger Prize (for the second chapter), (best paper by a
UCLA Economics Department graduate student)
2006 NSFAward-2ndLindauMeetingoftheWinnersoftheNobelPrize
in Economic Sciences. Lindau, Germany
2007 Outstanding Teaching Award, Department of Economics, UCLA
2007–2008 UCLA Dissertation Year Fellowship
2008 Robert Ettinger Prize (for the ﬁrst chapter), (best paper by a UCLA
Economics Department graduate student)
PUBLICATIONS
“The EMU Effect on Trade: What’s in it for the UK?” (with A. Micco and E. Stein). in
Prospects for Monetary Unions After the Euro, ed. P. De Grauwe and J. Melitz, MIT
Press, 155-186, 2005.
“The Currency Union Effect on Trade: Early Evidence from EMU” (with A. Micco
and E. Stein). Economic Policy, 18(37): 315-356, 2003.
“Financial Liberalization and Growth. Does it Pay to Join the Party?” (with A. Galindo
and A. Micco). Economia, 3(1): 231-261, 2002.
xvi“Fiscal Evasion and Corruption: The Importance of Priorities” (in Spanish) Revista de
Analisis Economico. 16(2): 43-76, 2001.
xviiABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays on Learning and Macroeconomics
by
Guillermo Luis Ordo˜ nez
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California, Los Angeles, 2008
Professor Andrew Atkeson, Co-chair
Professor David K. Levine, Co-chair
This dissertation contains four essays that apply techniques of learning and implicit
contracts to the analysis of macroeconomic problems. The ﬁrst essay explores the role
of borrowers’ reputation concerns on the magniﬁcation of macroeconomic crises. The
second essay investigates the importance of ﬁnancial frictions in delaying the recovery
of economies after crises. The third essay (coauthored with David Lagakos) develops
an implicit contract model to understand the differences in wage smoothing across
industries. The fourth essay studies the effects of different signalling technologies in
the efﬁciency of organizations with career concerned managers.
xviiiCHAPTER 1
Fragility of Reputation and Clustering in Risk-Taking
I study the interplay between reputation and risk-taking in a dynamic stochastic envi-
ronment where it is ex-ante efﬁcient for ﬁrms to engage in safe projects, but ex-post
preferred to invest in risky ones, appropriating surplus from lenders. By introduc-
ing fundamentals, I interpret the model as a dynamic global game in which strategic
complementarities arise endogenously from reputation updating, overcoming perva-
sive multiple equilibria. I ﬁnd that even though reputation deters opportunistic be-
havior, it introduces fragile incentives which may lead to large changes in aggregate
risk-taking in response to small changes in aggregate fundamentals, inducing ﬁnancial
crises and credit crunches.
11.1 Introduction
Reputation concerns deter opportunistic behavior by creating a link between past ac-
tions and expectations about future actions. Consider, for example, an environment in
which lenders provide funds to ﬁrms whose risk-taking decisions and proﬁts are un-
observable. Firms could take excessive risk, appropriating most of the beneﬁts from
large successes and imposing most of the losses from big failures on lenders. This in-
efﬁcient risk-taking reduces lending and increases its cost. However, if ﬁrms generate
signals correlated to decisions, lenders could use those signals to construct reputa-
tion and offer better lending conditions to ﬁrms with better reputation. Firms are then
afraid of losing their reputation and are deterred from taking excessive risk. This role
for reputation has been extensively discussed in the literature 1.
The point of this paper is to argue that these reputational incentives are fragile be-
cause they may suddenly collapse, inducing big changes in aggregate risk-taking in
response to small changes in aggregate fundamentals. This sudden shift in behavior
may have a large impact on economic outcomes such as corporate failures, credit con-
ditions, interest rates, and returns to investors. Hence reputation may have been an
unnoticed detonator of ﬁnancial collapses and credit crunches characterized by conﬁ-
dence crises. In normal times, lenders have conﬁdence in ﬁrms with good reputation
and no conﬁdence in ﬁrms with bad reputation. In bad times, lenders lose conﬁdence
in almost all ﬁrms and lending breaks down2.
1Among the most inﬂuential papers on reputation are Milgrom and Roberts [1982], Kreps and Wil-
son [1982], Fudenberg and Levine [1992], Holmstrom [1999] and Mailath and Samuelson [2001]. Lit-
erature speciﬁcally relating reputation and risk-taking was pioneered by Diamond [1989]
2Recent examples of how a loss of conﬁdence in ratings (a measure of reputation) can fuel crises
were the ﬁnancial problems experienced by many countries in August 2007. Since the implementation
of Basel II regulations, under which banks holding AAA assets are allowed to keep less capital and
lend more, banks around the world have been ﬁlling their vaults with AAA- rated structured products,
specially CDOs. In August 2007 Central Banks were forced to inject large amounts of liquidity into
the overnight money markets because banks were charging very high rates to lend to each other since
they lost conﬁdence on the meaning of AAA backed securities (The Economist. ”The game is up” and
2I construct a model where incentives to take risk monotonically vary with a sto-
chastic aggregate fundamental. All ﬁrms can invest in risky projects and some of them
(strategic ﬁrms) can also invest in safer projects, with a lower probability of default
and a higher probability of generating good signals. A ﬁrm’s reputation is deﬁned
as the probability that lenders assign to the ﬁrm being the strategic type. Reputation
is Bayesian updated by lenders from observing the signals, and ﬁrm incentives are
shaped in large part by the concern for their reputation. To protect their reputation,
strategic ﬁrms engage in safe projects when otherwise they would have preferred to
opportunistically take risky ones.
In the absence of any equilibrium selection device, it is not possible to draw ﬁrm
conclusions about the interplay between reputation and risk-taking, since this model
delivers multiple equilibria. For some range of fundamentals, if lenders believe that
strategicﬁrmswillplaysafe, thentheseﬁrmswillindeedhaveincentivestoplaysafeto
increase the probability of good signals. The reason is that good signals will be in part
attributed to the ﬁrm using a safe project and then the ﬁrm being strategic. Contrarily,
if lenders believe that strategic ﬁrms will undergo risky projects, then ﬁrms will indeed
have incentives to take risks. In this case, good signals will be just attributed to good
luck in risky projects. This strong dependence of reputation formation on lenders
beliefs about ﬁrms choices is at the heart of the reputation fragility. It is irrelevant
whether or not a ﬁrm has a good reputation if lenders are convinced the ﬁrm will
choose the risky project.
I use techniques from global games to select a unique equilibrium that is robust to
information perturbations. I assume that after the lending contract has been negotiated,
but before deciding the project, ﬁrms observe a noisy signal of the fundamental. This
is a key technical part of the analysis since the model is a non-standard global game.
”Surviving the markets”, 08/16/07).
3Strategic complementarities arise endogenously from reputation formation and are af-
fected by the dynamic structure of the game. Hence standard conditions for global
games to work, such as uniform limit dominance, are not assumed but obtained en-
dogenously. Uniqueness is characterized, for each reputation level, by a threshold in
fundamentals below which all ﬁrms with that reputation level take risks. This result
generates a well-deﬁned probability of risk-taking (the probability fundamentals are
below the threshold) to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of reputation to deter
excessive risk.
The intuition behind the collapse of reputation relies on two types of incentives to
choose safe projects. First, safe projects increase the probability that ﬁrms continue
operating. These “continuation incentives” increase with reputation since ﬁrms with
better reputations face lower borrowing rates in the future and hence have higher ex-
pected future proﬁts. Second, safe projects increase the probability of generating good
signals, which are used for reputation formation. Because of learning, these “reputa-
tion incentives” are high for intermediate and low for extreme reputation levels. The
reason is that neither ﬁrms with very high nor very low reputation can change their rep-
utation quickly, whereas intermediate ﬁrms can. The fragility of reputation arises from
combining these two types of incentives. Consider the intermediate reputation level at
which reputation incentives are maximized. For reputation levels below that point, as
reputation increases, both continuation and reputation incentives to increase, generat-
ing a big reduction in the fundamental threshold below which risk-taking is preferred.
For reputation levels above that point, as reputation increases, continuation incentives
still increase but reputation incentives decrease, compensating each other and generat-
ing small changes in thresholds. Since thresholds are less sensitive to reputation when
reputation is high, risk-taking becomes attractive for ﬁrms with an increasingly larger
range of reputation levels as fundamentals decline.
4Finally, we relate the predictions of the model with data. First, taking credit ratings
of corporate bonds as a proxy for reputation and ratings transitions as a proxy for
reputation formation, we show reputation evolves gradually and changes less in bad
times than in good times. Second, we discuss recent empirical evidence suggesting
that both risk-taking behavior (measured by idiosyncratic risk) and corporate defaults
tend to cluster “excessively” in recessions (Campbell et al. [2001] and Das et al. [2007]
respectively). These empirical ﬁndings seem consistent with the model implications
for reputation evolution and risk-taking clustering.
This paper combines two separate strands of literature - reputation and global
games. The model is closely related to Diamond [1989] and Mailath and Samuel-
son [2001] who study reputation incentives in state invariant contexts. As in Dia-
mond [1989], ﬁrms behavior affects reputation through the probability of continuation
in business. As in Mailath and Samuelson [2001], ﬁrms behavior affects reputation
through the generation of signals correlated to actions. I introduce these two chan-
nels in a single framework, ﬁnding that the combination is more than the sum of parts
since it leads to the result that reputation incentives are fragile. Their papers also have
multiple equilibria. While Diamond [1989] deals with it analyzing extreme equilib-
ria, Mailath and Samuelson [2001] focus on the most efﬁcient one. Since this paper
is interested in understanding the time variation and state dependence properties of
reputation incentives, we have explicitly tackled the multiplicity issue.
The model is also related to the literature on dynamic global games. I follow
Chassang [2007] and Toxvaerd [2007] to solve for uniqueness. However, my model
presents additional complications since strategic complementarities are not hard-wired
into payoffs but arise endogenously from reputation updating, and hence are tied to the
dynamic structure of the game. This paper also contributes to the scarce literature of
learning in global games. While most papers study cases in which players learn about a
5policy maker or a status quo (e.g., Angeletos et al. [2006] and Angeletos et al. [2007]),
my model deals with the opposite case in which the market learns about players’ types,
generating coordination problems. To the best of my knowledge this is the ﬁrst paper
that exploits fundamental-driven incentives to create a reputation global game model
and select a unique equilibrium.
In the next two sections I describe a full version of the model (also considering
consumers) and discuss equilibrium multiplicity when fundamentals are perfectly ob-
served. In sections 1.4 and 1.5, I show how to select a unique equilibrium using a
dynamic global games approach when fundamentals are observed with noise. In sec-
tion 1.6 I discuss the fragility of reputation, characterized by big changes in risk-taking
in response to small changes in fundamentals. In section 1.7, I use numerical simula-
tions to illustrate the role of reputation in magnifying crises. In section 1.8, I show the
predictionsofthemodelareconsistentwithdataonreputationdynamicsandclustering
in risk-taking. In the last section, I make some ﬁnal remarks.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Description
The economy is comprised of a continuum of long-lived, risk neutral ﬁrms (with mass
1) that produce a good or provide a service, an inﬁnite number of risk neutral lenders
who fund ﬁrms to produce and consumers who buy the good or service from ﬁrms.
1.2.1.1 Firms
Each ﬁrm runs a unique project. The activity of all ﬁrms faces an identical market
and industry risk, hence differences in results across ﬁrms are only induced by their
6production decisions, generating a purely idiosyncratic risk component. There are two
ways to produce. Safe technologies (s) that have been previously proven to deliver a
high probability of success, and risky technologies (r) that may lead to the discovery
of cheaper and better production alternatives but also reduce the probability of success.
There are two types of ﬁrms, deﬁned by their access to these production tech-
nologies. Strategic ﬁrms S can decide whether to follow safe or risky technologies3.
Risky ﬁrms R do not have access to safe technologies, so they do not have a choice
but to follow risky technologies. Reputation is deﬁned by φ = Pr(S), the probabil-
ity of being a strategic ﬁrm. The introduction of these two types are based on my
(maybe pessimistic) belief that all ﬁrms can play risky but not all of them can play
safe. While all ﬁrms can perform trial-error procedures, not all of them have access to
well-designed procedures4.
Firms cannot accumulate assets. At the beginning of the period, the ﬁrm negotiates
a loan (normalized to 1) to produce. Then, strategic ﬁrms should decide whether to use
safe or risky technologies5. At the end of the period, after production has taken place,
the ﬁrm may continue (c) or die (d), with probabilities depending on the technology
used. If the ﬁrm continues, two possible signals (good g or bad b), correlated with the
technology chosen, are generated6.
3I use interchangeably play safe or take safe actions (s) and play risky or take risky actions (r)
4Another possible assumption is that non-strategic ﬁrms only have access to safe technologies. In
this case the characterization of equilibrium is different but the main result of large changes in aggre-
gate behavior in response to small changes in fundamentals is the same. However, I believe a better
description of reality is that some ﬁrms are restricted to use superior technologies rather restricted to
use inferior ones.
5Since in this section I focus on a given period t reputational problem, I am not using any subscript
to refer to time. In the next section, when introducing dynamic considerations, I will explicitly denote
periods by subscripts.
6These two signals can be interpreted as results from production. Good signals are the ﬁrm growth
or high-quality production. Bad signals are the production of defective products or the provision of a
low-quality service.
7Probabilities are,
Pr(c|s) = ps > Pr(c|r) = pr (1.1)
Pr(g|c,s) = αs > Pr(g|c,r) = αr (1.2)
Hence, the unconditional probability of good signals is higher using safe tech-
nologies than using risky ones (i.e., psαs > prαr). Additionally, assume that the un-
conditional probability of bad signals is higher playing risky than playing safe (i.e.,
pr(1−αr) > ps(1−αs))7.
1.2.1.2 Lenders and Consumers
Lenders and consumers cannot observe the technology used by the ﬁrm nor its proﬁts
but can observe whether the ﬁrm continues or not and, in case of continuation, whether
itgeneratesgoodsignals(g)orbadsignals(b). Togiveroomforreputationtointroduce
incentives, signals are observable but unveriﬁable on court, which means interest rates
charged by lenders and prices paid by consumers cannot be conditioned on observed
signals.
Lenders provide funds to ﬁrms. There is an inﬁnite number of risk neutral lenders
whoseoutsideoptionisariskfreeinterestrateR>18. Repaymentischaracterizedbya
costly state veriﬁcation with a bankrupt procedure that destroys the value of the output.
This is a natural way to introduce truth-telling by ﬁrms. When proﬁts are greater than
the value of interest rates, it is always optimal for ﬁrms to repay and get the positive
differential rather than default and ﬁle for bankruptcy. I assume that, conditional on
continuation, ﬁrms can always pay back their loans, hence default occurs only in case
7This assumption is not particularly relevant but introduces monotonicity in learning and spare us
from dealing with awkward expressions and extra conditions.
8Since lenders are the long side of the market, there is no competition for funds. The introduction
of such competition makes reputation effects more important and magniﬁes the results
8of ﬁrm’s death.9.
Consumers buy production from ﬁrms. Consumers’ utility depends on whether the
signals are good or bad. If the ﬁrm generates good signals (for example the production
of high-quality products) the utility for consumers is u(g) = 1. If the ﬁrm generates
bad signals, consumers’ utility is u(b) = 010. I assume consumers pay up front for
the good or service and the market interaction is given by perfect price discrimination.
Each consumer buys one unit of the good in each period and pays a price P, which
is a function of their expectations about the probabilities of receiving good signals.
This price does not depend on the ﬁrm’s actions (which are not observable) or the
signals (which are known only after the good is purchased). However, as will be
shown later, P depends on the ﬁrm’s reputation and on consumers’ expectations about
the probabilities the ﬁrm played risky.
1.2.1.3 Cash Flows
If the ﬁrms dies, present and future cash ﬂows are zero. If the ﬁrm continues, cash
ﬂows depend on the technology used. Expected instantaneous cash ﬂows from playing
safe are Ps(θ) = αsπs,g(θ)+(1−αs)πs,b(θ) and expected instantaneous cash ﬂows
from playing risky are Pr(θ) = αrπr,g(θ)+(1−αr)πr,b(θ). Cash ﬂows also depend
positively on a single-dimensional variable θ ∈R, which represents the aggregate eco-
nomic fundamentals that affect the proﬁtability of the project11. Fundamentals θ are
9Nothing fundamental changes with this assumption but it simpliﬁes the notation and eases the
exposition. The analysis relaxing it, such that default also exists in case of continuation, reinforces
results and is available upon request
10Without loss of generality we also assume consumers’ utility if the ﬁrm dies is just 0, as in the pres-
ence of bad signals. A better assumption may be a negative utility in the case of ﬁrm death. However,
the conclusions of the model are identical at the cost of complicating the exposition.
11For tractability reasons we assume fundamentals only affect the proﬁtability of projects and not the
probabilitiesofsuccess. However, assumingforexamplethathigherfundamentalsincreaseprobabilities
of success from playing safe respect than from playing risky (i.e., ps in relation to pr) we would obtain
the same results but with the complication that reputation updating varies in different states of the
economy.
9i.i.d. over time and distributed with a density v(θ), a mean E(θ), and a variance γθ.
To be more speciﬁc about the structure of these cash ﬂows, πa,j(θ) = A(θ)[P−
ca,j(θ)], for a ∈ {s,r} and j ∈ {g,b}. A(θ) is the level of demand for the ﬁrm’s prod-
uct, which depends positively on the aggregate state of the economy (or fundamentals
θ), P is the unit price and ca,j(θ) is the average cost of production, which depends
on the aggregate state of the economy, the technology used and the signal generated.
I assume that for any fundamental θ, costs from playing risky are more volatile than
costs from playing safe.
Assumption 1 cr,g(θ) < cs,g(θ) < cs,b(θ) < cr,b(θ) for all θ
This assumption arises naturally from the deﬁnition of risky technology. For ex-
ample, taking risks by cutting costs beyond safe procedures may be highly beneﬁcial
if the results obtained are good but can be very costly if the results are bad since it
may be necessary to pay ﬁnes, face demands, cover guarantees, etc. Since the price P
charged for the product does not depend on the technology used or the generated sig-
nals, this assumption immediately implies πr,g(θ) > πs,g(θ) > πs,b(θ) > πr,b(θ) for
all θ. Hence expected proﬁts from risky actions are more volatile and centered around
expected proﬁts from safe actions.
With respect to the cost structure, I also assume both expected average costs from
playing risky (i.e., Cr(θ) = αrcr,g(θ)+(1−αr)cr,b(θ)) and from playing safe (i.e.,
Cs(θ) = αscs,g(θ)+(1−αs)cs,b(θ)) depend negatively on fundamentals. As will be
discussed later P will decrease as fundamentals weaken, which means proﬁts per unit
of production decrease in bad times12.
Hence, in bad times there is a reduction in total expected instantaneous cash ﬂows
from two channels. On the one hand, demand decreases from a reduction in A(θ).
12Note this always happens with ﬁxed costs of production when facing a demand reduction
10On the other, average proﬁts also decrease from an increase in expected average costs.




What is really important about the assumption is not the direction of the inequal-
ity but rather the monotonic change in incentives as fundamentals vary. Unlike other
reputation models, we allow incentives behind moral hazard and adverse selection to
differ in different stages of the cycle. In this particular case, the assumption means that
playing risky is more attractive in bad times than in good times. When fundamentals
weaken, expected instantaneous cash ﬂows decrease more when using safe technolo-
gies than risky ones, for example if in the latter case, ﬁrms adjust easily to a changing
environment.
The particular direction of the assumption can be justiﬁed in two ways. First, under
limited liability, there will be a maximum cost c = P above which it is not possible for
the ﬁrm to cover the consequences of its actions (such as ﬁnes, demands, etc.). Under
this situation, even if ∂Cs
∂θ = ∂Cr
∂θ , since cr,b is the highest possible cost, it binds ﬁrst with
c. Hence, in expectation, average costs from safe actions effectively increase faster
than average costs from risky actions in bad times. Since potential losses are bounded
while potential gains are not, it is more attractive to take risk in bad times than in good
times. In other words, the highest variance distribution gets truncated faster in its left
tail. Second, in bad times experimentation in new production procedures is cheaper.
This idea has been extensively discussed since Schumpeter, who believed recessions
are good opportunities for ﬁrms to innovate and try new ways to produce.
1.2.2 Timing
The timing of the model is:
11• Firms, lenders and consumers observe the reputation level φ of all ﬁrms. Firms
acquire a loan of 1 from lenders. Lenders’ outside option is a risk free interest
rate R > 1
• Fundamentals θ (that only affect proﬁts) are realized by everybody in the econ-
omy13.
• The ﬁrm decides between following safe (s) or risky (r) technologies.
• Production occurs and the ﬁrm either continues (c) or dies (d).
• If the ﬁrm dies, it defaults on the loan.
• If the ﬁrm continues, it pays to lenders the negotiated interest rate R > 1 and sell
the product to consumers at a price P.
• After the sale, the ﬁrm generates good (g) or bad (b) signals of its actions.
Lenders and consumers observe those unveriﬁable signals and use them to up-
date the reputation from φ to φ0
This is the timing in each period. Since reputation only makes sense in a dynamic
context, the game will consist in many repeated periods with this sequence of interac-
tions and decisions. We will discuss the results of the model in both ﬁnite and inﬁnite
horizon versions of the repeated game.
1.2.3 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
Before formally deﬁning the equilibrium, we discuss some preliminaries concerning
the properties of reputation updating by lenders and consumers and the deﬁnition of
the value function that ﬁrms maximize.
13The timing in which fundamentals are observed will be relevant later to select a unique equilibrium.
An alternative, and possibly more realistic, assumption is that a subset of fundamentals is observed
before the loan is negotiated while another subset is observed before production but after lending
121.2.3.1 Reputation Updating
When updating a ﬁrm’s reputation, lenders and consumers have a prior about the ﬁrm’s
reputation and have beliefs about whether the ﬁrm plays risky. These two ingredients
deserve a detailed explanation.
The model assumes lenders and consumers receive a public signal g or b about the
ﬁrm’s actions14. Unfortunately, a model with common, public realizations has many
equilibria where reputation does not have the asset characteristics we are focusing on
andwhereanimplausibledegreeofcoordinationbetweenﬁrmbehaviorandthemarket
belief about the ﬁrm behavior is required15. I eliminate these equilibria by requiring
behavior to be Markov. However, even when restricting attention to Markovian strate-
gies, reputation formation still depends on beliefs about the probabilities the ﬁrm plays
risky.
Since we focus on Markovian strategies, the sufﬁcient statistic about the ﬁrm’s type
is the reputation level φ. Let x(φ,θ) be the probability a strategic ﬁrm with reputation
φ plays risky when the fundamental is θ. Additionally, let b x(φ,θ) be lenders and
consumers’ beliefs about the probability a strategic ﬁrm with reputation φ plays risky
when the fundamental is θ. By Bayesian updating, after observing a continuing ﬁrm
generating good signals,
Pr(S|c,g) = φg(φ,b x) =
[prαrb x+ psαs(1−b x)]φ
[prαrb x+ psαs(1−b x)]φ + prαr(1−φ)
(1.3)
14The obvious and natural alternative is that each agent in the market receives an idiosyncratic sig-
nal. However the idiosyncrasy of signals present the same problems to analyze than model of private
monitoring. Obstructing the ability to coordinate continuation play, it imposes serious constraints on
the ability to construct equilibria. See a complete discussion in Mailath and Samuelson [2006], Ch. 18
15One of these equilibria can be, for example, to play safe for certain fundamentals until the ﬁrst bad
result happens and then play risky afterward. In this particular equilibrium reputation does not exist
as we interpret it, and beliefs about ﬁrms’ behavior requires implausible degrees of complexity and
coordination. See discussion in Mailath and Samuelson [2001]
13and, after observing a continuing ﬁrm generating bad signals,
Pr(S|c,b) = φb(φ,b x) =
[pr(1−αr)b x+ ps(1−αs)(1−b x)]φ
[pr(1−αr)b x+ ps(1−αs)(1−b x)]φ + pr(1−αr)(1−φ)
(1.4)
where φg is the posterior after the observation the ﬁrm continued with good signals
and φb the posterior after the observation the ﬁrm continued with bad signals, given a
prior φ.
1.2.3.2 Proﬁts
For the moment, we will focus on the static problem that ﬁrms have to solve just
assuming a ﬁxed stream of continuation values for different φ in the future. I impose
three restrictions on continuation valuesV(φ). First, they are well-deﬁned. That this is
indeed the case will be shown in Section 1.5, where a fully ﬂedged dynamic model is
considered. Second, they are positive, which is clear since proﬁts are bounded below
by zero. Finally, they are monotonically increasing in the reputation level φ. Even
when this seems a natural assumption because reputation is a valuable asset, it is also
a useful assumption for expositional purposes. In Section 1.5, I discuss the conditions
for this assumption to hold and why it is convenient to discuss the results but not
critical to obtain them.
Total discounted proﬁts for a given reputation level φ and observed fundamental
θ, conditional on the probability of risk-taking x and on market’s beliefs b x about that
probability of risk-taking, are:

















−¥V(φ0,θ0|b x0)v(θ0)dθ0 are elements of a given stream of con-
tinuation values ¡0 = {V(φ0)}1
φ0=0
Note the value function depends on the reputation level (φ), fundamentals (θ), and
beliefs the market assigns to the ﬁrm playing risky (b x). Naturally, in equilibrium a
strategy for ﬁrms uniquely determines the equilibrium updating rule the market must
use if their beliefs are to be correct (i.e., x = b x).
In what follows I focus on cutoff strategies in which the ﬁrm will decide to play
risky if it observes a fundamental below a certain threshold and safe if it observes a





0 if θ > k∗(φ)
1 if θ < k∗(φ)
(1.6)
In Section 1.3 we show that even restricting attention to this type of strategies, we have
a multiplicity of equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge. In Section
1.4 we show that introducing noise in the observation of fundamentals, the unique
equilibrium surviving iterated elimination of dominated strategies as the precision of
signals goes to inﬁnity, is a threshold strategy of this type. Intuitively this result arises
from the monotonicity assumption of the relation between incentives to play safe and
fundamentals.
1.2.3.3 Equilibrium
Deﬁnition 1 A Markov perfect equilibrium in cutoff strategies is: cutoffs k∗(φ), inter-
est rates R(φ) and posteriors φg and φb, such that
• Eachﬁrmwithreputationφ observesθ andchoosesx∗(φ,θ)tomaximize b V(φ,θ|x,b x)





0 if θ > k∗(φ)
1 if θ < k∗(φ)
• Lenders charge R(φ) such that they obtain R in expectation.
• Posteriors φg and φb are updated using Bayes’ Rule (equations 1.3 and 1.4).
• A strategy for φ ﬁrms uniquely determines the equilibrium interest rates and
updating rule the market must use if their beliefs are to be correct (i.e., b x(φ,θ)=
x∗(φ,θ)).
1.3 Multiplicity with Complete Information about Fundamentals
InthissectionweshowthereisacontinuumofMarkovianperfectequilibriainmonotone
cutoff strategies when ﬁrms perfectly observe fundamentals. This result arises from
the impossibility of pinning down a unique belief for lenders and consumers to use in
updating ﬁrms’ reputation.
To achieve this result, we ﬁrst discuss the dependence of the value and formation
of reputation on lenders and consumers’ beliefs about ﬁrms’ actions. Then we dis-
cuss properties of the differential gains from playing safe rather than risky that are
used to determine ﬁrms’ optimal actions. Finally, we show equilibrium multiplicity in
each period for a given stream of continuation values and discuss how this multiplicity
problem becomes more serious as the horizon of the game grows.
1.3.1 Reputation and Beliefs
The next Proposition shows the role of reputation and beliefs as a source of multiplic-
ity.
16Proposition 2 For a given reputation level φ and a fundamental θ, the reputation
formation (measured by φg −φb) and the reputation value (measured by R(φ) and
P(φ)) decrease as lenders and consumers assign a greater probability the ﬁrm plays
risky (i.e., greater b x(φ,θ)).
In the next subsections, we show this proposition by parts, ﬁrst focusing on the
formation of reputation and then in the value of reputation. Finally, we discuss the
place of this result within the reputation literature.
Intuitively, when lenders and consumers assign a low probability of the ﬁrm play-
ing risky, good signals are also signals that a ﬁrm had played safe with high probability
and then it is more likely the ﬁrm is strategic. In this case, learning is easier and play-
ing safe is a good way to increase probabilities of having good results and to increase
reputation. On the contrary, when the market assigns a high probability of the ﬁrm
playing risky, good signals are attributed to good luck rather than the use of safe pro-
cedures. In this case, since learning is difﬁcult, ﬁrms do not have incentives to increase
the probability of generating good signals by playing safe.
The value of reputation also depends on beliefs about risk-taking. If lenders believe
it is very likely strategic ﬁrms play risky, they will charge high interest rates since it
is less likely in expectation to recover the loan. If they believe ﬁrms play safe, they
will charge low interest rates. Similarly, if consumers believe strategic ﬁrms played
risky, the willingness to pay for the product is low because it is less likely to be a good
product. However, if they believe strategic ﬁrms played safe, the willingness to pay
for the product is higher for high reputation levels since it is more likely to enjoy good
products.
Hence, reputation is a valuable asset, not because it represents an assumed intrinsic
valuable characteristic, but because it increases instantaneous cash ﬂows and reduces
expected future interest rates by having access to safe actions. However, the magnitude
17of these effects in a given period depends heavily on the beliefs about the ﬁrm playing
risky in that period. This property is the main source of multiplicity. If lenders and
consumers believe the ﬁrm plays risky, not only do not update the reputation but also
the reputation does not have any effect on increasing instantaneous cash ﬂows or in re-
ducing interest rates. This eliminates the deterring effects of reputation on risk-taking
by making ﬁrms more prone to take risks. Contrarily, if lenders and consumers be-
lieve ﬁrms plays safe, both value and formation of reputation is important, preventing
risk-taking by making ﬁrms more likely to play safe.
1.3.1.1 Reputation Formation
In this setting, the formation of reputation depends heavily on the beliefs of lenders
and consumers about ﬁrm’s actions. This is because reputation is not understood as
the possession of an intrinsically valuable characteristic but the possession of a char-
acteristic that only has value if it is really used.
Note from equations 1.3 and 1.4 that φg = φb = φ when b x = 1 and φg ≥ φ ≥ φb
when b x ≤ 1, with the gap φg −φb increasing as b x goes to 0. Graphically, reputation
evolves as in Figure 1.1. Reputation priors φ are represented in the horizontal axis
and reputation posteriors φ0 are represented in the vertical axis. Take, for example,
the case in which lenders and consumers believe strategic ﬁrms play safe for sure (i.e.,
b x = 0). In this case, given a current reputation level φ, the gain in terms of reputation
of generating good signals rather than bad signals is determined by the gap φg −φb.
Contrarily, when lenders and consumers believe strategic ﬁrms play risky for sure (i.e.,
b x = 1), there is no gain in terms of reputation from generating good signals rather than
bad ones. Recall also that when φ = 0 or φ = 1 there is no updating, no matter the
signals nor the beliefs about the ﬁrm’s actions. Contrarily, the maximum updating gap
(φg−φb) is obtained at an intermediate value φM for any value of b x < 1.
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1.3.1.2 Reputation Value
Now we will discuss the value of reputation in increasing expected proﬁts by reducing
interest rates and instantaneous cash ﬂows and how this value decreases as beliefs of
risk-taking increase.
First, interest rates decrease as reputation levels φ increase. Since I assume loans
are negotiated before knowing fundamentals, interest rates are deﬁned by the risk free









[(prb x(φ,θ)+ ps(1−b x(φ,θ)))φ + pr(1−φ)]v(θ)dθ




∂φ <0 for a ﬁxed b x. This is important because
it is the ﬁrst reason why ﬁrms would like to build and maintain reputation. For a given
b x, high reputation levels imply lenders charge lower interest rates to ﬁrms.
19Since we are focusing on cutoff strategies, from equation (1.6) beliefs b x(φ,θ) are
a function of the cutoffb k(φ) that lenders and consumers believe a ﬁrm with reputation






Pr(c|φ,b k) = (1−φ)pr+φ
h
prV (b k(φ))+ ps(1−V (b k(φ)))
i
where V (b k(φ)) is the cumulative distribution of θ up to b k(φ). The sufﬁcient con-
dition for interest rates to decrease with reputation is that cutoff beliefs b k(φ) are non-
increasing in φ. As we will show, this is the case in equilibrium, in which beliefs are
correct (i.e., b k(φ) = k∗(φ)).
Second, instantaneous cash ﬂows increase as reputation levels φ increase, since
consumers are willing to pay a higher price P for the same product. This is common in
most models in which ﬁrms care about having a reputation of producing high-quality
products. Rather than just assuming this relation, we obtain it from our perfect price
discrimination setup. Since consumers get a per period utility of 1 from the consump-
tion of products under good signals and 0 from the consumption of products under bad
signals, they are willing to pay for the product up to their reservation value.
P(φ,θ) = (αrb x(φ,θ)+αs(1−b x(φ,θ)))φ +αr(1−φ) (1.9)
Note that P(φ,θ) ∈ [αr,αs] and that
∂P(φ,θ)
∂φ < 0 for a ﬁxed b x. This is an additional
reason why ﬁrms care about reputation. For a given b x(φ,θ), high reputation imply
ﬁrms can charge higher price for their products. Again, since we are focusing on





(1−φ)αr+φαs if θ >b k(φ)
αr if θ <b k(φ)
Similarly to the interest rates case, the sufﬁcient condition for expected prices to
increase with reputation is that cutoff beliefsb k(φ) are non-increasing in φ. As we will
show, this is the case in equilibrium, in which beliefs are correct (i.e., b k(φ) = k∗(φ)).
Hence interest rates R and instantaneous cash ﬂows Ps and Pr can be written fully
explicitly as functions of fundamentals and reputation levels, R(φ,R), Ps(φ,θ) and
Pr(φ,θ)
1.3.1.3 Relation with the Literature
In this model, reputation is not intrinsically valuable, as would be the case of talents,
quality or skills but it is deﬁned by access to actions. To take advantage of a reputation
of having access to a safe technology, lenders and consumers must also believe that
the ﬁrm will in fact decide to play safe in that period. It is worthless to be seen as a
ﬁrm that can choose if at the same time lenders and consumers believe the choice will
be to play risky, the same action taken by ﬁrms that do not have a choice.
Since risk-taking is the product of a certain action rather than an intrinsic character-
istic, reputation should be deﬁned both using adverse selection (lenders and consumers
do not know if the ﬁrm has the possibility to choose or not) and moral hazard (actions
have value in themselves to lenders and consumers other than being just signals). A
more general setting should allow reputation to be also a signal of the possession of an
intrinsic value. We may think, for example, that a ﬁrm that knows how to play safe is
also a ﬁrm that can produce better products simply because its managers are talented
people. Assuming this extra effect would reinforce the monotonicity of the contin-
21uation values on φ, sustaining the main results. However, it also adds unnecessary
elements to the exposition of the main conclusions16.
This model differs importantly from other models relating reputation and risk-
taking. Here we will discuss the main differences with the two most relevant related
papers, Diamond [1989] and Mailath and Samuelson [2001]17.
Diamond [1989] considers three types of ﬁrms - naturally risky, naturally safe, and
strategic ﬁrms that can choose between risky or safe projects. He shows that strategic
ﬁrms may choose safe projects and forego proﬁts to enjoy lower interest rates in the
future. A difference with our model is that ﬁrms signal their type just by continuing in
business, hence reputation can only increase over time, being undistinguishable from
age. Introducing a second set of signals after continuation, our model allows reputation
to be constructed, destroyed and managed.
This last characteristic of our model is related to Mailath and Samuelson [2001]
who in a different setting study a problem where reputation can vary depending on
results and where strategic types try to separate from ”bad” types. However, they
do not consider ﬁrms can die as a result of their actions, not capturing continuation
incentives on decisions.
Our model differ from these two paper in three important dimensions. First, it
incorporates elements of continuation (as in Diamond [1989]) and elements of repu-
tation based on results (as in Mailath and Samuelson [2001]). On the one hand, the
16Nevertheless, when relevant, we will show along the exposition how strengthening reputation also
as an intrinsically valuable element reinforce the results
17Another relevant paper for us, even when not closely related, is Holmstrom [1999]. He suggests
that managers’ incentives for risk-taking depend on their career concerns. When proposing projects,
managers send to owners imperfect signals about their talent to determine which ones are good projects.
The better the perceived talent the higher future wages. When wages are linearly related to talents and
managers are risk neutral, they are indifferent about risk-taking decisions. However, if managers are
risk averse, they prefer to propose that no investment should be taken, avoiding the risk of having a
bad result. Since uncertainty is shared by the manager and the owners a ”nicely behaved” pure strategy
equilibrium always exists.
22combination of these two types of incentives in a single framework is critical to the
main fragility result, hence being more than the sum of the parts. On the other hand it
allows us to separate the interactions of lenders and consumers with the ﬁrm.
Second, our model let incentives for opportunistic behavior to vary with aggregate
fundamentals. This is in stark contrast with both Diamond [1989] and Mailath and
Samuelson [2001] who analyze reputation in an invariant situation. This improvement
sheds light on reputation effects over cycles.
Finally, as in these two papers, ours suffer a multiple equilibria problem. Diamond
[1989] deals with multiplicity by focusing on the evolution of extreme equilibria (i.e.,
cases in which all strategic ﬁrms play risky or all of them play safe). Mailath and
Samuelson [2001] only focuses on discussing the properties and conditions of the best
equilibrium, the one that eliminates inefﬁciency completely. In our case, the introduc-
tion of fundamental-driven incentives naturally lead us to the use of a dynamic global
games approach to select a unique equilibrium, which is robust to small perturbations
in information about the state of the economy. This uniqueness is important to charac-
terize risk-taking behavior by ﬁrms over economic cycles and to analyze the efﬁciency
effects of reputation.
1.3.2 Differential gains from playing safe
Given cutoff strategies, we can redeﬁne beliefs of risk taking at each fundamental θ
as a function of cutoff beliefs. Following equation (1.6), b x(φ,θ) is a function of b k(φ).
Total discounted proﬁts for a given reputation φ and fundamental θ, conditional on the
probability of risk-taking x and on cutoff beliefs b k, are:
b V(φ,θ|x,b k) = x [pr[Pr(θ)−R(φ|b k)]+βpr
h





αsV(φg(φ,b x|b k))+(1−αs)V(φb(φ,b x|b k))
i
]
23Since we are analyzing cutoff strategies we can deﬁne differential proﬁts from
playing safe rather than risky as D(φ,θ|b k) = b V(φ,θ|0,b k)− b V(φ,θ|1,b k).
D(φ,θ|b k) = psPs(φ,θ)− prPr(φ,θ)+β(ps− pr)V(φ)−(ps− pr)R(φ|b k)
+β[psαs− prαr][V(φg(φ,b x|b k))−V(φ)] (1.11)
+β[pr(1−αr)− ps(1−αs)][V(φ)−V(φb(φ,b x|b k))]
Thesearethe differentialgainsfromplayingsafe foraﬁrm φ thatobservesa funda-
mental θ, conditional on lenders and consumers having cutoff beliefs b k(φ) and hence
beliefs b x(φ,θ) of risk-taking in θ. The ﬁrm decides to play safe if D(φ,θ|b k) > 0 and
risky if D(φ,θ|b k) < 0.
The next lemma shows how D(φ,θ|b k) depends on θ, b k and b x
Lemma 3 D(φ,θ|b k) is monotonically increasing in θ, monotonically decreasing in b x
and monotonically non-increasing in b k
Proof We divide this proof in three steps.
• Step 1:
∂D(φ,θ|b k)
∂b k ≤ 0
Regardless of θ, it is straightforward to show, from equation (1.8), that
∂R(φ|b k)
∂b k ≥ 0
• Step 2:
∂D(φ,θ|b k)
∂b x < 0
By decomposing the ﬁrst component, we can write it explicitly as (psPs(φ,θ)−
prPr(φ,θ)) = (ps − pr)A(θ)P(φ,θ|b k)−[psCs(θ)− prCr(θ)]. First, for a given θ,
b k deﬁnes a b x and (psPs − prPr) only depends on b x through prices. For a given
φ and θ, as shown in Section 1.3.1.2,
∂P(φ,θ|b k)
∂b x < 0. Since ps > pr and A(θ) > 0,
∂(psPs−prPr)
∂b x < 0. Second, for a given φ and θ, as shown in equations (1.3) and (1.4),
reputation gaps (φg−φ) and (φ −φb) decrease as b x increases. By assumption18, V(φ)
18This is an assumption for the moment since we will show this is the case in Section 1.5
24is monotonically increasing in φ, hence V(φg)−V(φ) and V(φ)−V(φb) decrease as
b x increases. The higher the beliefs assigned to the ﬁrm playing risky, the more difﬁcult
is the updating of reputation and the smaller the reputation gains from playing safe.
Hence
∂(V(φg)−V(φ))
∂b x < 0 and
∂(V(φ)−V(φb))





prCr(θ)]. First total demand A(θ) increases with fundamentals. Second there is a rein-
forcement effect that comes through prices. As shown in the previous step,
∂P(φ,θ|b k)
∂b x <
0 and by cutoff strategies ∂b x
∂θ ≤0. Since ps > pr and P>0, then
∂(ps−pr)A(θ)P(φ,b x)
∂θ >0.
Finally, by assumption 2,
∂[psCs(θ)−prCr(θ)]
∂θ < 0 since ps > pr. Hence
∂(psPs−prPr)
∂θ > 0.




Lemma 3 shows that differential gains from playing safe decrease as fundamentals
go down (θ decreases) and as the beliefs of the ﬁrm playing risky go up, both in
expectation (b k increases) and for a given θ (b x increases), which represents the source
of multiplicity in this model. Intuitively, the reasons behind these relations are the
following.
Differential gains from playing safe decrease as fundamentals weaken. When the
state of the economy gets worse average costs in expectation increase less by exper-
imenting than by following safe procedures, making more attractive to play risky in
recessions.
Differential gains from playing safe decrease as beliefs of the ﬁrm playing risky
increase. First, the price consumers are willing to pay for the good decreases because
they assign a less probability of getting a good result. Since prices are lower, the gains
from increasing the probability of remain alive by playing safe decrease. Second, in
expectation default is more likely, interest rates are higher and ﬁrms are more prone
25to take risks since they become heavily indebted. Finally, a higher belief that the ﬁrm
plays risky reduces the updating of beliefs, reduces the gain in terms of reputation from
getting good results and makes less attractive to play safe.
We will assume Uniform Limit Dominance, which determines extreme fundamen-
tals θ(φ|b k) and θ(φ|b k) for each reputation value φ when cutoff beliefs areb k such that,
for all θ <θ(φ|b k) it is optimal to play risky and for all θ >θ(φ|b k) it is optimal to play
safe, no matter what lenders and consumers believe ﬁrms decide given that fundamen-
tal θ (i.e., no matter b x(φ,θ)). While θ(φ|b k) is obtained for b x = 0 in which reputation
is heavily updated, θ(φ|b k) is obtained for b x = 1 in which reputation does not change.
Assumption 3 (Uniform Limit Dominance)
• For each φ and b k, ∃θ(φ|b k) such that D(φ,θ|b k,b x = 0) = 0
• For each φ and b k, ∃θ(φ|b k) such that D(φ,θ|b k,b x = 1) = 0
Following this notation, we can deﬁne θ(φ|−¥) the value of θ for which it is
indifferent to play risky or safe if b x = 0 and the lowest possible interest rate for that
φ is charged (R(φ|−¥) = R
pr(1−φ)+psφ). We can also deﬁne θ(φ|¥) the value of
θ for which it is indifferent to play risky or safe if b x = 1 and the highest possible
interest rate for that φ is charged (R(φ|¥) = R
pr). Naturally, θ(φ|−¥) ≤ θ(φ|b k) and
θ(φ|¥) ≥ θ(φ|b k) for all b k.
Important features are Single Crossing properties that are obtained from analyzing
the differential gain from playing safe. The following two lemmas describe these
properties, which allows us to identify a unique cutoff in the set of fundamentals (θ)
and on the set of beliefs (b x) that make a particular ﬁrm indifferent between playing
risky or safe, given a ﬁxed b k.
Lemma 4 (State monotonicity) For every reputation level φ and cutoff belief b k, ﬁx a
b x(φ,θ)forallθ andthereexistsauniqueθ∗ ∈[θ(φ|b k),θ(φ|b k)]suchthatD(φ,θ|b k,b x)<
260forθ <θ∗, D(φ,θ|b k,b x)=0forθ =θ∗ andD(φ,θ|b k,b x)>0forθ >θ∗. Furthermore,
θ∗ is increasing in b k and b x.
Proof By Lemma 3 D(φ,θ|b k) is increasing in θ and by Assumption 2 there is a
unique crossing on the space of fundamentals since, as they rise, the value of playing
risky increases monotonically at a lower rate than the value of playing safe. Hence
there is a unique θ∗ such that D(φ,θ∗|b k,b x) = 0. Since b x ∈ [0,1] then, by deﬁnition,
θ∗ ∈ [θ(φ|b k),θ(φ|b k)]. By Lemma 3, D(φ,θ|b k) is decreasing in b k and b x, then θ∗ is
increasing inb k and b x. If the beliefs of the ﬁrm playing risky or the interest rate increase,
the ﬁrm will strictly prefer to play risky at the previous θ∗, requiring an increase to
recover the indifference. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5 (Belief single crossing) For every reputation level φ and cutoff belief b k,
ﬁx a θ ∈ [θ(φ|b k),θ(φ|b k)] and there exists a unique b x∗ such that D(φ,θ|b k,b x) > 0 for
b x < b x∗, D(φ,θ|b k,b x) = 0 for b x = b x∗ and D(φ,θ|b k,b x) < 0 for b x > b x∗. Furthermore, b x∗ is
increasing in θ.
Proof By Lemma 3 D(φ,θ|b k) is monotonically decreasing in b x. This ensures there
is a unique crossing in beliefs b x. Hence there is a unique b x∗ such that D(φ,θ|b k,b x∗)=0,
where b x∗ ∈ [0,1]. Since, by Lemma 3, D(φ,θ|b k) is increasing in θ, so is b x∗. If funda-
mentals improve the ﬁrm will strictly prefer to play safe at b x∗, requiring an increase in
the beliefs the ﬁrms plays risky b x∗ to recover the indifference. Q.E.D.
1.3.3 Multiple Equilibria
The model exhibits multiple equilibria when ﬁrms perfectly observe fundamentals.
Proposition 6 For all reputation levels φ ∈ (0,1), there is a continuum of equilibrium
strategy cutoffs k∗(φ) ∈ [θ(φ|θ),θ(φ|θ)]. For reputation φ = 1 there is ﬁnite multiple
27equilibria when γθ → 0. For reputation φ = 0, there is always a unique equilibrium
cutoff k∗(0).
Proof The Proposition follows directly from assumption 3 and lemmas 4 and 5. A
cutoff k∗(φ) is an equilibrium strategy only if it’s a best response for any realization
of the fundamental θ. Take a cutoff k∗(φ) such that k∗(φ) ∈ [θ(φ|k∗),θ(φ|k∗)]. The
existence of such a case is guaranteed by assumption 3. From the cutoff strategy,
x(φ,θ) = 0 for all θ > k∗(φ) and x(φ,θ) = 1 for all θ < k∗(φ). From Lemma 5,
at θ = k∗(φ), indifference occurs at some 0 < x∗(φ,k∗) < 1. The cutoff k∗(φ) is an
equilibrium because, for all θ > k∗(φ), D(φ,k∗|k∗) > 0 and hence it is optimal for the
ﬁrm to play safe (i.e., x(φ,θ) = 0). Similarly, for all θ < k∗(φ), D(φ,k∗|k∗) < 0 and
hence it is optimal for the ﬁrm to play risky (i.e., x(φ,θ) = 1). Now take an arbitrarily
close cutoff k∗∗(φ) = k∗(φ)+ε such that 0 < R(k∗∗(φ))−R(k∗(φ)) < δ, where an
arbitrarily small ε > 0 allows to deﬁne an arbitrarily small δ. By the discontinuity on
beliefs (sudden jump from x = 1 to x = 0 at θ = k∗)and the same reasoning described
above, k∗∗(φ) is also an equilibrium cutoff strategy. Inductively it is possible to deﬁne
a continuum of equilibrium strategy cutoffs.
The bounds of the equilibrium cutoffs [θ(φ|θ),θ(φ|θ)] are determined in the fol-
lowing way. θ(φ|θ) is the value of the cutoff that determines an interest rate R(θ) and
considers the gains from reputation (b x=0). Similarly, θ(φ|θ) is the value of the cutoff
that determines a higher interest rate R(θ) and does not consider the gains from reputa-
tion (b x = 1). The condition for these bounds to be unique and all θ ∈ [θ(φ|θ),θ(φ|θ)]






∂k∗ . This condition basically
requires interest rates do not jump suddenly with changes in cutoffs, or in other words,
since V (k∗) determines R(φ|k∗), the distribution of fundamentals has a variance big
enough.
28For φ =1 the only source of possible multiplicity comes from different ﬁxed points
of beliefsb k =b(b k), where b(b k) is the best response to cutoff beliefsb k. In this case there
is not continuum of equilibria since there is no discontinuity of differential payoffs
generated by reputation (i.e., D(1,θ|b k,b x=0)=D(1,θ|b k,b x=1)). A unique equilibrium







For φ = 0 there is a unique equilibrium because there is a unique possible interest
rate given by R(0) = R
pr. Furthermore, reputation updating does not happen. Hence,
D(0,θ|b k,b x = 0) = D(0,θ|b k,b x = 1) for R(0) and [θ(0|θ),θ(0|θ)] collapses into a sin-
gleton given by the unique equilibrium strategy cutoff k∗(0) Q.E.D.
This multiplicity characterized by a continuum of equilibrium cutoffs for each φ
is pervasive to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of reputation to deter exces-
sive risk-taking. Since each cutoff represents a different ex-ante probability that φ
ﬁrms take risks (V (k∗(φ))), equilibria are ranked in terms of ﬁrm’s instantaneous cash
ﬂows, prices paid by consumers and interest rates charged by lenders. The higher the
equilibrium cutoff, the more likely it is for ﬁrms to take risks, the lower the price con-
sumers are willing to pay in expectation and the higher the interest rates charged by
lenders.
An intuitive explanation of the multiplicity is provided in Figure 1.2. Take a cut-
off k∗(φ) for some reputation level φ ∈ (0,1) such that k∗(φ) ∈ [θ(φ)|k∗),θ(φ)|k∗)].
This is an equilibrium because it is optimal to play safe for all θ > k∗(φ) (since
D(φ,θ|k∗,b x=0)>0 for all θ >k∗(φ)) and it is optimal to play risky for all θ <k∗(φ)
(since D(φ,θ|k∗,b x = 1) < 0 for all θ < k∗(φ)). The function D(φ,θ|k∗) for different
fundamentals is the bald function with a discontinuity at k∗(φ) in Figure 1.2. The cut-
off k∗(φ) is an equilibrium strategy because it is a best response for any realization of
the fundamental θ such that beliefs are correct.
29An arbitrarily small increase in the cutoff generates an arbitrarily small increase in
the interest rate. If interest rates do not change suddenly, they cannot overcome the
discontinuity generated by the reputation effects that sudden changes in beliefs gen-
erate. Hence, it is possible to ﬁnd equilibrium cutoffs arbitrarily close and hence a
continuum of equilibria. As we move the cutoff to the right of k∗(φ), interest rates
increase, reducing D(φ,θ|b k) for all θ19. Given the discontinuity introduced by rep-
utation at the equilibrium cutoff strategy, the new cutoffs constitute equilibria until
θ(φ|θ) is reached. The same is true as we decrease cutoffs from k∗ towards θ(φ|θ).
These extremes, determined by extreme beliefs and lending rates, constitute bounds to
equilibrium cutoffs.
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This is the typical result of multiple equilibria in reputation settings in which
”strategic” types try to separate from ”bad” types rather than pooling with ”good”
types. The multiplicity relies heavily on the impossibility of pinning down beliefs to
updatereputation, asdiscussedinMailathandSamuelson[2006], MailathandSamuel-
son [2001] and Diamond [1989].






∂k∗ , I impose changes in payoffs to be greater than
changes in interest rates, for a given change in fundamentals, making this process smooth.
30Up to this point we have highlighted the multiplicity that arises in a given period,
for a given stream of value functions assigned to the future ¡0. Once we introduce
dynamics, the multiplicity problem increases, making it very difﬁcult to draw any con-
clusion about the effects of reputation on risk-taking behavior. The intuition of this
result is straightforward. Since in each period multiplicity exists, multiple streams of
continuation values for different φ, which are consistent with multiple equilibria in
future periods, can be used to construct D(φ,θ). Introducing extreme continuation
values determined by the highest (¡
0) and the lowest (¡0) probability of risk-taking in
all future periods for all reputation levels, it is possible to construct extreme bounds
θ(φ|θ,¡
0) < θ(φ|θ,¡0) and θ(φ|θ,¡0) > θ(φ|θ,¡0) such that the region of multi-
plicity in a given period expands when compared with the case of a unique stream of
continuation values assumed so far.
It is important to distinguish the multiplicity determined just from the determina-
tion of interest rates and the multiplicity introduced by reputation. The multiplicity
introduced by the determination of interest rates arises from the possibility of multi-
ple ﬁxed points in which the beliefs about the cutoff ﬁrms use are equal to the best
response of ﬁrms to those beliefs (i.e., b k(φ) = b(b k(φ))). Generically this multiplic-
ity will be ﬁnite and easy to eliminate with certain assumptions on the distribution of
fundamentals20. The multiplicity introduced by reputation incentives arises from the
discontinuity of differential payoffs at the equilibrium cutoff k∗(φ). This allows for
the determination of a continuum of indeterminate equilibria, which is impossible to
eliminate just with assumptions on the distribution of fundamentals.
20For example, if we assume fundamentals are normally distributed θ ∼ N (E(θ),γθ), the sufﬁcient









2π[(1−φ)pr+φps−φ(ps−pr)V (θ)]2. As can be
seen, when φ = 0 the condition is always fulﬁlled (by assumption 6 the left-hand side term is positive),
leading to the unique equilibrium discussed in Proposition 6. In general, without reputation concerns,
uniqueness can be obtained when the variance γθ is big enough with respect to the reputation level.
31In this environment comparative statics and comparative dynamics analysis are not
trivial since there is no explicit theory to guide the selection of equilibrium, leaving
a big role to self-fulﬁlling beliefs and payoff irrelevant sunspots. However, as noted
by Morris and Shin [2000], what really creates the multiplicity is the assumption of
complete information and common knowledge of fundamentals that at the same time
implies an implausible degree of coordination and capacity to predict rivals’ behavior
in equilibrium. In the following section we show that the introduction of few noise in
the observation of fundamentals leads to the selection of a unique equilibrium.
1.4 Uniqueness with Incomplete Information about Fundamentals
In this section we slightly modify the assumption about complete information of fun-
damentals and the timing in which they are realized. We assume ﬁrms observe a noisy
signal of the aggregate fundamental before deciding which technology to use. After
production takes place, fundamentals are realized by ﬁrms, lenders, and consumers21.
The signal observed by the ﬁrm is not observable by lenders and consumers, who can
only infer it from observing the real fundamental. This modiﬁcation allows us to select
a unique market’s belief about the probability a φ strategic ﬁrm takes risks. Having a
unique belief, we can select a unique equilibrium in the reputation environment. More
precisely, the assumptions about the information technology are
Assumption 4 Each ﬁrm i observes a signal zi =θ +σεi where εi ∼F identically and
independently distributed across i
Given θ the distribution of signals z is then given by F(z−θ
σ ).
21The assumption about the timing fundamentals are observed is important. Otherwise, if interest
rates or prices reveal, through the aggregation of information by the market, the true fundamental be-
fore production, the whole point of introducing heterogeneity through signals to pin down a unique
equilibrium disappears. See Atkeson [2001]




In words, this assumption means that a ﬁrm that receives a high signal, assigns a
large probability that lenders and consumers believe the ﬁrm has in fact observed a
high signal.
Introducing this assumption, the ﬁrm uses a cutoff strategy in the set of signals
and not on the set of fundamentals, which are no longer observable. This means that
for a history of fundamentals and a current signal about fundamentals z, a strategy
for a ﬁrm with reputation φ picks a real number z∗(φ) with the interpretation that
it uses safe technologies whenever z > z∗(φ) and risky ones whenever z < z∗(φ)22.
The next proposition estates that, assuming this information structure, there exists a
unique Markovian perfect Bayesian equilibrium in monotone cutoff strategies for each
reputation level φ, when signals are precise enough.
Proposition 7 For a given φ, as σ → 0, in equilibrium there exists a unique cutoff
signal z∗(φ) such that D(φ,z|z∗(φ)) = 0 for z = z∗(φ), D(φ,z|z∗(φ)) > 0 for z > z∗(φ)
and D(φ,z|z∗(φ)) < 0 for z < z∗(φ), where D(φ,z|z∗(φ)) are the expected differential
gains from playing safe if a φ ﬁrm receives a signal z and lenders and consumers
believe strategic ﬁrms φ use a cutoff z∗(φ).
The proof is in the Appendix. Relaxing the assumption of common knowledge
about fundamentals, when signals are very precise, allows us to use the approach pro-
vided by global games to select a unique belief concerning the probability that ﬁrms
take risky actions. The intuitive proof is based on the iterated deletion of dominated
strategies. Assume, for example, a strategic ﬁrm with reputation φ observes a signal
22Recall each ﬁrm receives an idiosyncratic signal zi. We get rid of the subindex for simplicity in
notation. However, signals vary across ﬁrms and are not observed by lenders or consumers.
33θ(φ|θ). In this case the ﬁrm would like to play risky even if the market uses a belief
b x(φ) = 0. By receiving a low signal the ﬁrm also believes the fundamental is close
to θ(φ|θ). If fundamentals in fact happen to be θ(φ|θ), lenders and consumers be-
lieve with some positive probability that the ﬁrm had observed a signal below θ(φ|θ)
hence having a belief b x(φ) > 0 (i.e., ﬁrm takes risks with some positive probability).
However, with this belief, the ﬁrm would strictly prefer to play safe, not being an equi-
librium a cutoff θ(φ|θ). By continuity the same reasoning can be applied to signals
above θ(φ|θ). The same reasoning applies also to signals close to θ(φ|θ).
We require σ →0 so the ﬁrm put more weight to its private signal than to the public
signal given by the prior distribution of θ. The previous process of iterated deletion
of dominated strategies results in a unique cutoff z∗(φ) such that the ﬁrm plays risky
whenever z < z∗(φ) and safe whenever z > z∗(φ).
This uniqueness result remains once we consider the full-ﬂedged dynamic model.
In the next section we consider both the ﬁnite and inﬁnite horizon game. In the ﬁnite
horizon game it is always possible to deﬁne a unique sequence of equilibrium cutoffs
as signals become very precise. In the inﬁnite horizon game we can show there is a
unique limit to the sequence of perfect Markovian equilibrium for the ﬁnite game.
1.5 Dynamics
In this section we show how to solve the model dynamically such that a unique se-
quence of cutoffs for each reputation level φ is obtained. We conﬁrm that continuation
values are well deﬁned such that we can indeed use the propositions and proofs from
previous sections, where a single period was considered. First I assume all ﬁrms live
for a ﬁnite period of time T such that VT+1(φ) = 0 for all φ. Afterwards I extend the
34results to an inﬁnite horizon game as T → ¥23.
This extension is important for two reasons. First, reputation is an intrinsically
dynamic process that must be studied dynamically to fully understand it. Second,
since the previous sections were based on an assumed proﬁle of continuation values,
we must conﬁrm they are always well deﬁned and we must understand under what
conditions they are monotonically increasing in reputation and how they may change
results.
The following Lemma shows how continuation values for all reputation levels
Vt(φ)areindeedwelldeﬁnedateachperiodt basedontheboundaryconditionVT+1(φ)=
0 for all φ24.
Lemma 8 For a given reputation φ and a period t, as σ → 0, xt(φ,zt) = 0 for all
zt <z∗
t (φ) and xt(φ,zt)=1 for all zt >z∗
t (φ), where z∗
t (φ)= f(
− →
Vt+1(φ)) is the unique
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Proof To show the ﬁrst part of the Proposition we must show we can solve the
model as a series of static games that deliver a unique equilibrium (speciﬁcally, a
unique cutoff for each φ) in each period t. At the last period T the cutoff z∗
T(φ) will be
very high in general since VT+1(φ) = 0 for all φ. Hence, when solving for risk-taking
23While previous sections results were obtained for a given period t, in what follows we use the same
arguments but denote explicitly each period by subscripts t.
24In order to solve this ﬁnite dynamic global game we follow Morris and Shin [2003], Toxvaerd
[2007], Giannitsarou and Toxvaerd [2007] and Steiner [2006]
35at the last period T, there will not be any future punishment from a possible death or
from a potential loss of reputation.
At the last period T, DT(φ,θ) is well deﬁned for all φ and θ. A cutoff z∗
T(φ) can
be obtained as shown in Proposition 7, from
R 1
0 DT(φ,z∗






(1−φ)pr+φ(prb x+ ps(1−b x))
Once z∗







and the expected continuation value at T for each reputation level φ. For signals zT <
z∗
T(φ) ﬁrms play risky and for signals zT > z∗
T(φ) they prefer to play safe. As σ → 0,











Since equilibrium strategies are well deﬁned and unique at period T (through
z∗
T(φ)), continuation values VT(φ) are well deﬁned for all φ.
Now consider the decision of a ﬁrm φ at period T −1. The problem to be solved
at T −1 is essentially a static one since VT(φ) are unique and well deﬁned for all φ
from equation (1.13). Then, DT−1(φ,θ) is also well deﬁned for all φ and θ. Using
Proposition 7 there is a unique cutoff z∗
T−1(φ) and it is possible to obtain a unique and
well deﬁned VT−1(φ) for all φ.
By straightforward inductive reasoning, there will exist a unique sequence of cut-
offs {z∗
t (φ)}T
t=0. Furthermore there will exist a unique sequence of expected total












The next proposition shows that continuation values are always well deﬁned and,
given the boundary condition imposed by a ﬁnal period T, the sequence of equilibrium
cutoffs is unique.
Proposition 9 InaﬁnitegamewithﬁnalperiodT andaboundaryconditionVT+1(φ)=
0 for all φ, as σ → 0, continuation values {Vt(φ)}T





The proof of the proposition is a direct application of Lemma 8 and is based on
the idea that, if the dynamic global game has a ﬁnite ﬁnal period, it can be solved as a
sequence of static global games.
Before extending our conclusions to an inﬁnite period game, we discuss how the
backward determination of continuation values may lead to a convergence to a ﬁxed
point in continuation values for all reputation levels φ in periods t far enough from T.
This is relevant because these ﬁxed points represent bounded limits required to show
that there is an inﬁnite horizon equilibrium that is a unique limit of the ﬁnite horizon
Markov perfect equilibrium25.
First, recall that strategic complementarities that generate multiplicity in the repu-
tational model arise endogenously from reputation formation, rather than being hard-
wired into static payoffs, as is standard in the global game literature. This is important
because reputation levels φ = 0 and φ = 1 do not show a multiplicity problem since
lenders and consumers beliefs do not affect reputation updating. The ﬁxed point of
value functions for these two extreme reputation levels are given by parameters only
25I haven’t examined yet the broader issue of what other equilibria there might be in the inﬁnite
horizon game
37and do not depend on value functions for other reputational levels. Hence, V(0) and
V(1) can be used as anchors to determine value functions for the rest of reputation
levels. Then, we can obtain the conditions for ﬁxed points from analyzing these two
extreme cases26.














Let’s introduce now a technical assumption to ensure a unique steady state27
Assumption 6 V(1|r) > V(0|s)
Using this assumption, the next Lemma shows the conditions for the continuation
values to converge to a unique value as we iterate backwards from a large ﬁnite pe-
riod T. Furthermore, we will characterize the type of behavior consistent to those
conditions.














β[prV (E(θ))+ ps(1−V (E(θ)))
(1.17)
26We will assume the distribution of fundamentals has a variance γθ large enough such that there is a
unique equilibrium for φ = 1
27This can be justiﬁed, for example, assuming disastrous cash ﬂows from using safe procedures in
very bad times.
38It is possible to show that e V(1) < e V(0). The intuition is that, everything else
constant, z∗(1) < z∗(0) and then it is necessary that e V(1) < e V(0) to compensate and
to have the same cutoff z∗(1) = z∗(0) = E(θ)
Lemma 10 Convergence to a unique continuation value for each φ
• If e V(0) < V(0|s), (hence e V(1) < V(1|r)), continuation values converge to a
unique V(φ) for each φ. The probability of playing safe is close to 1 for all
φ.
• If e V(1) > V(1|r), (hence e V(0) > V(0|s)), continuation values converge to a
unique V(φ) for all φ. The probability of playing safe is close to 0 for all φ.
• If e V(0) > V(0|s) and e V(1) < V(1|r), continuation values converge to a unique
V(φ) for each φ only when v(z∗(0)) < 1. The probability of playing safe is
strictly between 0 and 1 for all φ.
This lemma is proved and graphical intuition is provided in the Appendix. The
ﬁrst two bullet points correspond to cases in which continuation values converge to
a unique ﬁxed point characterized by playing safe and risky almost surely, for all φ.
The third case is more interesting since the ﬁxed point is characterized by a posi-
tive probability of playing both safe and risky. However to achieve convergence to a
ﬁxed point it is also necessary that the variance of θ be big enough to avoid a cycli-








< 1. If γθ → 0 this condition will not be fulﬁlled and a cycli-
cal pattern will arise. If γθ is big enough, this condition will be fulﬁlled and conver-
gence of continuation values will arise. This is in fact a similar condition to the one
required to obtain a unique equilibrium in the static model without reputation.
Under the assumptions, when information becomes very precise σ → 0 and con-
tinuation values converge to a ﬁxed point in a ﬁnite period game, there is an inﬁnite
39horizon equilibrium that is a unique limit of ﬁnite horizon Markov perfect equilibria,
for all reputation values φ.
Proposition 11 If VT(φ) → V(φ) for all φ as T → ¥, given σ → 0, there exists a
sequence of cutoffs {z∗
t (φ)}¥
t=0 for each φ that is a unique limit of the ﬁnite horizon
Markov perfect equilibria described in Proposition 9.
Proof Having shown uniqueness for an arbitrary ﬁnite horizon T, we must show
the same reasoning is extended as T → ¥. First note the value of taking safe actions
andthevalueoftakingriskyactionsareboundedandwellbehavedmonotonefunctions
of T when continuation values converges to a ﬁxed point VT(φ) → V(φ) as T → ¥.
Second, note also D(φ,zt|z∗
t (φ)) represents the optimal trade off between the value
from playing safe and the value of playing risky. Hence D(φ,zt|z∗
t (φ)) also converges
to a unique limit as T → ¥. Then z∗
t (φ)(T) → z∗
t (φ)(¥) as T → ¥, where z∗
t (φ)(T) is
the equilibrium cutoff at t far enough from T and z∗
t (φ)(¥) is the equilibrium cutoff at
t in an inﬁnite horizon game. Q.E.D.
When continuation values converge to a ﬁxed point, which are the cases described
by Lemma 10, there is an inﬁnite horizon equilibrium that is a unique limit of the
Markov perfect equilibria in the ﬁnite horizon version of the game. Rather than using
the boundary condition we can use the steady state value V(φ) for each φ to solve
backwards. When dynamics are characterized by cyclical behavior it is not possible to
use a unique continuation value as a boundary condition. Hence, there would not exist
a unique limit to the Markov perfect equilibrium as deﬁned in Proposition 9.
In the full-ﬂedged dynamic model, the ex-ante probability of risk-taking will be
uniquely determined in each period by Pr(z < z∗(φ)), or when σ → 0, by Pr(θ <
z∗(φ)). Since this unique belief is used in the reputation updating, a unique equilib-
rium exists in the reputation model. The unique equilibrium is based on payoff relevant
40fundamentals, rather than payoff irrelevant sunspots or self-fulﬁlling beliefs, which al-
lows us to obtain conclusions about the determinants of the probability of risk-taking
and about how this probability changes in response to parameters and fundamental
variations. These considerations, which cannot be performed using models with mul-
tiple equilibria or models with a unique equilibrium based on sunspots or self fulﬁlling
beliefs, are the subjects of the next section.
1.6 Reputation and Risk-Taking Behavior
In previous sections we obtained a unique equilibrium and showed how steady states
continuation values are determined. In this section I use the results to analyze the
determinants of risk-taking, the clustering behavior of risk-taking, and the fragility of
reputation to deter inefﬁcient risk-taking.
1.6.1 Determinants of Risk-Taking
Recall the ex-ante probability of risk-taking is given by Pr(θ < z∗(φ)) = V (z∗(φ))
when σ → 0. Then, we have to analyze how the cutoffs z∗(φ) react to variables such
as reputation levels φ, interest rates R(φ) and reputation concerns.
Proposition 12 Theex-anteprobabilityofrisk-takingforaﬁrmwithreputationlevelφ







β(pr(1−αr)−ps(1−αs))>0. Since the cutoff z∗(φ) is determined by equation (2.6),
as the reputation rewards and punishments go up, D(φ,θ) also goes up and by Lemma
4 it is required a smaller signal as a cutoff z∗(φ) in order to maintain the indiffer-
41ence. Hence more reputation rewards and punishments imply reductions in the ex-ante
probability of risk-taking. Q.E.D.
Reputation reduces excessive risk-taking behavior, a positive role of reputation
widely discussed, informally in the press and casual discussions and formally by an
extensive literature in reputation. This model also delivers this result, but explicitly
solving the multiplicity that arises from different possible beliefs about the ﬁrm’s ac-
tions.
Proposition 13 The ex-ante probability of risk-taking increases with interest rates.
Proof Since
∂D(φ)
∂R(φ) =−(ps−pr)<0, by equation (2.6) it is straightforward to show
∂z∗(φ)
∂R(φ) ≤ 0 by using Lemma 4 Q.E.D.
When interest rates increase, ﬁrms are more indebted and moral hazard problems
becomemorerelevant. Incentivestofollowriskyproceduresandhencetheinefﬁciency
of risk-taking behavior also increase. This result suggests, for example, that ﬁrms
in underdeveloped countries with high R, have greater incentives to take excessive
risk and reputation concerns are less effective in deterring the resultant excessive risk-
taking.
Proposition 14 The ex-ante probability of risk-taking decreases with reputation in the
range φ ∈ [0,φM]. Whether the probability of risk-taking increases or decreases in the
range φ ∈ [φM,1] depends on the rate of increase
∂[βV(φ)−R(φ)]
∂φ > 0 when compared
with the rate of decrease
∂[V(φg)−V(φb)]
∂φ < 0. Furthermore,
∂2z∗(φ)
∂φ2 > 0 for all φ ∈ [0,1]
Proof As shown in section 1.3.1.1, (φg −φb) achieves a maximum at φM. By
assumption V(φ) is monotonically increasing in φ (this will be discussed in detail
in the next section), hence (V(φg)−V(φb)) also achieves a maximum at φM, being
V(φg) = V(φb) at φ = 0 and φ = 1. Hence, in the range φ ∈ [0,φM], as φ increases,
42P(φ) increases, V(φ) increases, R(φ) decreases and V(φg)−V(φb) increases for all
b x < 1. From equation (1.11) it is clear that when φ increases in the range [0,φM],
D(φ,z) goes up and the cutoff z∗(φ) decreases, reducing the probability of risk-taking.
When φ is in the range [φM,1] still P(φ) increases, V(φ) increases and R(φ) de-
creases as φ increases, increasing D(φ,z). We call this effect ”continuation effect”.
However in this range, as φ goes up, V(φg)−V(φb) goes down, decreasing D(φ,z).
We call this effect ”reputation effect”. Depending on which one of the effects is higher,
D(φ,z) can either increase or decrease, reducing or increasing the probability of risk-
taking respectively.
Recall that, using equation (2.6) z∗(φ) is obtained by considering all possible be-
liefs b x ∈ [0,1], so even when comparing across different levels of reputation φ in aver-
age the shape of reputation updating is the one shown in Figure 1.1. If the impact of
a higher reputation φ ∈ [φM,1] on current and continuation payoffs is greater than the
impact in reducing reputation effects, the probability of risk-taking continues decreas-
ing in this range of reputation levels as well. However, even when the direction in the
probability of risk-taking is not clear and depends on parameters when φ ∈ [φM,1], it
is possible to guarantee that the rate at which the probability of risk-taking decreases
in the range φ ∈ [0,φM] is higher than in the range φ ∈ [φM,1].
To show
∂2z∗(φ)
∂φ2 > 0 it is enough to show
∂2D(φ)








∂φ2 < 0 and
∂2V(φg)−V(φb)
∂φ2 < 0. The
intuition is that the combined decrease in z∗(φ) and φ creates a fast decrease in interest
rates and increase in prices for low reputation levels, making V(φ) concave on φ. The
result is a convex schedule of cutoffs z∗(φ) Q.E.D.
Figure 1.3 is an example of the relation between the cutoff z∗(φ) and the reputa-
tion level φ. It shows the probability of risk-taking is higher for low reputation levels
because continuation and reputation effects are not that important to deter these ﬁrms
43from taking risky actions. For low reputation levels, as φ increases, continuation val-
ues V(φ), prices P(φ) and reputation punishments V(φg)−V(φb) go up while R(φ)
goes down, reducing z∗(φ). This is the case until φ hits φM. For φ > φM, as φ in-
creases, continuation effects still go up but reputation pressures go down. The cutoff
will increase or decrease depending on which effect dominates.
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Note that in case the probability of risk-taking is minimized at a value of φm < 1
(i.e., the cutoff schedule goes down and then increases toward φ = 1), prices would be
maximized and lending rates minimized at φm, hence the value function would achieve
the maximum at φm. In this case continuation values would not increase monotonically
with φ. It would increase until φm and then decrease towards one.
However, it is possible to draw some conclusions with respect to φm. First, φm ∈
[φM,1] as discussed above. Second, φm is biased towards one (i.e., the value function
is almost always monotonically increasing in φ) when the probability of playing safe
in steady state is high for all φ. This makes the difference between V(1) and V(0)
big enough such that incentives from continuation are large when compared with the
incentives from reputation (this is the case described in the ﬁrst bullet point of Lemma
10 or in Figure 1.15 at the Appendix). At the other extreme, when steady states are
44characterizedbyrisk-takingasin1.16, V(1)=V(0), bothincentivesfromcontinuation
and from reputation would be nonexistent.
This implies that the nonlinear schedule in cutoffs remains, even in cases where
continuation values are not monotonically increasing for all φ but decreases for val-
ues close to one. It is difﬁcult to draw any further analytical conclusions since value
functions and cutoffs for all φ in equilibrium should be obtained jointly (i.e., in equi-
librium, value functions of a given φ have an impact in determining the value functions
for all other reputation levels). We will show how to solve this schedule numerically
and support these considerations in Section 1.7.
1.6.2 Risk-Taking Clustering
1.6.2.1 Sensitivity of risk-taking to fundamentals
It is important at this point to analyze what happens with risk-taking in the case of a
reduction in fundamentals. If θ < z∗(φ), for a given reputation value φ and a signal
noise σ → 0, then most ﬁrms with that reputation level receive in expectation a signal
z < z∗(φ) and decide to take risks. Since lenders and consumers observe θ and also
z∗(φ) in equilibrium, they can infer a φ ﬁrm has a high x(φ), prices will be low and
reputation would not be heavily updated. Small changes in fundamentals around z∗(φ)
induce sudden changes in risk-taking for ﬁrms with reputation φ.
The next proposition formalizes this idea.
Proposition 15 For highly precise signals about fundamentals (i.e., σ → 0), small
changes in fundamentals θ around the optimal cutoff z∗(φ) may induce a sudden
change in risk-taking behavior for ﬁrms with reputation level φ.
Proof Assume an equilibrium cutoff z∗(φ) for ﬁrms with reputation level φ. The
45market observes the fundamental value θ after ﬁrms have taken their actions from
observing a signal z = θ +σε. Lenders and consumers know φ ﬁrms will decide to
play risky when z < z∗(φ), hence the probability assigned a particular ﬁrm plays risky
is given by Pr(z < z∗(φ)|θ) or which is the same, Pr(ε <
z∗(φ)−θ
σ |θ). Since ε ∼ F, the
probability a ﬁrm φ plays risky x(φ) = F(
z∗(φ)−θ
σ ).
If σ is low and θ > z∗(φ), then x(φ,θ) is close to 1, prices are low and reputation
formation is not important, reinforcing that ﬁrms want to play risky in that situation.
Contrarily, if σ is low and θ > z∗(φ), then x(φ,θ) is close to 0, prices depend a lot on
reputation and reputation is heavily updated, reinforcing that ﬁrms want to play safe in
that situation. Q.E.D.
A lot of action can happen around the equilibrium cutoff to ﬁrms of the same
reputation level when signals are highly precise, even when fundamentals do not show
a signiﬁcant change. However, the analysis so far has focused in the sudden change
of behavior for ﬁrms with a particular φ value. What is the behavior in the aggregate
assuming a particular distribution of reputation in the economy?
All ﬁrms with reputation φ will cluster when fundamentals go below the cutoff
z∗(φ). As shown in Proposition 14 and Figure 1.3, cutoffs z∗(φ) are similar for values
of reputation φ ∈ [φM,1]. When the state of the economy is good, changes in fun-
damentals do not induce a change in risk-taking behavior for many reputation levels.
Contrarily, in bad states of the economy, changes in fundamentals do induce a change
in risk-taking behavior for many reputation levels. If the distribution of reputation
levels is not heavily skewed towards low reputation ﬁrms, this will generate a big clus-
tering in aggregate risk-taking when fundamentals weaken enough. This effect can be
observed in Figure 1.4.
This property of the model implies large spikes in risk-taking behavior with a short
duration, where risk-taking increases even for ﬁrms with high reputation. In fact, this
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is exactly a feature we can observe in the data (as will be discussed in Section 1.8.2.1),
generating sudden and big losses for investors in those particular events.
What is even more striking is that clustering occurs exactly because of the exis-
tence of reputation concerns. Assume momentarily that ﬁrms born with a prior about
the probability of being strategic φ that they cannot modify by gaining or losing rep-
utation. In this counter-natural exercise, which arises for example in the case of un-
availability of information about signals, differential gains from playing safe are given
by equation (1.11) but without the last two components that represent the incentives
from reputation. In this case, when obtaining cutoffs for each reputation level without
reputation concerns, only continuation effects are present in the computation, which
eliminates the nonlinearity introduce by reputation through learning, as in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.5 shows in general the relation between cutoffs with and without reputation
concerns. While cutoffs are the same at φ =0 and φ =1, for all other reputation levels
the beneﬁts from playing safe are higher with reputation concerns, reducing cutoffs.
In particular, the difference between the cutoffs with and without reputation concerns
reaches the maximum at φM, where the reputation gains from playing safe reach the
47maximum. Speciﬁc examples will be shown in Section 1.7.
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1.6.2.2 Considerations about the distribution of reputation
The clustering result not only depends on the non-linear schedule of cutoffs but also
on the distribution of reputation levels in the economy. In reality, the distribution of
reputation seems to have a high mass among intermediate reputation levels (see Tables
1.1 and 1.2 in Section 1.8.1). In the theory, since cutoffs for each φ are independent
of the distribution, it depends on speciﬁc assumptions about the birth of new ﬁrms in
the economy. Denote ωt(φ) the fraction of ﬁrms with reputation φ in the economy at
period t. Its expected evolution is
ωt(φ) = b(φ)D+ωt−1(φ0)αs(1−V (z∗(φ0)))+ωt−1(φ1)(1−αs)(1−V (z∗(φ1)))
−ωt−1(φ)[V (z∗(φ))+(1− pr)(1−V (z∗(φ)))] (1.18)
where b(φ) is the birth rate of ﬁrms with reputation φ as a fraction of the total popula-
tion of ﬁrms, ωt−1(φ0)αs(1−V (z∗(φ0))) is the fraction of ﬁrms with reputation φ0 at
t−1 that in expectation will be upgraded to φ in periodt (where φ0 =
prαrφ
prαrφ+psαs(1−φ)).
48Similarly, φ1 is the reputation level that is downgraded to φ. The negative expression
represents the proportion of φ ﬁrms that die or change reputation out of φ.
Expressing birth rates for each φ as a function of a stationary expected distribution
b(φ) = ω(φ)[2− pr(1−V (z∗(φ)))]−ω(φ0)αs(1−V (z∗(φ0))) (1.19)
−ω(φ1)(1−αs)(1−V (z∗(φ1)))
Recall from the deﬁnition of b(φ) I am not restricting the economy from shrinking
or growing and I am not taking any stand on the shape of the distribution. Hence,
it is possible to impose any stationary distribution of reputation assigning the correct
birth rate from equation (1.19). Given this degree of freedom it is relevant to discuss
which are the assumptions on birth primitives required for a reputation distribution to
overcome the non-linearity of cutoffs and to avoid clustering in risk-taking28.
First, by learning properties, φ =0 and φ =1 are absorbing states. Assuming there
is no renovation of ﬁrms in the economy, (i.e., b(φ) = 0 for all φ), the economy will
shrink with time and will converge to a distribution of ﬁrms with reputation 0 and 1,
with a proportion given by the distribution of types in the economy. In this case the
distribution of ﬁrms depends exclusively on the reputation dynamics of existing ﬁrms.
Now assume all dying ﬁrms are replaced by newborns with a reputation φ = 0.529,
this renewal would ﬁll intermediate reputation ﬁrms, making the distribution more
evenly distributed or even with a greater mass at intermediate levels. Considering
these effects, a distribution heavily skewed towards low reputation levels requires that
most newborn ﬁrms are believed to have a very low initial reputation level, or which is
the same, the proportion of strategic types is very small.
28Since we are dealing with simultaneous equations analytically intractable but easily solvable nu-
merically, I will just make some general considerations based on numerical simulations available upon
request
29This is the case, for example, if the prior is that 50% of ﬁrms are strategic and there is no further
information about the ﬁrm at the time it arises
491.6.3 Efﬁciency considerations
In equation (1.11), the components of D(φ,θ) distinguish how effective is reputation to
deal with inefﬁciencies that arise from adverse selection and moral hazard. Consider
ﬁrst the case of full information in which lenders and consumers know both ﬁrms’
types and actions30. When strategic ﬁrms have a φ = 1. The value in case they decide
to play safe and risky respectively areV(1,θ|s)FI = psPs(1,θ)−ps
R
ps +βpsV(1) and
V(1,θ|r)FI = prPr(1,θ)− pr
R
pr +βprV(1).
Some speciﬁcities in the previous expressions are worth noting. First, since there
are no reputation problems, the expected future value is always V(1). Second, in-
terest rates reﬂect the real probability of default (Rs(1) = R/ps and Rr(1) = R/pr),
which means the cost of the capital for ﬁrms is always R in expectation. Finally,
since consumers also observe actions, they pay a price reﬂecting the real probability
of good results Ps(1) = αs and Pr(1) = αr. In this sense psPs(1,θ)− prPr(1,θ) =
A(θ)[(psαs− prαr)−(Cs(θ)−Cr(θ))]
Hence, differential gains from playing safe under full information are,
D(1,θ)FI = psPs(1,θ)− prPr(1,θ)+β(ps− pr)V(1)
Thesearetheﬁrsttwocomponentsinequation(1.11)forthecaseofφ =1whenac-
tions are observable. The value of the fundamental θ∗
FI(1) for which D(1,θ∗
FI(1))FI =
0, determines the point below which it is efﬁcient for strategic ﬁrms to play risky and
above which it is efﬁcient for strategic ﬁrms to play safe.
When lenders cannot observe ﬁrms’ actions, they charge a unique interest rate
R(1), regardless of the technology used. This generates a moral hazard problem. Firms
are more prone to take risks because they are not paying the premium for increasing
30In fact it is not interesting to have full information of actions and not types, since strategic ﬁrms
can easily signal their type just by playing safe at least once
50default probabilities lenders would charge for taking risks. While ﬁrms appropriate all
gains from good results, they impose to lenders the losses from bad results. Formally,
in the case of non-observable actions,V(1,θ|s)= psPs(1,θ)−psR(1)+βpsV(1) and
V(1,θ|r) = prPr(1,θ)− prR(1)+βprV(1). The main difference with full informa-
tion is a common interest rate R(1) ∈ [ R
ps, R
pr]. Hence,
D(1,θ) = psPs(1,θ)− prPr(1,θ)+β(ps− pr)V(1)−(ps− pr)R(1)
The last component in this equation represents the moral hazard incentives to play
risky that come from the lending relationship. Since D(1,θ) < D(1,θ)FI, it is easy
to show θ∗
FI(1) < z∗(1). R(1) wil be determined in equilibrium by z∗(1). For funda-
mentals θ ∈ (θ∗
FI(1),z∗(1)), it is efﬁcient that ﬁrms follow safe technologies but they
prefer to take risks. So, moral hazard generates excessive and inefﬁcient risk-taking.
So far, we have been discussing the inefﬁciency generated by moral hazard for
a ﬁrm with reputation φ = 1. However, the un-observability of actions opens the
room for the problem of adverse selection. This is because actions produce a non-
deterministic outcome that inhibit the market to fully learn about the type of the ﬁrm.
Now, considering adverse selection together with moral hazard, take a reputation value
φ < 1. Since P(φ) < P(1), R(φ) > R(1) and V(φ) < V(1), then D(φ,θ) < D(1,θ).
This means that z∗(φ) > z∗(1). Hence for the fundamentals θ ∈ (z∗(1),z∗(φ)), it is
efﬁcient that ﬁrms take safe actions but they prefer to take risks. So, adverse selection
further increases inefﬁcient risk-taking by ﬁrms.
Equation (1.11) shows the differential proﬁts for any φ (given beliefsb k) for the case
with adverse selection, moral hazard and the possibility of reputation formation. The
last two components increase D(φ,θ|b k), reverting the inefﬁciencies caused by moral
hazard and adverse selection.
51Reputation has a bright side. It reduces inefﬁcient risk-taking. However, reputation
also has a dark side. It reduces inefﬁcient risk-taking in a way that generates sudden
and isolated events of clustering of risk-taking, loss of conﬁdence, big increases in
default probabilities and huge losses by investors. Reputation concerns are effective
in reducing excessive risk-taking, but there are states of the economy bad enough that
reputation incentives break down and suddenly collapse.
1.7 Simulations
In this section we develop a numerical example to show how reputation concerns gen-
erate large changes in aggregate behavior as a response to small changes in fundamen-
tals. We also discuss about reputation efﬁciency effects and the sizable negative effects
of net returns to investors in those extreme situations.
For simplicity, we don’t introduce prices explicitly, so the market is composed only
by lenders and all the results come only from interest rates. To be more speciﬁc, we
assume Pr is constant and Ps = Pr+K+ψθ, where K < E(θ) and ψ > 0, hence ful-
ﬁlling assumptions 2 and 6 to ensure a unique steady state in continuation values. The
computational procedure is described in the Appendix. Parameters in this particular
exercise are β = 0.95, R = 1, Pr = 1.6, K = −0.001, ψ = 0.4, ps = 0.9, pr = 0.7,
αs = 0.8, αr = 0.4 and θ ∼ N (0,1). These parameters have been chosen such that
under full information risk-taking is efﬁcient only for very low fundamental values,
which arise with a probability 0.001%. This means risk-taking is almost never an
efﬁcient situation.
Figure 1.6 shows the ex-ante probability of risk-taking by ﬁrms with different repu-
tation levels. The probability that intermediate ﬁrms take risks is much greater without
reputation concerns than with reputation concerns. For example, the ex-ante probabil-
52ity a ﬁrm with a reputation level φ = 0.4 takes risk is 60% without reputation concerns
but only 4% with reputation concerns. Hence, the gap between the two curves shows
the reduction in the ex-ante probability of inefﬁcient risk-taking generated by reputa-
tion concerns. Even when reputation reduces inefﬁcient risk-taking around intermedi-
ate reputation levels, it is not that successful for very low or very high reputation levels.
Firms with very high reputation (φ around 1) and ﬁrms with very low reputation (φ
around 0), have a probability of risk-taking around 3% and 75% respectively, whether
or not they have reputation concerns.
Figure 1.6: Ex-ante probability of risk-taking - with and without reputation
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Figure 1.7 shows the same intuition of risk-taking clustering as Figure 1.5. As
fundamentals decline, reputation levels that enter into a phase of risk-taking gradu-
ally grow when reputation is not a concern but suddenly grow when reputation is a
concern. Figure 1.8 shows expected value functions and lending rates for ﬁrms with
different reputation levels φ. Firms with reputation concerns pay lower interest rates
and have higher expected continuation value than ﬁrms without reputation concerns.
53This is because ex-ante probabilities of risk-taking are lower for all ﬁrms with repu-
tation concerns, reducing current and future interest rates and increasing continuation
values.
Figure 1.7: Cutoffs - with and without reputation
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Figures 1.9 and 1.10 show the effects of sudden and isolated events of risk-taking
in deep recessions, using 100 simulated periods. To do this exercise it is necessary to
aggregate across ﬁrms, for which I assume a uniform reputational distribution. Since
data seems to suggest this distribution has a greater mass in intermediate reputation
levels, this is a conservative assumption31. Without reputation concerns, risk-taking
is more common and arises as a result of even small declines in fundamentals. With
reputation concerns, inefﬁcient risk-taking is greatly reduced in general, except in very
deep recessions when reputation does not provide enough incentives to inhibit inefﬁ-
cient risk-taking, even for ﬁrms with high reputation.
Figure 1.9 shows aggregate probability of default. This number goes from 10% in
31see Tables 1.1 and 1.2 in Section 1.8.1
54Figure 1.8: Value functions and lending rates - with and without reputation
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the case no ﬁrm takes risk to 30% in the case all ﬁrms take risk. Figure 1.10 shows
aggregate net returns. First we obtain individual net returns for each reputation level
(computed by the lending rate charged to φ multiplied by the real probability of suc-
cess by φ minus the risk free rate). Then we calculate the weighted sum of individual
returns to obtain aggregate net returns, which will depend on fundamentals. When val-
ues of fundamentals decline enough, returns decline catastrophically since all ﬁrms, no
matter their reputation, decide to take risks. Since lenders charge a low interest to high
reputation ﬁrms, when those conditions arise, sudden losses are of high magnitude.
With reputation concerns these rates are lower, then the losses are bigger.
We can also predict the returns of lending activities to ﬁrms with different repu-
tation levels. Figure 1.11 shows simulated net returns of investors in ﬁrms with rep-
utation levels φ = 0, φ = 0.5 and φ = 1, for the cases with and without reputation
concerns and for periods 55 to 75 in our simulation, when the two crises occur. In
all cases, by the determination of lending rates in equilibrium, expected net returns
55Figure 1.9: Simulated probability of default - with and without reputation
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Fundamentals
(before observing fundamentals) are zero.
Lenders to ﬁrms with very low reputation (φ = 0) charge the maximum possible
interest rate. Since in equilibrium they are right, all ﬁrms are of type R and then,
no matter the fundamentals, net returns are always zero. Lenders to ﬁrms with very
high reputation values (φ = 1) charge interest rates that assume there will be some
fundamentals under which even these ﬁrms will take risks. When fundamentals are
normal, investors make a small difference because risk-taking of these ﬁrms is infre-
quent. When risk-taking occurs, they lose a lot.
Since reputation does not make any difference for extreme values, these two lines
are the same in both panels of Figure 1.11. When reputation is φ = 0.5 and reputation
concerns exist, ex-ante probability of risk-taking is small and the pattern is similar to
the one observed for φ =1, with less gains in normal times and less, but more frequent,
56Figure 1.10: Simulated aggregate net returns - with and without reputation
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Fundamentals 
looses in very bad times. Without reputation concerns, intermediate reputation ﬁrms
are more volatile since they enter more frequently in the phase of risk-taking. Hence it
is necessary to pay more in good times to compensate for more frequent losses in bad
times.
Even when results from this simulation are based on particular and arbitrary para-
meters, they are highly robust to changes in the numbers used as soon as they fulﬁll
assumptions 2 and 6. In all cases, reputation concerns introduce incentives to deter
inefﬁcient risk-taking and generate a sudden wave of risk-taking, with big losses to
investors, below a certain threshold.
57Figure 1.11: Simulated individual net returns - with and without reputation
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1.8 Some Testable Hypothesis
1.8.1 Reputation over the Cycle
According to the model, in economic troughs we should see two patterns of reputation
formation. On the one hand, we should observe higher default and downgrading, both
because these are times of weakening in fundamentals (even when we neutralized this
effect in this model) and because ﬁrms decide to take more risks, being more prone
to exit and to have bad results. On the other hand, we should observe fewer cases of
reputation revision, since it is more difﬁcult for the market to update beliefs.
It is however difﬁcult to directly track the evolution of reputation in the market.
Here I propose a novel approach. I analyze credit ratings to capture the idea of reputa-
tion and rating transitions to capture the idea of beliefs updating and learning.
As a ﬁrst step, let’s divide the reputation continuum from 0 to 1 in seven bins from
Aaa to C. Aaa corresponds to the highest possible reputation (φ close to 1) while C
58corresponds to the lowest possible reputation (φ close to 0). With this interpretation,
rating transitions deliver information on how reputation varies and how beliefs are up-
dated in different phases of economic cycles. I use a detailed view of rating migration
provided by Moody’s yearly rating transition matrices. These matrices summarize the
size and direction of rating movements, including defaults32, for the entire Moodys-
rated universe, over speciﬁc time horizons.
In Table 1.1 I compare rating transition and default rates in 2001 (the last recession
year with high recorded idiosyncratic risk as a proxy of risk-taking behavior33) with
averages for the 20-year period 1980-2000 for broad rating categories. This is a very
rough way to look for clues about general features of reputation evolution and changes
in reputation over the cycle.
First, focus on the average characteristics of rating transition matrices (ﬁrst panel in
Table 1.1). As can be observed in the concentration of transitions around the diagonal,
upgrades or downgrades in reputation are given gradually rather than suddenly. In the
model this is predicted by equations 1.3 and 1.4 and graphically shown in Figure 1.1.
These patterns are consistent with our model, where reputation can be constructed,
destroyed, and managed. As in Mailath and Samuelson [2001], this is in stark contrast
with other more standard models where reputation is intrinsically valuable (as Holm-
strom [1999]), where ”bad” types try to pool with ”good” types and then reputation
can be suddenly lost rather than managed over time (as Milgrom and Roberts [1982],
Kreps and Wilson [1982] and Fudenberg and Levine [1992]) or where reputation can
32These rates are calculated as fractions in which the numerator represents the number of issuers that
defaulted on Moodys-rated debt in a particular time period and the denominator represents the number
of issuers that could have defaulted on Moodys-rated debt in that time period. Moodys deﬁnes a bond
default as ”any missed or delayed disbursement of interest and/or principal, bankruptcy, receivership,
or distressed exchange where (i) the issuer offered bondholders a new security or package of securities
that amount to a diminished ﬁnancial obligation (such as preferred or common stock, or debt with a
lower coupon or par amount) or (ii) the exchange had the apparent purpose of helping the borrower
avoid default”.
33According to Goyal and Santa-Clara [2003] and Davis et al. [2006], 200 and 2001 were years of
particularly high idiosyncratic risk
59only increase over time or disappear (as Diamond [1989]).
Now we can focus on the comparison of rating transition across different states
of the economy. We use the year 2001 both because it was the last recorded NBER
recession date and because it was a year with a large degree of clustering in risk-
taking behavior measured by ﬁrm-level volatility in returns. The shaded cells are those
statistically different between the two transition matrices (at a 95% of conﬁdence, one
sided test). Comparing the two matrices, 2001 is characterized by a higher default rate
(35% against 28% in average in the previous 20 years), mostly concentrated among
low reputation ﬁrms.
Three facts consistent with our model predictions are worth noting. First, in re-
cession ﬁrms take more risk, generating a higher probability of bad results (and down-
grading) and a higher probability of default and exit. As can be seen, in 2001 there was
more downgrading and less upgrading than on average since 1980. Second, by com-
paring the bolded diagonal elements of the two matrices, that indicate the frequency
at which ratings have remained unchanged over respective periods, we can see that in
2001 the fraction of ﬁrms whose reputation was not updated is higher than its average
since 1980. This denotes the difﬁculties in revising ratings in times with clustering in
risk-taking. Furthermore, this difference between panels is more important for high
reputation ﬁrms, which are the ones whose behavior changes the most in large reces-
sions compared to normal times. Finally, transitions are more concentrated around the
diagonal in recessions. The cells located far away from the diagonal are emptier in
recessions than in normal times, showing the difﬁculties to update in recessions.
These patterns have also been noticed in other studies that try to document changes
in ratings for other reasons. Here we highlight the ﬁnding from three sources, Bangia
et al. [2000], Moody’s reports and Altman and Rijken [2006].
First, in Table 1.2 we repeat results from Bangia et al. [2000], who use data from
60Table 1.1: Reputation updating over the cycle
All-Corporate Average Rating Transition Matrix, 1980-2000 (percent)
Terminal Rating
Initial Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa-C Default # of Firms
Aaa 89.31 10.15 0.50  --- 0.03  ---  ---  --- 2,585
Aa 0.96 88.42 10.04 0.38 0.16 0.02  --- 0.04 8,085
A 0.08 2.34 90.17 6.37 0.81 0.22  --- 0.02 15,210
Baa 0.09 0.39 6.42 84.48 6.92 1.39 0.12 0.20 10,066
Ba 0.03 0.09 0.50 4.41 84.25 8.65 0.52 1.54 8,816
B 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.58 6.37 82.67 2.98 7.17 7,437
Caa-C  ---  ---  --- 1.10 3.06 5.89 62.17 27.77 1,025
All-Corporate Average Rating Transition Matrix, 2001 (percent)
Terminal Rating
Initial Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa-C Default # of Firms
Aaa 98.99 1.01  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 121
Aa 0.31 94.14 5.24 0.16  --- 0.16  ---  --- 714
A 0.26 2.38 89.71 6.80 0.34 0.17 0.17 0.17 1,312
Baa 0.20 0.30 3.72 90.15 4.32 0.80 0.20 0.30 1,081
Ba  ---  --- 1.23 6.94 80.00 9.38 1.23 1.23 540
B  ---  --- 0.12 1.01 5.95 67.65 15.50 9.78 1,055
Caa-C  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 2.67 62.50 34.82 266 
 
 
US Expansion Quarters (1981-1998) (percent)
Terminal Rating
Initial Rating AAA AA  A BBB BB  B CCC Default # of Firms
AAA 98.21 1.66 0.11 0.02 0.02 --- --- --- 6,581
AA 0.15 98.08 1.61 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.01 --- 19,458
A 0.02 0.53 98.06 1.21 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.00 36,404
BBB 0.01 0.07 1.47 96.94 1.25 0.22 0.02 0.02 24,529
BB 0.01 0.03 0.19 1.93 95.31 2.25 0.16 0.12 18,161
B --- 0.02 0.07 0.10 1.70 95.91 1.31 0.88 20,002
CCC 0.05 --- 0.19 0.23 0.47 3.57 87.32 8.17 2,129
US Recession Quarters (1981-1998) (percent)
Terminal Rating
Initial Rating AAA AA  A BBB BB  B CCC Default # of Firms
AAA 97.99 1.76 0.25 --- --- --- --- --- 795
AA 0.18 96.89 2.79 0.05 0.09 --- --- --- 2,186
A 0.02 0.88 96.44 2.59 0.07 --- --- --- 4,330
BBB 0.04 0.04 1.11 96.31 2.33 0.07 --- 0.11 2,708
B B - - -0 . 0 60 . 0 61 . 3 9 94.98 2.72 0.42 0.36 1,655
B --- 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.72 95.02 2.27 1.77 1,806
CCC --- --- --- --- --- 1.20 85.60 13.20 250 
Standard & Poor’s (rather than Moody’s) from 1980-2000 and show US expansion
quarters against US recession quarters, deﬁned as periods above and below the trend
respectively34. They also noticed that defaults and downgrades are more likely in re-
cessions and that transitions are more concentrated around the diagonal in economic
troughs. The fact that the numbers in the diagonal are smaller in some cases during de-
pressions is more than compensated for the increase in downgrades in those particular
periods. Furthermore, by analyzing coefﬁcients of variation, Bangia et al. [2000] men-
tion that ”results suggest that migration probabilities are more stable on contractions
than on average”
Second, in several Moody’s special reports, the same patterns are discussed. For
example, the Historical Default Rates of Corporate Bond Issuers, 1920-1999 report
states ”In spite of the higher default rates in 1999, overall rating volatility was lower
than its average since 1980”
34This comparison may hide our main point that under certain important weakening in fundamentals
risk-taking behavior increases in a large degree as a result of a cluster behavior. Since recession dates as
deﬁned in Bangia et al. [2000] also correspond to certain reductions in fundamentals that do not justify
a sudden risk-taking behavior, the comparison of the tables may hide the main source of action. This is
why in our original exercise in Table 1.1 we just used an extreme year characterized by a big weakening
of fundamentals as deﬁned by NBER
61Table 1.2: Reputation updating over the cycle (Bangia et al., 2000)
All-Corporate Average Rating Transition Matrix, 1980-2000 (percent)
Terminal Rating
Initial Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa-C Default # of Firms
Aaa 89.31 10.15 0.50  --- 0.03  ---  ---  --- 2,585
Aa 0.96 88.42 10.04 0.38 0.16 0.02  --- 0.04 8,085
A 0.08 2.34 90.17 6.37 0.81 0.22  --- 0.02 15,210
Baa 0.09 0.39 6.42 84.48 6.92 1.39 0.12 0.20 10,066
Ba 0.03 0.09 0.50 4.41 84.25 8.65 0.52 1.54 8,816
B 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.58 6.37 82.67 2.98 7.17 7,437
Caa-C  ---  ---  --- 1.10 3.06 5.89 62.17 27.77 1,025
All-Corporate Average Rating Transition Matrix, 2001 (percent)
Terminal Rating
Initial Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa-C Default # of Firms
Aaa 98.99 1.01  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 121
Aa 0.31 94.14 5.24 0.16  --- 0.16  ---  --- 714
A 0.26 2.38 89.71 6.80 0.34 0.17 0.17 0.17 1,312
Baa 0.20 0.30 3.72 90.15 4.32 0.80 0.20 0.30 1,081
Ba  ---  --- 1.23 6.94 80.00 9.38 1.23 1.23 540
B  ---  --- 0.12 1.01 5.95 67.65 15.50 9.78 1,055
Caa-C  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 2.67 62.50 34.82 266 
 
 
US Expansion Quarters (1981-1998) (percent)
Terminal Rating
Initial Rating AAA AA  A BBB BB  B CCC Default # of Firms
AAA 98.21 1.66 0.11 0.02 0.02 --- --- --- 6,581
AA 0.15 98.08 1.61 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.01 --- 19,458
A 0.02 0.53 98.06 1.21 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.00 36,404
BBB 0.01 0.07 1.47 96.94 1.25 0.22 0.02 0.02 24,529
BB 0.01 0.03 0.19 1.93 95.31 2.25 0.16 0.12 18,161
B --- 0.02 0.07 0.10 1.70 95.91 1.31 0.88 20,002
CCC 0.05 --- 0.19 0.23 0.47 3.57 87.32 8.17 2,129
US Recession Quarters (1981-1998) (percent)
Terminal Rating
Initial Rating AAA AA  A BBB BB  B CCC Default # of Firms
AAA 97.99 1.76 0.25 --- --- --- --- --- 795
AA 0.18 96.89 2.79 0.05 0.09 --- --- --- 2,186
A 0.02 0.88 96.44 2.59 0.07 --- --- --- 4,330
BBB 0.04 0.04 1.11 96.31 2.33 0.07 --- 0.11 2,708
B B - - -0 . 0 60 . 0 61 . 3 9 94.98 2.72 0.42 0.36 1,655
B --- 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.72 95.02 2.27 1.77 1,806
CCC --- --- --- --- --- 1.20 85.60 13.20 250 
Finally, Altman and Rijken [2006] try to rationalize the stability in rating transi-
tions, especially on economic troughs. Their explanation is the ”through-the-cycle”
methodology that rating agencies use to construct and update their estimates. Accord-
ing to Moody’s, ratings are stable because they intend to measure default risks in the
long run and because modiﬁcations are made only when rating agencies are conﬁdent
that observed changes in a company’s risk proﬁle are likely to be permanent. Altman
and Rijken [2006] explanation is also based on a prudent behavior of agencies. When
Moody’s or Standard & Poors attribute ratings to bond obligors, they are engaged in a
complex judgment. In particular, rating migrations are triggered when the difference
between the actual agency rating and the one predicted by the model they use exceeds
a certain threshold, modifying ratings only partially. Our explanation is not based on a
prudentbehaviorbyagenciesbutondifﬁcultiesinevaluatingthepoliciesofﬁrmsgiven
the point of comparison of similar ﬁrms. In fact, agencies agree that recessions inhibit
rating migrations since the elements used to consider whether a permanent change in
overall risk status occurred or not are noisier than in normal times
As can be seen from our own analysis and from some evidence in the literature, dif-
62ferences in reputation formation over the cycle constitute evidence that in recessions,
when risk-taking behavior clusters, reputation is not heavily updated. Hence, the de-
terring effect of reputation concerns over risk-taking behavior is seriously inhibited in
times of weakening fundamentals.
1.8.2 Clustering in Risk-Taking Behavior
Here we discuss some indicative evidence that risk-taking behavior measured by idio-
syncratic risk tends to cluster excessively in recessions. Furthermore, corporate default
rates seem to follow a similar pattern which, in our model, is a direct consequence of
risk-taking clustering.
Campbelletal.[2001]analyzesthetrendandcyclicalbehaviorofidiosyncraticrisk
measured as a ﬁrm level proﬁt volatility. The construction of this indicator ﬁxes market
and industry risk, reﬂecting variations in volatility that happen exclusively as a result
of changes occurring inside a ﬁrm, such as risk-taking by managers. They show not
only that idiosyncratic risk more than doubles in recessions but also that the magnitude
of this clustering cannot be explained only from a weakening in fundamentals.
Similarly, Das et al. [2007] do not only show that default rates cluster in recessions
but also that the correlation in default cannot be explained merely by fundamentals.
They go even further and suggest there seem to be a non-observed variable that is more
active in bad times than in good times and may account for the non-explained degree
of clustering. Considering the evidence from Campbell et al. [2001] and the ﬁndings
about reputation formation over the cycle, our model suggests risk-taking behavior
may be the non-observable variable that is highly active in bad times. Even more we
propose as a potential explanation that, in recessions, reputation concerns do not work
as an effective mechanism to deter risk-taking.
631.8.2.1 Idiosyncratic Risk as a Proxy for Risk-Taking
Campbell et al. [2001] show that idiosyncratic risk tends to cluster excessively in re-
cessions. In fact market volatility and recessions help to predict ﬁrm-level volatility.
However, even when recessions are highly correlated to ﬁrm-level volatility, they have
a smaller effect on the predictable component of volatility. Even when idiosyncratic
risk doubles in recessions, the predictable component only helps to explain an increase
of about 1.5. Furthermore, they show idiosyncratic risks tend to have the most nega-
tive correlation with NBER recession dates. This represents an important unexplained
clustering in ﬁrm-level volatility and potentially on risk-taking behavior over the cycle.
Figure 1.12 shows the idiosyncratic risk series from Campbell et al. [2001]35.
Green bars show NBER-dated recessions. Hence, clustering occurs almost exclusively
on economic downturns.






































































































Figure 1.13 shows some representative examples of idiosyncratic risk in industries
35Idiosyncratic risk is measured by the monthly volatility of daily ﬁrm-level returns from the CRSP
data set, including ﬁrms traded on the NYSE, the AMEX, and the Nasdaq. Monthly volatility is adjusted
by subtracting market and industry volatilities. Data is recorded for 49 industries following the classiﬁ-
cation from Fama and French [1997]. Daily excess returns were calculated subtracting the 30-day T-bill
return divided by the number of trading days in the month from daily returns.
64withimportantcycles. Thesecyclesarenotperfectlycorrelated. Campbelletal.[2001]
show these are mostly driven by shock in industry-speciﬁc fundamentals. All the plot-
ted industries’ idiosyncratic risks cluster around recessions. Outside recession dates,
idiosyncratic risks seem to follow their own cycle, with industries clustering at differ-
ent times when industry-speciﬁc fundamentals weaken. See, for example differences
in the evolution of idiosyncratic risk between electronic equipments and telecommuni-
cations since 1992 or the differences between textiles and alcoholic beverages between
the crises of 1974 and 1982.
Figure 1.13: Idiosyncratic risk across some industries
 




































































































































Even when industry-speciﬁc fundamentals are important, the aggregate effect of
depressions for all industries is easy to observe when comparing correlation of idio-
syncratic risks across industries. The weighted average correlation of idiosyncratic
risk36 of the 49 industries considering NBER recession dates is 0.48. Taking recession
dates and the October 1987 market crash out of the sample, the correlation is just half
of that number, 0.24. Considering NBER recession dates and the 1987 market crash
represent just 50 months out of 414 months in the sample (from July 1962 to December
36Weights are based on market values using average market capitalization
651997), it is clear the aggregate effect of depressions in all industries when compared to
cycles outside economic troughs.
Our model captures exactly this feature, ﬁrm-level volatility in industries tend to
cluster at the same time when a large weakening of aggregate fundamentals occurs
and it tends to cluster at different times when aggregate fundamentals do not show any
relevant change but industry fundamentals do.
1.8.2.2 Corporate Default Rates as a Consequence of Risk-Taking
Another possible application of our results is the explanation of a seemingly puzzling
new result in the literature. Corporate default rates cluster in recessions with a magni-
tude that cannot be easily explained merely by a weakening of fundamentals. Figure
1.14 shows corporate default rates of speculative grade bonds collected by Moody’s
from 1920 to 2006.




US Expansion Quarters (1981-1998) (percent)
Terminal Rating
Initial  Rating AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC Default
AAA 98.21 1.66 0.11 0.02 0.02 --- --- ---
AA 0.15 98.08 1.61 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.01 ---
A 0.02 0.53 98.06 1.21 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.00
BBB 0.01 0.07 1.47 96.94 1.25 0.22 0.02 0.02
BB 0.01 0.03 0.19 1.93 95.31 2.25 0.16 0.12
B --- 0.02 0.07 0.10 1.70 95.91 1.31 0.88
CCC 0.05 --- 0.19 0.23 0.47 3.57 87.32 8.17
US Recession Quarters (1981-1998) (percent)
Terminal Rating
Initial  Rating AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC Default
AAA 97.99 1.76 0.25 --- --- --- --- ---
AA 0.18 96.89 2.79 0.05 0.09 --- --- ---
A 0.02 0.88 96.44 2.59 0.07 --- --- ---
BBB 0.04 0.04 1.11 96.31 2.33 0.07 --- 0.11
BB --- 0.06 0.06 1.39 94.98 2.72 0.42 0.36
B --- 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.72 95.02 2.27 1.77


















































documented in the literature. Koopman and Lucas [2005], Bangia et al. [2000] and
Nickell et al. [2000] present wide evidence of the co-cyclicality between default rates
66in all industries and macro fundamentals. Stock and Watson [1989] indeed highlight
the important role of default rates in the construction of leading indicators.
However, the question is whether the large degree of clustering experimented in
recessions can be merely explained by weakening in fundamentals. Das et al. [2007]
recently make an original effort to test how well fundamentals can explain clustering
in corporate default rates. They test a standard doubly stochastic model of default un-
der which, ”conditional on the paths of risk factors that determine all ﬁrm’s default
intensities, ﬁrm defaults are independent Poisson arrivals with these conditionally de-
terministic intensity paths.”. They ﬁnd in the data evidence of the existence of default
clustering beyond that predicted by the doubly stochastic model. Furthermore, intro-
ducing additional variables related to fundamentals (such as GDP growth), which may
be missing covariates in the model, they ﬁnd a degree of clustering that is not captured
by the extended model either37. Calibrated estimations of Gaussian copula correlation,
which is a measure of the degree of correlation in default times that is not captured by
co-movement in default intensities, range between 1% to 4% in Das et al. [2007] to
20% in Akhavein et al. [2005].
Das et al. [2007] propose that there seems to be a non-observed variable that is
more active in bad times than in good times. In our model, this unobserved variable
is risk-taking behavior, which clusters in bad times. Furthermore, we propose risk-
taking is more active in bad times than in good times because the deterring effects
of reputation are seriously hindered in economic depressions due to the existence of
strategic complementarities in learning.
With a different methodology, Koopman et al. [2006] found that fundamentals
(measured by the level of economic activity, bank-lending conditions, and ﬁnancial
37Koopman et al. [2006] is an additional recent paper that shows cross-ﬁrm default correlation asso-
ciated with observable factors cannot account for the large degree of time clustering in defaults found
in the data.
67markets variables) seem to be all important determinants of default rates. However,
simple models seem to be signiﬁcantly dynamically misspeciﬁed. Once they intro-
duce in the model latent variables, macro fundamentals seem unable to explain the
large degree of default that occurs in recessions. The question is open as to which
missing latent variables capture the intensity of default. Contagion and frailty have
been suggested as possible explanations38.
Our model suggests to look at sudden changes in risk-taking behavior over the cy-
cle as a potential factor behind a sudden jump in default rates. In the model default
rates are a direct consequence of risk-taking behavior, captured by the exit state39. The
probability of observing an exit (and hence a default) jumps from a number close to
(1−ps) to a higher one close to (1−pr) in big depressions. We have shown some em-
pirical evidence that risk-taking behavior clusters in recessions, at a higher magnitude
than fundamentals can possibly explain. This suggests that risk-taking may be a good
avenue to explore sudden jumps in default rates.
Finally, recall the similarities between our numerical simulations in Section 1.7
and the data, especially the similarities between Figure 1.9 and Figure 1.14. Reputa-
tion reduces risk-taking (and hence default rates) most of the time, generating sudden
and isolated events of clustering in risk-taking, ﬁnancial crises, big losses to investors
and, eventually, credit crunches. If reputation formation is somehow inhibited, coun-
tries would experience more volatility in default rates, higher interest rates and more
frequent but also less dramatic crises.
38Even when these answers cover part of the story they have some problems. Schonbucher [2003]
shows that if ”contagion” fully explained the large degree of clustering it should not be the case that in
default times both partner and competitor ﬁrms have a higher default probability. Yu [2005] has found
some inconclusive evidence of ”frailty” and learning after default as a correlation device.
39Recall in the model we assumed there is no default from a reduction of cash ﬂows
681.9 Conclusions
Reputation concerns deter excessive risk-taking behavior. This is a widely accepted
property of reputation, both on formal and informal grounds. This paper studies these
deterring effects when incentives for inefﬁcient risk-taking vary with the state of the
economy. The main ﬁnding is that reputation effects may suddenly collapse, leading to
large changes in aggregate risk-taking as a response to small changes in fundamentals.
In the model reputation is the probability of being a ﬁrm with access to a safe
technology. Since all ﬁrms have access to risky technologies (experimentation, for
example), ﬁrms’ unobservable types are deﬁned by the unobservable actions they can
take. Firms that can choose between safe and risky actions want to distinguish them-
selves from ﬁrms that do not have a choice. A higher reputation allows ﬁrms to pay
lower interest rates and to charge higher prices. However, since types are deﬁned by
action availability, reputation does not have an intrinsic value. The reputation of being
able to choose between safe and risky actions does not really matter if lenders and con-
sumers also believe the choice will be to take risks. In this sense reputation is fragile
because its value is a combination of having a certain type and behaving in a certain
way. None of these two conditions is important without the other.
In the model reputation can be constructed, destroyed and managed. However,
this desirable property comes with a cost in terms of equilibria multiplicity. To over-
come this problem I interpret the reputation model extended with fundamentals as
a non-standard dynamic global game in which strategic complementarities arise en-
dogenously from reputation formation, and hence depend on the dynamic structure of
the game, rather than being hard-wired into static payoffs as is common in the global
games literature. This allows us to select a unique equilibrium robust to information
perturbations.
69I provide empirical support for my theory using data on corporate credit-rating
transitions over the business cycle. I show that credit ratings evolve more slowly in
bad times than in good times, which supports my prediction that reputation formation
is more gradual and more difﬁcult in bad times. I also discuss recent literature that
shows that risk taking and defaults cluster in time, especially around recessions, at a
large degree that cannot be explained just from a weakening in fundamentals. These
empirical results are also consistent with the large degree of clustering predicted by
the model.
Finally, the model suggests several new policy implications. First, under periods
of ”clustering in risk taking” credit ratings are likely to be uninformative about default
probabilities. Even ﬁrms with AAA bond ratings, for example, may have incentives in
bad times to undertake risky projects which greatly increase the probability of default.
This introduces a warning sign against relying on ratings as a basis to determine the
right capital that banks should hold, as is the case with the Basel II regulations. My pa-
per suggests that banking regulations which rely on ofﬁcial credit ratings may spread
the effects of losses of conﬁdence in borrowers more widely through the ﬁnancial sys-
tem, opening the doors to broader ﬁnancial crises. Second, policies that promote credit
bureaus facilitate learning and increase reputation incentives in domestic ﬁnancial sys-
tems. My model implies that these policies have the potential to deter excessive risk
taking but at the same time may exacerbate credit crises.
701.10 Appendix
1.10.1 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof To prove this proposition I proceed in four steps. First I derive the posterior
density and distribution of θ given a signal z. Second, I prove there is a unique signal
z∗(φ) that makes a strategic ﬁrm φ indifferent between taking risk or not, such that
z∗(φ) is determined using Laplacian beliefs. Third I show that using z∗(φ) is a best
response when the prior about θ follows a uniform distribution on the real line and
both lenders and consumers believe z∗(φ) is the equilibrium cutoff. Finally we show
that, as σ → 0, the game with any prior distribution of θ uniformly converges to the
unique solution proved in the previous step.
• Step 1: Distributions of fundamentals conditional on signals






























where fz and fz|θ are the densities of z and z|θ respectively. Since z is the sum of
θ and σε, its density is given by the convolution of their densities, i.e., v and fσε.
Considering that Fσε(η) = F(η/σ), fσε(η) =
f(η/σ)










71We can obtain the distribution of the observed signal z after observing a fundamen-
tal θ.














Plugging equations 1.24 and 1.23 in 1.22, we obtain equation 1.20. The posterior











and the expression in equation (1.21) follows from variable transformation u = z−θ
σ
Q.E.D.
• Step 2: Unique equilibrium cutoff z∗(φ) (using Laplacian beliefs).
Lemma 17 Thereisauniquecutoffsignalforeachreputationφ suchthatD(φ,z∗|z∗)=
0, D(φ,z|z∗) > 0 for z > z∗ and D(φ,z|z∗) < 0 for z < z∗, where D(φ,z|z∗) are the ex-
pected differential gains from playing safe for a ﬁrm with reputation φ that observes a
signal z when lenders believe the cutoff the ﬁrm follows is z∗(φ).






probability the ﬁrm plays risky when the fundamental is θ
Z 1
0
D(φ,z∗|b x)db x = 0 (1.25)
Proof When fundamentals θ are not observed directly, the ﬁrm observes a signal z
and lenders believe ﬁrms use a cutoff z∗(φ), the expected gains from playing safe are
D(φ,z,z∗) = E[D(φ,θ|b x)|z] (1.26)
where b x is just a function of the cutoff z∗.











Note that θ = z∗−σF−1(b x). From equation (1.21), deﬁne










D(φ,z∗−σF−1(b x)|b x)dY(b x;z,z∗)
Laplacian beliefs arise from




For z = z∗, Y(b x;z∗,z∗) = b x. Then, as σ → 0
Z 1
0
D(φ,z∗|b x)db x = 0
By Lemmas 4 and 5, we know there is a unique solution z∗(φ) to this equation. Q.E.D.
The intuition behind the use of a uniform distribution of beliefs b x to obtain the
solution is straightforward. Adapting the discussion in Morris and Shin [2003], the
key to understanding this feature is to consider the answer to the following question
asked by a ﬁrm. ”My signal has a realization z. What are the chances that lenders
assign a probability smaller than η to me having a signal smaller than z?”. If the true





probability is smaller than η if z−θ
σ < F−1(η), or when
θ > z−σF−1(η)
The probability of this event, conditional on z
Pr(θ > z−σF−1(η)|z) = Pr(z−σε > z−σF−1(η)) = F(F−1(η)) = η






η, hence the cumulative distribution of b x is the identity function, implying the density
of b x is uniform over the unit interval. In words, if z∗(φ) happens to be the switching
point of an equilibrium strategy, then playing safe or risky should be indifferent for the
ﬁrm given lenders and consumers beliefs b x are uniformly distributed in [0,1].
• Step 3: Best response with uniform priors over fundamentals.
Now we need to verify that there exists indeed an equilibrium in which a ﬁrm with
reputation φ plays risky whenever z < z∗(φ) and plays safe whenever z > z∗(φ). Sig-
nals z allow ﬁrms to have an idea not only about the fundamental but also about the sig-
nal lenders and consumers believe the ﬁrm has observed. Following Toxvaerd [2007],
I ﬁrst assume θ is drawn from a uniform distribution on the real line, hence an im-
proper distribution with inﬁnite probability mass. It is possible to normalize the prior
distribution assuming v(θ) = 1, simplifying the density to fθ|z(θ|z) = σ−1f(z−θ
σ ) and
the distribution to Fθ|z(θ|z) = F(z−θ
σ )
First, we will denote e D(φ,z|z∗) the case with a uniform prior distribution of funda-






b z(φ) is the cutoff that the market believes strategic players φ use and z is the signal
received by the ﬁrm. In words, since the market believes φ strategic ﬁrms follow the
cutoff b z(φ), when updating reputation and knowing the real fundamental, the market





the ﬁrm observed a signal z below the cutoff and
played risk.
Expected payoff gains from playing safe rather than risky, given signal z when the
market believes strategic ﬁrms φ use cutoffs b z(φ) are given by
















Changing variables introducing m =
θ−b z(φ)
σ










We can rewrite it in a simpler way as









. As shown in
Athey [2002], because of the monotone likelihood property, b D(φ,z|b z(φ),z0) inherits
the single crossing property of e D(φ,θ|b x). This means it exists a z∗(φ,b z(φ),z0) such that
b D(φ,z|b z(φ),z0) > 0 if z > z∗(φ,b z(φ),z0) and b D(φ,z|b z(φ),z0) < 0 if z < z∗(φ,b z(φ),z0).
Assuming z > z0 and b D(φ,z|b z(φ),z) = 0, we can show
b D(φ,z0|b z(φ),z0) ≥ b D(φ,z|b z(φ),z0) ≥ b D(φ,z|b z(φ),z) = 0
The ﬁrst inequality coming from the state monotonicity and the second from the action
single crossing property. A symmetric argument holds for z > z∗(φ). Hence, there
exists a best response χ : R → R such that
e D(φ,z|b z(φ)) > 0 if z > χ(b z(φ))
e D(φ,z|b z(φ)) = 0 if z = χ(b z(φ))
e D(φ,z|b z(φ)) < 0 if z < χ(b z(φ))




e D(φ,z∗(φ)|b x)db x = 0 (1.28)
Hence, χ(z∗(φ)) = z∗(φ), showing that there is a unique equilibrium in cutoff





0 if z > z∗(φ)
1 if z < z∗(φ)
(1.29)
75Q.E.D.
• Step 4: Best response with general priors over fundamentals.
Lemma 18 As σ → 0, D(z,z−σξ) → e D(z,z−σξ) uniformly.










= e Y(b x;z,z−σξ)
As in Toxvaerd [2007], we show convergence with respect to the uniform conver-
gence norm, which implies uniform convergence. Uniformity ensures that the equiva-
lence between the games with the two different assumptions about the prior distribu-
tions, is not a result of a discontinuity on σ = 0.
Fromtheexistenceofdominanceregionsforeachreputationlevelφ, (−¥,θ(φ|θ))
and (θ(φ|θ),¥). Pick z(φ) < θ(φ|θ) and z(φ) > θ(φ|θ) and restrict attention to the
compactsetsZ ≡[z(φ),z(φ)]andZσ ≡[z(φ)−σξ,z(φ)−σξ]. HenceD(φ,z,z∗)maps
into a compact set.
Deﬁne the sup-norm
k D(φ) k≡ supz,z∗{|D(φ,z,z∗)|}
With respect to the Euclidean metric,
∀ε1 > 0,∃δ1|z−z0| < δ1 ⇒ |D(φ,z,z∗)−e D(φ,z0,z∗)| < ε1,∀z∗
∀ε2 > 0,∃δ2|z∗−z∗0

















As σ → 0
k D(φ)−e D(φ) k= supz,z∗{D(φ,z,z∗)−e D(φ,z,z∗)} → 0
with respect to the sup-norm Q.E.D.
1.10.2 Proof and Intuition Lemma 10
Let’s start with the case in which playing safe with a very high probability is a ﬁxed
point among continuation values (ﬁrst bullet point in Lemma 10). If an important
weakening of fundamentals occurs, ﬁrms will cluster in risk-taking behavior for a short
period of time. This case is the simplest one and helps to develop a clear understanding
of the intuition behind the next graphs.
Figure 1.15 shows Vt(φ) as a function of the expected continuation value in t +1
(Vt+1(φ)). The lines labeled ”Always Risky” and ”Always Safe” represent cases in
which strategic ﬁrms with a reputation level φ are believed to play always risky or
always safe (as deﬁned in equation (1.10) when x = 1 and x = 0) respectively. By
Assumption 6, the intercept in the case in which ﬁrms are believed to play risky is
higher than the intercept of the value when strategic ﬁrms are believed to play safe.
Furthermore, the slope of the value when ﬁrms are believed to play risky (βpr) is
smaller than the slope of the value when strategic ﬁrms are believed to play safe (βps).
In Figure 1.15 we show the two extreme cases where φ = 0 and φ = 1. Take
for example φ = 0. In this case, regardless of the beliefs of lenders and consumers,
77E(Vt+1(φ0)) = Vt+1(φ) because reputation never improves or decays. A similar argu-
ment is true for φ = 1.
However, thesearetheexpectedvaluesincaselendersandconsumersneverchange
beliefs about risk-taking behavior, regardless of fundamentals or future payoffs. As
shown in Lemma 8, the expected continuation value of a particular ﬁrm depends on the
probabilities the fundamental θ lies below the optimal cutoff z∗(φ). Hence, expected
values Vt(0) and Vt(1) are represented by the solid red lines.
For φ = 0, Dt(0,zt) = psPs(0)− prPr(0)+(ps − pr)[βVt+1(0)−Rt(0)]. This
differential determines z∗
t (0), which is negatively related to Vt+1(0). It is possible to
ﬁnd a e Vt+1(0) for which z∗
t (0) = E(θ). For a small γθ, if e Vt+1(0) is to the left of the
point SS0 in Figure 1.15, then the continuation value converges backward to V(0) for
a reputation level φ = 0. Given a continuation value V(0), strategic ﬁrms φ play safe
with a very high probability.
A similar analysis is true at the other extreme, for φ = 1. In this case Dt(1,zt) =
psPs(1)− prPr(1)+(ps − pr)[βVt+1(1)−Rt(1)]. Note Dt(1,zt) > Dt(0,zt) (for a
given continuation value at t +1) from two effects. First, prices for φ = 1 are greater
than prices for φ = 0 (in the case the market assigns some positive belief for the ﬁrm
to play safe). Hence, psPs(1)− prPr(1) > psPs(0)− prPr(0). Second, interest rates
charged to ﬁrms with high reputation φ = 1 are lower than those charged to φ = 0,
hence Rt(1) < Rt(0).
It is important to note that even if lenders and consumers strangely believe that
φ =0 is unlikely to play risky and φ =1 is unlikely to play safe, Rt(1)<Rt(0) because
they also believe the φ = 0 ﬁrm cannot make a choice while the φ = 1 ﬁrm is at least
strategic for sure and sometimes will play risky.
Since Dt(1,zt) > Dt(0,zt), e Vt+1(1) < e Vt+1(0) and hence e Vt+1(1) is to the left of
SS1. The intercept is higher for φ =1 than for φ =0 while slopes are the same. Hence,
78continuation values converge to a higher level for φ = 1 than for φ = 0, V(1) > V(0).
The lowest possible price and highest possible lending rate correspond to φ = 0
because regardless of what a strategic ﬁrms would decide, lenders and consumers just
believe that a ﬁrm is not strategic. For all other reputation levels, the potential behavior
of strategic ﬁrms matters because lenders and consumers assign a probability that the
ﬁrm is, in fact, strategic.
Hence, whenever e Vt+1(0) is to the left of the point SS0 in Figure 1.15, the contin-
uation values for all reputation levels φ will converge to a unique value V(φ)
The case depicted in Figure 1.15 not only shows that continuation values are well
deﬁned but also that they converge to a ﬁxed point such that all ﬁrms will be playing
safe with a very high probability (close to 1).
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A similar analysis leads to convergence to continuation values dominated by risk-
taking. This is the case depicted in Figure 1.16. The condition for this to be the case is
79that e Vt+1(1) exceeds the value at which Vt(1) crosses the 45-degree line. In this case
all ﬁrms, regardless of their reputation, decide to take risk with a very high probability
(close to 1). In this extreme case continuation values are well deﬁned and converge
to the same value for all reputation levels φ. Reputation does not play any role in
introducing incentives in this particular situation where all ﬁrms almost always decide
to play risky.
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Steady states in which the market believes that ﬁrms will play safe or risky with a
very high probability (close to 1) are not particularly interesting (even when the ﬁrst
case is able to explain situations of sudden and scarce risk-taking clustering, as shown
in the data).
In Figure 1.17 we show the third possible situation in which, for φ = 0 and φ =
1, e V(0) and e V(1) lie between the points SS0 and SS1. To obtain convergence to a
single continuation value (rather than cyclical movements) we must make the extra
assumption that γθ is high enough.
The probability of risk-taking is higher for low reputation ﬁrms. This implies
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monotonicity of continuation values on reputation levels φ
In the case of cyclic or even chaotic patterns, a full characterization of these cycles
is always possible because continuation values are well deﬁned, as shown in Propo-
sition 9. However, it is possible for continuation values to behave counter-intuitively.
Recall Vt(φ) depends on Vt+1(φg) and Vt+1(φb), but these will depend on the speciﬁc
part of the cycle that φg and φb will be playing at t +1. For example, it is possible that
Vt+1(φb) > Vt+1(φg) if φb will be playing risky next period while φg will be playing
safe. In this case, reputation is reversed and ﬁrms may try to have a bad reputation to
take advantage of the future risk-taking behavior of low reputation level ﬁrms.
In our model, reputation is not treated as an intrinsic asset that makes the market
blindly assign more value to ﬁrms with higher reputation. Because of this, it may be
that ﬁrms do not try to achieve a higher reputation per se, but the reputation of ﬁrms
more likely to play risky in order to pool with them and get more expected proﬁts.
These pervasive effects of cycles come from the fact that reputation is not an asset
per se but a signal of how well ﬁrms commit. Introducing reputation as an asset would
81eliminate this particular feature of the model, preserving, nevertheless, the existence
of cyclical behavior.
In any case, as all models with univariate dynamics, this is not a compelling set-
ting to analyze cycles since it heavily depends on the deﬁnition of the period length.
Making the period shorter enough, for example, generates cycles at a higher frequency.
Since the period length does not have any economic meaning but it changes the results
of the model, this model is not effective to discuss cyclical properties.
1.10.3 Computational Procedure
We solve the model following the next procedure.
• Set a large grid of φ ∈ [0,1]
• Solve for the full information case (efﬁciency)
– Guess a VFI(1)0 = 0.
– Obtain θ∗
0 as the solution of














– Use VFI(1)1 as the new guess and iterate until VFI(1)I −VFI(1)I−1 < ε.
• Solve for the reputation case.
– Guess a V(φ)0 = 0 for all φ.
– Using V(φ)0 obtain D(φ,z|b x)0 for large Nx beliefs b x ∈ [0,1].
82– Solve for z∗(φ)0 that makes åD(φ,z|b x)0
Nx = 0
– For all θ < (>)z∗(φ)0, x(φ,θ)0 = 1(= 0).
∗ R(φ|z∗
0)0 follows from z∗(φ)0
∗ φg(φ,θ)0 and φb(φ,θ)0 follow from x(φ,θ)0.











– Use V(φ)1 as the new guess.
– Solve for z∗(φ)1 that makes åD(φ,z|b x)1
Nx = 0.
– Iterate until V(φ)I −V(φ)I−1 < ε for all φ.
• Solve for the non reputation concerns case
– Guess a V(φ)0 = 0 for all φ.
– Obtainθ∗
MH(φ)0 bymakingD(φ,θ)MH = psPs(φ,θ)−prPr(φ,θ)+β(ps−
pr)[VFI(φ)0−R(φ|θ∗
FI)] = 0









– Use VMH(φ)1 as a new guess and iterate until VMH(φ)I−VMH(φ)I−1 <ε.
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86CHAPTER 2
Slow(er) Boom, Sudden Crash. Financial Frictions and
Recoveries
Asset markets are characterized by slow booms and sudden crashes. Lending rates, for
example, are more likely to experience big jumps rather than big drops. We focus on
the comparison of this asymmetry across countries.
First, we document that lending rates are more asymmetric in economies with poor
ﬁnancial systems. Second, we explain this ﬁnding by introducing ﬁnancial frictions
into a model with endogenous ﬂow of information. High agency costs restrict the
generation of information that fuels booms. Contrarily, they are not so important in
good times, being irrelevant in determining the magnitude or speed of crashes. Finally,
by calibrating the model, we show that cross-country differences in the asymmetry of
lending rate ﬂuctuations are well explained by differences in ﬁnancial frictions.
872.1 Introduction
Asymmetry is a well known feature in asset markets. Lending rates, for example,
exhibit sudden increases but slow and gradual reductions. The “tequila” 1994 peso
crisis was a typical case of this pattern. It took just 4 months for Mexican lending rates
to rose around 70 percentage points, but more than 30 months to return to pre-crisis
levels 1.
Even when the explanation of this asymmetry has attracted a lot of attention in
economics2, differences across countries have been surprisingly absent from this lit-
erature. However, the study of these differences is of the utmost importance. First,
high asymmetry on lending rate ﬂuctuations may cause ﬁnancial distresses, banking
crises and eventually growth reductions (Bergoeing et al. [2004]). Second, since there
are gains from reducing business cycles ﬂuctuations and improve the forecasting of
macroeconomic aggregates, the beneﬁts from understanding the source of asymme-
try on asset prices are non-trivial (Van Nieuwerburg and Veldkamp [2006]; Chen and
Chan [1989]). Finally, a preference for (positive) skewness in rates of return is a
general characteristic of investors having utility functions displaying the desirable be-
havioristic attributes (Kraus and Litzenberger [1976]).
In this paper we make three contributions. The ﬁrst one is empirical. By focusing
1Many similar examples can be found in the most important recent crises. In Brazil, in October
1997, loan rates rose from 71% to 98% and it took 10 months to return to pre-crisis levels. In Indonesia,
the 8 months following the Asian crisis experienced a rise in lending rates from 18% to 35% while it
tooks 24 months to return to pre-crisis levels. In Russia, during the ﬁrst half of 1998 lending rates rose
from 24% to 48% in and it tooks 25 months for loan rates to return to pre-crisis levels.
2Banerjee [1992], Banerjee and Newman [1993] and Welch [1992] explained crashes from herd
behavior and information cascades. Jacklin et al. [1992], based on Glosten and Milgrom [1985], used a
portfolio insurance model of stock market crashes. Allen et al. [2006] used an information based model
of bubbles. Zeira [1994] and Zeira [1999] proposed models of informational overshooting to explain
booms and crashes in stock prices. Veldkamp [2005] used a model with endogenous ﬂow of information
to explain unconditional asymmetry.
For a review of asymmetries in real markets and aggregate economies see Van Nieuwerburg and
Veldkamp [2006] and Jovanovic [2006].
88on lending rates, we document a negative relationship between ﬁnancial development
and asymmetry. Lending rates on countries with high levels of monitoring and bank-
ruptcy costs tend to be more asymmetric. Literature on asymmetric lending rates have
been based either on evidence from a single country or on evidence from a small sam-
ple of similar countries.
The second contribution is theoretical. We explain these empirical facts by intro-
ducing ﬁnancial frictions and agency costs into Veldkamp [2005] model of endoge-
nous ﬂow of information. In her complete information model, agents choose to invest
or not in a risky asset based on an inference about the unobserved state of the econ-
omy, which is constructed from signals sent by current ventures. When agents think
the state is good, many investments generate a large sample of observations. When the
state changes to bad, there are a lot of signals in the economy, investors deduce easily
conditions have changed and interest rates increase a lot. Contrarily, when the state
is bad and changes to good, the limited number of existing ventures offer few signals
about the switch, agents slowly learn about it and lending rates drop gradually.
We introduce asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders and costly
state veriﬁcation into this setup. High agency costs (such as monitoring and bank-
ruptcy costs) increase lending rates in equilibrium, producing under-investment and a
reduction on the number of signals available in the economy. However, the reduction
of economic activity is not symmetric across states. In bad times, since the likelihood
a venture fails is big, high agency costs impose big restrictions on loans, slowing down
the creation of new economic activity. Contrarily, in good times agency costs are not
that important in determining the number of ventures. Hence, high agency costs slow
down the learning that fuels booms but not the information that sustain big crashes.
Naturally this is translated into greater asymmetry on lending rates.
The third contribution is quantitative. Calibrations of the model closely match the
89data on cross-country differences of asymmetry in lending rates ﬂuctuations. Using
these results we estimate agency costs per country, which are consistent with the very
limited (mainly anecdotical and survey based) existing estimations in the literature.
Roughly speaking, data on asymmetry of lending rates is consistent with monitoring
costs of around 5% over total assets for developed countries and 30% for underde-
veloped ones. The model is also able to explain cross-country differences on lending
spreads levels.
In Section 2.2 we report stylized facts about the negative relation between develop-
ment of ﬁnancial systems and asymmetry on lending rates and, particularly the positive
relation between agency costs and asymmetry. In Section 2.3 we explain these ﬁndings
by introducing ﬁnancial frictions into a model with endogenous ﬂow of information.
In Section 2.4 we calibrate the model and obtain estimations of agency costs in differ-
ent countries by matching the model with the data. In Section 2.5 we make some ﬁnal
remarks.
2.2 Stylized Facts
In this section we report an interesting but unexploited source of asymmetry on lending
rates across countries, namely the development of ﬁnancial systems in general and the
magnitude of agency and monitoring costs in particular.
In the ﬁrst part different exercises are made to show that the less ﬁnancially devel-
oped is a country, the higher the likelihood of having changes of lending rates highly
asymmetric (i.e. the more likely to have crashes when compared with booms of the
same magnitude).
Since we speciﬁcally propose monitoring costs, contract enforcement and easiness
in the ﬂow of information as determinants of that relation in the ﬁnancial system, the
90second part of this section goes deeper and uses different alternative methods to show
how the skewness in lending rates is particularly tied to monitoring and bankruptcy
costs.
Finally, the last part discusses the possible relation between skewness on lending
rates and skewness on real variables of the economy. Results show that it is not pos-
sible to explain asymmetry in interest rates by asymmetry of real variables, which is
a justiﬁcation to use a model explaining the relation between monitoring costs and
lending rates asymmetries independently of real variables.



















where n is the number of observations (periods per country), xt =ln(ρt)−ln(ρt−1),
ρt is the lending rate at period t and x is the sample mean of the series.
Skewness is obtained using monthly data data on real lending rates from 1960 to
2004. Real lending rates are calculated based on information from the International Fi-
nancial Statistics (IFS), by correcting nominal lending rates (from ﬁgure 60P..ZF...) by
a consumer price index (from ﬁgure 64P..ZF...) 3. Even when skewness was obtained
for 70 countries that fulﬁll certain minimum requirements 4, the following analysis
will be based only on those countries that exhibit positive values, which correspond to
approximately 80% of them. The reason for doing this is that many studies based on
individual countries, and hence more reliable information, typically have found posi-
3To obtain real lending rates we subtract the HP trend of inﬂation from the nominal ﬁgures. To use
other measures of expected inﬂation do not change the main results.
4More than 100 observations, not many changes in the collection methodologies and a deﬁned cycli-
cal pattern.
91tive skewness (see Veldkamp [2005] for a discussion). In our case we need to compare
a lot of countries and we have to rely on a comparable common source of information
like the IMF. A list of all countries used in the sample, their individual asymmetry
levels and classiﬁcations are detailed in Appendix 2.6.1.
2.2.1 Negative relation between asymmetry on lending rates and ﬁnancial de-
velopment in general
2.2.1.1 Regressions
To analyze the relation between asymmetry on lending rates and ﬁnancial develop-
ment, the former is measured by the skewness of log changes in real lending rates (as
described before), while the later is measured for each country by the credit to pri-
vate sector as a percentage of GDP obtained from the World Development Indicators
(WDI)
As shown in Table 2.1, just regressing these two variables for different period
samples (1960-90 and 1990-2004) and different country samples (all countries and
non-african countries) it is possible to ﬁnd a mild but statistically signiﬁcant negative
relation.
However, errors from previous regressions show a structure. Figures 2.1 and 2.2
not only show the mentioned negative relation but also how many observations lie in
the lower triangle part of the ﬁgure. This means countries with less developed ﬁnancial
systems are more prone to present high levels of skewness than countries with more
developed ﬁnancial sectors.
The existence of a well developed ﬁnancial system does not seem to be a necessary
condition to have low skewness levels, but deﬁnitely seems to restrict the possibility
of having high skewness levels. Since skewness is a tail property that keeps track of
92Table 2.1: Asymmetry on lending rates and ﬁnancial development
Dependent Variable All countries Non-african countries
Lending rates skewness 1960-1990 1990-2004 1960-1990 1990-2004
Credit to Private Sector / GDP -0.025 -0.023 0.025 -0.008
(0.010)∗∗ (0.009)∗∗ (0.014)∗ (0.012)
Constant 4.06 2.77 4.15 1.62
(0.57)∗∗∗ (0.53)∗∗∗ (0.90)∗∗∗ (0.66)∗
Observations 44 55 27 39
* Signiﬁcant at 10%, ** Signiﬁcant at 5% and *** Signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the skewness measured over the
distribution of log changes in monthly lending rates, obtained from the IMF’s IFS database.
Yearly data on Credit to Private Sector as a percentage of GDP from the World Bank’s WDI
database. The simple average per country over the period sample is considered.
93booms and crashes, a higher positive skewness means a higher probability of show-
ing a huge crash when compared with the probability of having a boom of the same
magnitude.
Figure 2.1: Skewness on lending rates and credit to private sector / GDP (1960-1990)
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A possible reason less developed ﬁnancial systems have both high and low asym-
metry levels is the heterogeneity of volatility in those economies. In fact this relation
between volatility and skewness will be captured in our model and shown in the simu-
lations from Section 2.4.
To solve this problem skewness is controlled by the volatility of GDP per capita,
the volatility of lending rates (both measured by the coefﬁcient of variation), the av-
erage inﬂation in the period and the log of GDP per capita. As shown in Table 2.2,
once controlled, a stronger negative relation between asymmetry of lending rates and
ﬁnancial development is obtained.
After controlling for other variables, the errors do not seem to have a structure.
This can be seen in Figures 2.3 and 2.4, which reply Figures 2.3 and 2.4 but do not
show the lower triangular pattern observed without controls.
94Figure 2.2: Skewness on lending rates and credit to private sector / GDP (1990-2004)
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A simpler way to observe the negative relation between asymmetry on lending rates
and ﬁnancial development is just by dividing countries in a diversity of classiﬁcations
correlated with ﬁnancial development groups and checking if there is, in average, a
difference between them in terms of asymmetry on lending rates. This classiﬁcation
will be also relevant to performs simulation exercises in Section 2.4
The following classiﬁcations are used:
a) Income groups as deﬁned by the World Bank.
b) OECD and non-OECD countries.
c)Countrieswithhighandlowcontractenforcement. A”contractenforcement”
indicator from Levine et al. [1997] is used. This measure is an average between two
indicators from La Porta et al. [1998], Rule of Law, which is an assessment of the
law and order tradition of the country and Government Risk, which is an assessment
of the risk the government modify a contract after it has been signed. In both cases
95Table 2.2: Fitted asymmetry on lending rates and ﬁnancial development
Dependent Variable All countries Non-african countries
Fitted LR Skewness 1960-1990 1990-2004 1960-1990 1990-2004
Credit to Private Sector / GDP -0.019 -0.013 -0.018 -0.010
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗
Constant 3.89 2.43 3.85 1.69
(0.17)∗∗∗ (0.14)∗∗∗ (0.28)∗∗∗ (0.10)∗∗∗
Observations 44 55 27 39
* Signiﬁcant at 10%, ** Signiﬁcant at 5% and *** Signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the ﬁtted skewness controlled by log
of GDPpc, volatility of GDPpc, volatility of lending rates and inﬂation. The simple average
per country over the period sample is considered.
the indices go from 1 (the worst possible situation) to 10 (the best possible situation).
The cutoff between low and high contract enforcement was set on 7 in order to have a
similar number of countries in both classiﬁcations.
d)CountrieswithandwithoutPrivateBureau. A”PrivateBureau”fromDjankov
et al. [2007] is deﬁned as a private commercial ﬁrm or non proﬁt organization that
maintains a database on the standing of borrowers in the ﬁnancial system and its pri-
mary role is to facilitate exchange of information amongst banks and ﬁnancial institu-
tions.
While the use of the ﬁrst two classiﬁcations is justiﬁed by the well known positive
relation between economic and ﬁnancial development (Levine [1997]), the last two
classiﬁcations reﬂect the situation in terms of contract enforcement and access and
availability of information to lenders, more in line with the speciﬁc channels this paper
focuses on to explain why ﬁnancial development affects asymmetry levels.





































































In Table 2.3 we show the simple average of skewness for each classiﬁcation group
and for two different periods of time. In Appendix 2.6.2, we repeat this exercise but
using two different approaches. At the one hand we obtain skewness in log deviations
from trend rather than in log changes. At the other hand we obtain skewness in log
changesoflendingratesspreadsratherthanlevels. Resultsforbothcasesareconsistent
with conclusions from Table 2.3.
Richer countries, OECD countries and countries with high contract enforcement
and private bureaus always show less asymmetry than poorer countries, non-OECD
countries or countries with low contract enforcement and no bureaus that improve the
ﬂow of information to lenders.
This evidence reinforces the ﬁndings from the regressions about the negative rela-
tion between asymmetry on lending rates and ﬁnancial development.
97Table 2.3: Asymmetry on lending rates by country classiﬁcation
Countries classiﬁcation 1960-1990 1990-2004 1960-2004
Income Group 1 (Richest) 2.52 0.79 1.66
Income Group 2 2.92 1.81 2.37
Income Group 3 2.65 2.44 2.55
Income Group 4 (Poorest) 4.45 2.52 3.49
OECD 2.08 1.13 1.61
non-OECD 3.77 2.13 2.95
High contract enforcement 1.84 0.23 1.00
Low contract enforcement 4.10 1.24 2.67
Private Bureau 2.40 1.49 1.95
non-Private Bureau 4.03 2.07 3.05
Income classiﬁcation from the World Bank (WDI). Contract Enforcement
Indicator from Levine et al.(2000). Existence of a private bureau from
Djankov et al. (2004). Skewness by group is the simple average of the
skewness of ”member” countries for the referred period.
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2.2.2 Negative relation between asymmetry on lending rates and agency costs in
particular
The previous subsection shows in general the negative relation between asymmetries
on lending rates and general ﬁnancial and economic indicators. This paper proposes
that the speciﬁc determinants are the differences in monitoring and bankruptcy costs
and the degree of information asymmetry. If this is the case we should ﬁnd a negative
relation between asymmetry on lending rates and the level of agency costs.
The problem to perform this analysis is the unavailability of monitoring costs es-
timations for many countries. In fact even estimations of bankruptcy costs for the US
are subjects of a great controversy (Carlstrom and Fuerst [1997]).
Given the huge scarcity of information about these costs in the literature and, even
more, the big dissent about the existing estimations for the US, we use alternative
indicators to understand the speciﬁc impact of monitoring costs over asymmetries on
99lending rates.
Three exercises are developed to cope with the unavailability of direct information
on monitoring costs for many countries.
2.2.2.1 Evolution of technology and monitoring costs
Monitoring and bankruptcy costs are closely related to technology improvements since
theyarebasedontheefﬁciencytoauditaccountsandontheeasinesstoshareandtrans-
mit information. Naturally, the better the available technology (such as computers and
telecommunications), the less the monitoring costs existing on the ﬁnancial sectors5.
Table 2.3 shows that for each classiﬁcation group, the asymmetry in lending rates
decreases along time. At the same time, information technologies improve impor-
tantly and continuously from 1960. This positive relation between asymmetry and
monitoring costs, both decreasing in the last decades, is consistent with the theoretical
explanation we propose in this paper.
Monitoring costs (inextricably related to technology) increase the asymmetry on
lending rates. We propose this is why we observe a decrease in skewness for all coun-
tries along time.
2.2.2.2 Proxies for monitoring costs
Another alternative method to understand the relation between asymmetry and moni-
toring costs, given the lack of direct information about the later, is by the use of proxy
variables available for many countries. We will use two sets of proxies. The ﬁrst one
is based on Djankov et al. [2005], who speciﬁcally analyzes the time and cost of clos-
ing businesses. The second set of variables refers to the performance of ﬁnancial and
5Merton [1987] constitutes an early and powerful work on the impact of the informational technolo-
gies evolution over ﬁnance and monitoring.
100banking systems in general to ease the access and availability of information.
1) Bankruptcy costs and duration. (Djankov et al. [2005])
a)CostofBankruptcy: Costsofbankruptcyproceedings(as%oftheestatevalue)
that include court costs, as well as fees of insolvency practitioners, independent asses-
sors, lawyers, accountants, etc. It is calculated based on answers by practicing insol-
vency lawyers to a multiple choice survey.
b) Time for Bankruptcy: Years to complete a procedure as estimated by insol-
vency lawyers.
c) Recovery Rate: Measures the efﬁciency of foreclosure. It shows how many
cents on the dollar claimants (creditors, tax authorities, and employees) recover from
an insolvent ﬁrm. The calculation takes into account whether the business is kept as
a going concern during the proceedings, the discounted value due to the time spent
closing down and court, attorney, etc.
Even when it seems these variables are exactly the measures of monitoring and
agency costs we require, they have some drawbacks we should mention. First, the
estimation of bankruptcy costs is based on a multiple-choice question, where the re-
spondents choose among options biased towards zero6. Second, the variable presents
a very low variance, with 30% of the countries reporting 8% of the estate value cor-
responds to bankruptcy costs and 30% reporting 18%. In this sense, recovery rate
seems a better variable to capture our ideal measure of monitoring costs, given it is
constructed considering more bankruptcy elements.
Table 2.4 shows simple OLS regressions between skewness on lending rates and
these proxies. The general conclusion is that the more the monitoring costs, the more
the asymmetry. This can be observed in the statistically signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcients
6The options in the survey are 0-2 percent, 3-5 percent, 6-10 percent, 11-15 percent, 16-20 percent,
21-25 percent, 26-50 percent, and more than 50 percent of the estate value of the bankrupt business.




Cost of Bankruptcy 0.050
(0.013)∗∗∗




Constant 0.649 0.734 2.177
(0.229)∗∗∗ (0.374)∗∗ (0.425)∗∗∗
Observations 48 48 48
* Signiﬁcant at 10%, ** Signiﬁcant at 5% and *** Signiﬁcant at
1%. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All inde-
pendent variables were obtained from Djankov et al. [2005].
for cost and time of bankruptcy and the statistically signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient for
the recovery rate of claimants. The regressions are made only for the period 1990-
2004 because proxies are measured for 2004, not being relevant to explain processes
occurred 40 years before.
2) Contract enforcement and ﬁnancial sector health.
a) Contract Enforcement Days: The number of days to resolve a payment dispute
through courts. Variable constructed as at January 2003 by Djankov et al. [2005].
b) Legal protection to ﬁnancial assets
102c) Sophistication of ﬁnancial markets
d) Health of banking systems
Variables based on surveys conducted by the Global Competitiveness Report, 1999
(publishedbytheWorldEconomicForumanddirectedbySachs, PorterandMcArthur).
The variables are measured by an index that goes from 1 to 7 (from the worst possible
situation to the best possible situation).
Table 2.5 shows simple OLS regressions between skewness on lending rates and
these proxies. The general conclusion is again that the higher the monitoring costs and
contract enforcement delays and the smaller the capabilities of ﬁnancial and banking
sectors to ease the ﬂow of information, the higher is the asymmetry on lending rates.
This is delivered by the statistically signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient for contract enforce-
ment and the statistically signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcients for the other variables. The
regressions are computed for the period 1990-2004 following the same logic explained
for the ﬁrst set of proxies.
2.2.2.3 Financial Liberalization
An additional way to see the relation between monitoring costs and asymmetry in
lending rates is to follow the behavior of skewness before and after a shock in the
ﬁnancial system in which an abrupt change in the quality of monitoring costs occurred.
Such a shock can be, for example, a ﬁnancial liberalization process
Financial liberalization processes make ﬁnancial systems more prone to be inﬂu-
enced by modern foreign auditing and bankruptcy methods. Financial liberalization
processes also open ﬁnancial systems to competition that propitiates the environment
to adopt more efﬁcient monitoring practices, a better enforcement of contracts and an
easier ﬂow of information.




Contract Enforcement Days 0.0034
(0.0016)∗∗
Legal protection to ﬁnancial assets -0.358
(0.185)∗
Sophistication of ﬁnancial markets -0.321
(0.156)∗∗
Health of banking systems -0.469
(0.169)∗∗∗
Constant 0.38 2.95 2.53 3.49
(0.62) (1.03)∗∗∗ (0.75)∗∗∗ (0.94)∗∗∗
Observations 45 30 30 30
* Signiﬁcant at 10%, ** Signiﬁcant at 5% and *** Signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Contract Enforcement Days is the number of days to resolve a
payment dispute through courts. Variable constructed as at January 2003 by Djankov et al.
[2005]. Legal protection to ﬁnancial assets, sophistication of ﬁnancial markets and health
of banking systems are based on surveys conducted by the Global Competitiveness Report,
1999 (Sachs, Porter and McArthur).
104Hence ﬁnancial liberalization process are events in which, suddenly, monitoring
costs decrease and in general the quality of information gets better. In a similar vein,
an anti liberalization process that restricts competition would lead to a worsening in
the monitoring and auditing costs.
Table 2.6 shows a comparison of skewness in lending rates before and after the
main ﬁnancial liberalization event for 16 countries in which enough data exists to
reliably obtain skewness at both sides of the liberalization event (more than 100 obser-
vations at each side).
Data on ﬁnancial liberalization is obtained from Kaminsky and Schmukler [2001]
for the period 1973-1998. This database includes information on liberalization of cap-
ital accounts, domestic ﬁnancial sectors and stock market capitalization. For capi-
tal accounts authors consider whether corporations are allowed to borrow abroad and
whether multiple exchange rate mechanisms or other sorts of capital controls are in
place. Regarding domestic ﬁnancial liberalization authors explored interest rate con-
trols (lending and deposits) and other restrictions such as directed credit policies or
limitations on foreign currency deposits. Their analysis of stock market liberalization
encompasses the degree to which foreigners are allowed to own domestic equity and
restrictions on repatriation of capital, dividends and interests.
As can be seen, 10 out of 13 countries on the table show a reduction on the lending
rates asymmetry right after the main liberalization event. In the table, three countries
(Chile, Indonesia and Thailand) were not reported because they had experienced both
ﬁnancial liberalization and ﬁnancial restriction processes over the relevant period, not
being relevant just to pick one event.
Another interesting exercise to check for the robustness in the results is to consider
a comparison of asymmetry before and after the whole liberalization process and not
just one event. To cover this possibility and to cope with the experiences of Chile,
105Table 2.6: Asymmetry on lending rates before and after a main ﬁnancial liberalization
event
Country Main ﬁnancial Type of Skewness
liberalization event liberalization Pre-Event Post-Event
Month Year
Canada March 1975 KA 0.87 0.46
Finland January 1990 SM and DFS 0.42 0.15
France January 1985 DFS and KA 3.91 0.04
Italy January 1992 KA -3.76 0.82
Japan January 1985 SM 1.95 -0.28
Korea January 1991 SM -5.18 3.86
Philippines January 1994 KA and SM 0.37 0.18
Portugal January 1986 SM 4.00 -0.33
Spain December 1992 KA 2.07 0.45
Sweden January 1984 KA 3.45 0.11
UK October 1973 KA 3.85 1.46
US July 1973 KA -0.17 -0.08
Venezuela June 1995 SM 3.70 0.34
KA=Capital Account, SM=Stock Market, DFS=Domestic Financial System. Data
on liberalization dates from Kaminsky and Schmukler [2001].
106Indonesia and Thailand, Table 2.7 presents a summary of asymmetry before and after
the whole ﬁnancial liberalization process for each country, which naturally includes
the main event speciﬁed in Table 2.6.
As can be seen, 13 out of 16 countries considered experiment a reduction on the
lending rates asymmetry after the whole ﬁnancial liberalization process. From the
countries that do not follow the pattern, Italy and Korea show very strange skewness
levels (negative and of big magnitude) which is due to a huge lending rate decrease
experimented only once while US basically does not present any skewness (not statis-
tically different from zero) in either case.
It is also interesting to note that the behavior of the asymmetry reverts when con-
sidering ﬁnancial restrictions and not ﬁnancial liberalization processes. In this sense,
only Chile, Indonesia and Thailand had in the period considered ﬁnancial restriction
processes. When comparing before and after those processes, skewness on lending
rates in fact increases, as shown by Table 2.8.
These results reinforce the idea that reductions in monitoring costs, in this case
generated by sudden changes from liberalization practices, generate reductions in the
level of skewness.
As a conclusion of this subsection, whether considering the historical evolution of
technology for all countries, bankruptcy costs and duration, enforcement of contracts,
health or sophistication of ﬁnancial markets and the banking system or ﬁnancial liber-
alization processes as proxies of monitoring costs and ﬁnancial frictions in countries,
it seems pretty robust the conclusion that the more the monitoring costs, the more the
asymmetry on lending rates.
Exercises comparing groups of countries along time, cross sections across coun-
tries and the behavior of lending rates per country lead to the same conclusion. It
deﬁnitely seems to exist a positive relation between asymmetry of changes in lending
107Table 2.7: Asymmetry on lending rates before and after a ﬁnancial liberalization
process
Country START of ﬁnancial END of ﬁnancial Skewness
liberalization process liberalization process Pre- Post-
Month Year Month Year Process Process
Canada March 1975 March 1975 0.87 0.46
Chile January 1984 September 1998 1.13 0.55
Finland January 1986 January 1990 1.80 0.15
France January 1985 January 1990 3.93 0.08
Indonesia January 1983 August 1989 1.35 -0.09
Italy May 1987 January 1992 -3.64 0.82
Japan January 1979 January 1985 1.65 -0.28
Korea January 1988 January 1996 -6.87 3.81
Philippines January 1976 January 1994 7.85 0.18
Portugal January 1976 August 1992 4.55 -0.07
Spain January 1981 December 1992 2.17 0.45
Sweden January 1978 January 1989 3.70 0.11
Thailand January 1979 June 1992 1.56 0.14
UK October 1973 January 1981 3.85 1.93
US July 1973 January 1982 -0.17 -0.87
Venezuela March 1989 April 1996 3.47 0.37
KA=Capital Account, SM=Stock Market, DFS=Domestic Financial System. Data on
liberalization dates from Kaminsky and Schmukler [2001].
108Table 2.8: Asymmetry on lending rates before and after a ﬁnancial restriction process
Country START of ﬁnancial END of ﬁnancial Skewness
restriction process restriction process Pre- Post-
Month Year Month Year Process Process
Chile June 1979 January 1983 0.13 1.13
Indonesia March 1991 March 1991 -0.09 5.10
Thailand August 1995 May 1997 0.14 0.81
KA=Capital Account, SM=Stock Market, DFS=Domestic Financial System.
Data on liberalization dates from Kaminsky and Schmukler [2001].
rates and monitoring costs, enforcement possibilities and the degree of information
ﬂow and availability in the system.
2.2.3 Is the asymmetry on lending rates just a reﬂection of the asymmetry on
real variables?
An obvious question at this point is whether the results found so far is just a reﬂex of
what happens on the real side of the economy. If this is the case, the question should
changefromtryingtoexplainwhylendingratesaremoreasymmetricinlessdeveloped
countries to trying to explain why booms and crashes in the real side of the economy
relate with the development of ﬁnancial systems.
Notonlythisisacompletelydifferentquestionbutalsoitmeansthattherealsideof
the story cannot be considered separately. Table 2.9 however shows that skewness on
lending rates is not correlated with skewness on real variables such as real household
consumption or real GDP7. This means that a country with a high asymmetry on real
7Real GDP was obtained by deﬂating nominal GDP ﬁgures by CPI and by taking directly GDP in
volumes ﬁgures from the IMF database. Data were taken yearly from the IMF’s IFS.




Real GDP (deﬂated by CPI) 0.12 0.13 0.17
Real GDP (on Volume) 0.06 0.16 0.09
Real HH Consumption 0.12 0.09 0.12
Real variables are obtained yearly from the IMF’s IFS. Skewness of log
changes in lending rates have been obtained annually considering the in-
formation from December of each year.
GDP, for example, not necessarily presents also a high asymmetry on interest rates.
This section about stylized facts shows how the more developed a ﬁnancial system
inacountry(andparticularlythesmallerthelevelsofmonitoringandbankruptcycosts,
the higher the level of contract enforcement and the better the ﬂow of information), the
less the asymmetry of lending rates. This is important because a small asymmetry on
lending rates means crashes and booms of the same magnitude are similarly likely. On
the other side a big asymmetry means that booms are not as likely as crashes of the
same magnitude and then recoveries and reallocation of resources are more costly.




This model captures the previously described negative relation between asymmetry
and ﬁnancial development. It modiﬁes Veldkamp’s model by introducing ﬁnancial
frictions, agency costs and costly state veriﬁcation. In this way we can analyze the
impact of ﬁnancial development over skewness differences across countries.
Assume a credit market with a ﬁnite number N of entrepreneurs, who are poten-
tial risk neutral borrowers and a number M of perfectly competitive and risk neutral
lenders. It will be assumed that N < M, giving to borrowers all the negotiation power.
In each periodt, each entrepreneur observes a business opportunity. All opportuni-
ties have a common probability of success across entrepreneurs but different expected
proﬁts vit ∈ (v;v) in case of success 8. We assume entrepreneurs do not have access to
initial assets, hence they need to ask for a loan of 1 unit (i.e., the normalized cost of
the venture) in order to run the project.
If the entrepreneur decides to borrow, he will do that at an endogenous lending in-
terest rate (1+ρ), which depends on the expected rate of default and on the country’s
ﬁnancial development and monitoring costs, as will be shown shortly. If the entrepre-
neur decides not to borrow, he can always work for a exogenously ﬁxed wage w. If the
borrower is not lucky in the venture, he will receive a zero proﬁt.
The lender also has two possibilities. After deciding the lending rate, either to
lend in case some entrepreneur is willing to borrow at that rate or just to invest the
indivisible unit of capital in a risk free bond that pays an exogenous and constant rate
of return (1+r)
The probability of a venture success depends on an unobserved state variable that
8Given this support, trivial agents who always invest or who never invest are not included.
111can take two possibilities, a good state G or a bad state B. If there are good times the
probability of a loan being repaid is θg while in bad times that probability is given by
θb, such that θg > θb. Agents are not able to identify the state of the economy when
trading for a loan.
Until this point, the model is very similar to the one developed by Veldkamp. The
problem with the original set up such as described above is its impossibility to ex-
plain differences in skewness across countries without changing fundamentals. For
this reason the model is extended to assume information asymmetry and costly state
veriﬁcation.
Lenders cannot see ex-post if in fact the borrower was successful or not. As in
Townsend [1979] and Gale and Hellwig [1985], while cash ﬂows are costlessly ob-
servable to entrepreneurs or borrowers, they are observable to external creditors only
at some positive cost c. In return for receiving the loan in the ﬁrst period, borrowers
have to make a report. Depending on the report lenders may decide to monitor with
some probability γt.
Hence lenders have to rely on standard debt contracts as the ones described by
Gale and Hellwig [1985] to solve the information asymmetry. In return for receiving
the loan in the ﬁrst period, borrowers have to make a report. If entrepreneurs report a
success they are required to repay in the next period a state-invariant amount (1+ρ).
If borrowers report a failure, creditors pay the monitoring costs, observe the truth and
keep total proﬁts νi if the entrepreneur lied in the report and 0 otherwise.
The timing of the model can then be summarized as follows:
1) Agents enter each period with beliefs about the probability of being in a good
state (µt)
2) A debtcontract is determinedby lenders consideringthe costly stateveriﬁcation.
After this decision, entrepreneurs decide whether or not to take a loan and invest in a
112venture.
3) All lenders and entrepreneurs not participating in a loan contract, invest on their
outside options. Lenders not making a loan invest in the risk free venture obtaining
(1+r) while entrepreneurs not taking a loan work in a job that pays w.
4) Borrowers report the result of their ventures, the contract is fulﬁlled and all
payoffs are paid.
5) All reports and monitoring results are publicly observed.
6) State changes with a probability λ




A subgame perfect equilibrium (SPNE), for an initial belief µ0, is given by time se-
quences of borrowing decisions by each entrepreneur i {bit}, reporting decisions by
each borrower i if the venture is successful {zit}, lending rates set by each lender j
{ρjt}, monitoring probabilities when receiving unsuccessful reports by each lender j
{γjt} and beliefs (updated by Bayes formula) about the probability of being in a good
state {µt}, such that the following problems are solved in each period t:
a) Entrepreneurs: Given a set of available debt contracts, each entrepreneur i
chooses to take or not a loan and from which lender to take it (bit) and the probability
ofreportingthetruthincaseofhavingasuccessfulventure(zit), suchthatthefollowing




being θt = µtθg + (1 − µt)θb the expected probability of a successful venture,
which depends on the expected state of the economy.
b) Lenders: Given strategies of other agents, each lender j chooses an interest
rate (1+ρjt) and a monitoring probability when the borrower reports the venture was




being ljt = 1 if some borrower decides to take a loan from that lender j in period t.
We deﬁne by (nt) the total number of ventures funded in each period t, which





bit). This number will represent the number of signals used by the market to
update beliefs about the state of the economy.
c) Beliefs: From the nt funded ventures in period t, agents observe a number of
successes and failures9 and form posterior beliefs µP
t , using Bayes’ rule. 10
µP







Adjusting these posteriors by the probability of a change in state, the probability
of being in a good state in the next period is obtained by the following equation:
µt+1 = Pr(G)t+1 = (1−λ)µP
t +λ(1−µP
t ) (2.3)
9If the real number of successes is called sR, the number of successes observed and used in the
updating will be s = sRz+sR(1−z)γ. In case z = 1 then s = sR and the update proposed below is the
right one. We will show later z = 1 is in fact the case we should consider.
10RecallCn
s =Cn
n−s = n!/((n−s)!s!) and then drop from the equation.
114And ﬁnally, the probability of success of a given venture in the next period is given
by11:
θt+1 = Pr(s)t+1 = µt+1θg+(1−µt+1)θb (2.4)
2.3.2.2 Characterization




and always monitor a failure report (i.e., γjt = 1). All entrepreneurs i borrow (i.e.,
bit =1) indifferently from any lender j ∈{1,2,..,M} whenever vi ≥ e ν = 1
θt[1+r+w+
(1−θt)c]. All borrowers always report the truth (i.e., zit = 1).
Proof To obtain the SPNE, we work by backward induction in two steps. First
we obtain the optimum for lenders by characterizing the optimal debt contract to use.
Second we obtain the optimum for the entrepreneurs by taking as giving the contract
offered by lenders.
Step 1: Optimal decisions by lenders
Given lenders act in a competitive market, they make zero proﬁts in equilibrium.
Hence the debt contract is set such that expected proﬁts from lending are equal to the
potential proﬁts from investing in the free risk venture (1+r).
Lenders have to solve for lending rates considering the costly state veriﬁcation that
arises because they do not have information about the successfulness of the venture
they funded. Townsend, Gale and Hellwig showed that the optimal contract is given
by the standard debt contract.
When c > 0, the standard debt contract is characterized by a repayment on the
second period of a state invariant amount (1+ρ) in return for receiving one unit of
11Sometimes, to save notation and when no confussion may arise, I will set aside the subscript t +1
115capital in the ﬁrst period. If the entrepreneur fails to pay that amount reporting an
unsuccessful activity, lenders monitor the venture (paying the monitoring costs c >
0) and observe and keep for themselves the true company proﬁts. Obviously those
proﬁts are either zero, in the case the entrepreneur tells the truth and the venture was
in fact unsuccessful, or vi > (1+ρ), if the borrower lied and the venture was in fact
successful.
Statesinwhichmonitoringoccurscanbeinterpretedasbankruptcyandhencemon-
itoring costs can be interpreted as bankruptcy costs for the economy as a whole.
In general, when potential proﬁts π are a continuum variable, lenders determine
(1+ρ) such that expected proﬁts are equal to the outside option (1+r) after con-








In our particular model this condition can be simply written as:
(1−θt)(−c)+θt(1+ρjt) = 1+r
Since the expected probability of success is the same for all ventures, lending rates








Having determined the lending rates charged by all lenders, Gale and Hellwig
[1985] show it is optimal for lenders to always monitor when a failure is reported
(i.e., γjt = 1), such that in expectation they get the outside option.
Summarizing this part of the proof, at each periodt, all lenders j will set a standard
debt contract such that if the borrower reports a success, he pays a state independent
116rate given by equation (2.5) and if the borrower reports a failure, the lender monitors
for sure, (i.e., γjt = 1).
Step 2: Optimal decisions by entrepreneurs
Given this behavior by lenders, it is optimal to successful borrowers to always
report the truth (since they gain (νi −(1+ρ)) > 0 rather than 0 for sure in case of
lying).
Since lending rates charged by all lenders is the same it is irrelevant for borrowers
which lender j to take the loan from.
The only choice left to determine in equilibrium is whether entrepreneurs should
borrow or not (i.e., bit ∈ {0,1}). Since potential proﬁts are different across entrepre-
neurs, this choice is given by a cutoff value over vit such that an entrepreneur i borrows
(bit = 1) at period t whenever θt(vit −(1+ρt)) ≥ w.
Given (1+ρt) from equation (2.5), the rule for borrowing is then,





As can be seen, when the state veriﬁcation is costless to the lenders (c = 0), this
solution coincides with Veldkamp’s original model solution.
One of the most important results to trace from here is the number of ventures
funded in the economy because this is the number of signals used by agents to update
beliefs and to modify interest rates. The number of funded ventures is given by the





The number of ventures depends positively on the probability of a venture success
θt in three ways. A higher θt increases the expected payoff of borrowing, decreases
the market interest rate ρ and reduces the necessity of monitoring the venture because
it reduces the probability of a false unsuccessful report.





Of course a smaller e νt implies a higher number of signals nt as long as the cumulative
distribution of vit is monotonically increasing or, which is the same, whenever the
density function has mass in all points vi ∈ (v;v).
Because θt depends also positively on the probability of being in a good state µt
(∂θt
∂µt = θg −θb > 0 since θg > θb by assumption), the number of funded ventures
will depend also positively on the probability of being in a good state µt. Formally
this can be seen in the derivative of the cutoff e νt with respect to µt (∂e νt
∂µt = −(θg −
θb)
[1+r+w+c]
(µtθg+(1−µt)θb)2 < 0) since θg−θb > 0 by assumption.
This is important for the determination of signals in the economy. The greater the
value for µt, the greater is θt, the smaller the cutoff value e νt and the more the number
of funded ventures.
At this point it is important to see which are the main differences of introducing
agency problems in this model. Two important properties are added by agency costs.







Second, the greater c, the greater the cutoff value e νt entrepreneurs proﬁts vit have
to exceed in order to borrow. In this sense, the greater the monitoring costs, the smaller
118the number of funded ventures in the economy and hence the number of signals where







Two important conclusions arise. First, monitoring costs generate underinvestment
in all states. Second, the reduction in signals is not constant across states because, the
worst the belief, the more the restriction imposed by agency costs on investment. This
is because, when θt varies, c is scaled by a double effect in the numerator (1−θt) and
in the denominator (θt).
Figure 2.5 shows the relation between lending rates (1+ρt) and the expected prob-
ability of success (θt) for different levels of monitoring costs c. When the market
believe the probability of success is very high it is not very likely to spend on bank-
ruptcy later, hence monitoring costs do not impose serious restrictions on the levels of
lending rates and then on the determination of signals. Contrarily, when the market
believe the probability of success is very low it is very likely to spend on bankruptcy
later, hence monitoring costs matter a lot for the determination of lending rates and
signals.
This non-linear relation is important to understand the different relative impact of
monitoring costs on the formation of signals, rates and new ventures in different phases
of the cycle.
Since the number of signals is changing continuously in this model, to write an
explicit result as an analytical solution is intractable. This is why the results and con-
clusions from the model will be discussed with the help of Monte Carlo simulations in
Section 2.4.
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2.3.3 Asymmetry implications
This model generates time-irreversible lending rate changes on lending rates, which
basically means changes on lending rates have an asymmetric unconditional distribu-
tion where the probability of a large interest rate increase is higher than the probability
of a decrease of the same magnitude.
This feature of the framework contrasts with a constant information economy,
where the number of signals is given exogenously and changes on interest rates are
time-reversible and symmetric.
Our intention is not to provide a full proof of how the endogenous formation of
signals leads to time irreversibility and to asymmetric distribution of changes on lend-
ing rates (Veldkamp [2005] provides a ”four propositions” formal proof of this) but to
show how agency costs shape this property of endogenous information.
The following proposition analyzes how agency costs have an impact on asymme-
try and how differences in ﬁnancial development may imply differences in skewness
120onthedistributionoflendingrateschanges. However, wealsosketchesthemainpoints
about why endogenous information generates asymmetry in the ﬁrst place.
Proposition 20 In an endogenous information economy, assuming θg > θb, agency
costs increase asymmetry on lending rates.
Proof This proof proceeds in three steps. First, the concept of time reversibility is
introduced showing why a constant information economy does not present asymmetry.
The second step shows why an endogenous information economy is time irreversible
and then, asymmetric. Finally, the third step shows agency costs increase asymmetry
in such a context.12
Step 1: Time reversibility in a constant information economy
Time reversibility is deﬁned as the property of a stochastic process in which beliefs
in a good state are the time-reverse of beliefs in a bad state. In symbols, Pr[µG,t+1 =
x|µG,t = y] = Pr[µB,t+1 = x|µB,t = y]. In plain words, the increase in beliefs of being in
good times if, for example, all signals are successful should have the same magnitude
than the decrease of beliefs if all signals were unsuccessful.
Going to this extreme case, which represents the situation where the maximum
possible booms and crashes are obtained, consider the prior for the probability of being
in a good state is µt = x. If suddenly, all nt signals fail (st = 0), µt+1 = y < x. If in the
following period all nt+1 signals are successful (st+1 = nt+1) and the process is time
reversible, we should obtain that µt+2 = z = x.
12This proof is based on the case in which there is no state change (λ = 0) just to sketches the main
points about why the endogenous information model delivers asymmetry on interest rates. This is not
a critical assumption to show the impact of agency costs. A more general proof (with λ > 0) can be
found in Veldkamp [2005].
121If the economy has constant information, then the number of signals are the same
(say n) no matter the prior belief µ. Considering, without loss of generality, the case of
equally informative signals θ =θg =1−θb > 1
2 and assuming no state change (λ =0),
it is easy to show time reversibility.
Assume in period t initial beliefs are µt = x and all n signals fail (s = 0). Using
equations (2.2) and (2.3).




If in the following period t +1 all n signals are successful (s = n), then




and replacing (2.10) into (2.11), µt+2 = z = x. Hence, in a constant information
environment, beliefs respond to a time reversible stochastic process.
Step 2: Time irreversibility in an endogenous information economy
In an endogenous information economy, the number of signals is not independent
on the beliefs of being in a good state. In fact, the greater the probability assigned to be
in good times µt, the less the cutoff e νt given in equation (2.6) and the more the ventures
funded (the signals nt). Considering the same arguments and assumptions used in step
1, it’s possible to show the stochastic process is not time reversible anymore.
Assumeasbeforethatinperiodt, µt =xandallnx
t signalsfail(st =0)(thesubscript
t is now necessary because n varies on time and depends on beliefs. The superscript x
denotes nt depends on beliefs µt = x).







122Now, given y < x, borrowers are less conﬁdent about being in good times, the





If in the following period all n
y
t+1 signals are successful (st+1 = n
y
t+1), then










now replacing (2.12) into (2.13),























































basically means that highest possible decreases in beliefs (from x to y) are more likely
than increases in beliefs (from y to z) of the same magnitude. This is the same to say,
considering equation (2.5), that highest possible increases in lending rates are more
likely than decreases in lending rates of the same magnitude, which is a necessary and
sufﬁcient condition for the existence of positive asymmetry on lending rates.
Exactly the same conclusion (that z < x) can be obtained reverting the order of
successes and failures.
Hence, in an endogenous information economy, beliefs respond to a time irre-
versible stochastic process and lending rates show positive asymmetry.
Step 3: The effect of monitoring costs on lending rates asymmetry
123The magnitude and importance of the asymmetry is summarized by the differ-
ence z−x (equation 2.15) since it shows the degree of irreversibility in the stochastic
process and the gap in the probability of obtaining an increase in lending rates over the
probability of having a decrease of the same magnitude.
The gap z−x, for a given starting belief x and a given θ, only depends on the
difference (not on the levels) between n
y
t+1 and nx
t. The difference in the number of




t (assuming the cumulative distribution of v is monotonically increasing). For
example, if v is distributed uniformly n
y
t+1 −nx













This expression is positive when x>y because conﬁdence on good states decrease,
e ν
y
t+1 > e νx
t and the number of funded ventures decreases (n
y
t+1 < nx
t). The opposite is
true when x < y.
Hence, the impact of monitoring costs c over the gap n
y
t+1 −nx
t can be obtained
from its impact over (e ν
y
t+1−e νx










which is positive when x > y and negative when x < y
Two conclusions can be drawn from the last equation. First, the higher the differ-
ences in beliefs (x−y), the greater the impact of c on the number of funded ventures.
Second, monitoring costs do not have the same effect in the change of beliefs if µt is
closer to 1 than to 0. For a given difference in beliefs (x−y) the less conﬁdent agents
are about being in good times (x close enough to 0), the more important is the impact
of c on the gap between signals because agency costs become more restrictive.
124To check the impact of agency costs over symmetry assume the initial belief is
µt = x and all ventures fail such that x > y. By equation (2.16), (e ν
y





t. We will show the gap is greater under high agency costs than under low
agency costs.




t ) and (n
y
t+1 −nx
t). This is because, ﬁxing x the greater is e ν
y
t+1) and the smaller is
n
y
t+1). Considering equation(2.15) it is clear that high monitoring costs then widen
time irreversibility (given by z−x).
Hence, in an endogenous information economy with ﬁnancial frictions, the greater
the agency costs c, the more important the asymmetry on lending rates.
Q.E.D.
This Proposition shows that when comparing two countries with different levels
of monitoring costs c, both countries experience similar magnitude of crashes (given
by increases of lending rates) but the country with highest c show slower booms (de-
creases in lending rates) than a country with low agency costs. This translates into a
greater asymmetry of the changes on lending rates, the greater the levels of monitoring
costs.
This is a result shown empirically in subsection 2.3.4, where we found asymmetry
is mostly due to slower booms rather than sharper crashes. Even more, literature on
slow recoveries shows additional elements to conﬁrm the prediction that monitoring
costs increase asymmetry fundamentally by making booms slower 13.
13See for example Bergoeing et al. [2004].
1252.3.4 Additional testable predictions of the model
This model delivers a serie of testable predictions Naturally, the most important one
is that agency costs increase asymmetry on lending rates, as shown in Proposition 19.
This was the fact that motivates the introduction of agency costs in an endogenous
information model and was carefully tested in Section 2.2.
But there are also a couple of conclusions from the model that can be also tested in
the data.
2.3.4.1 Countrieswithlessdevelopedﬁnancialsystemsshowhigherlendingrates
A testable prediction from the model is that countries with less developed ﬁnancial
systems show, in average, higher levels of lending rates than countries with highly
developed ﬁnancial systems or, which is the same, with less ﬁnancial frictions and
agency costs.







Even when this relation seems very natural from a casual observation of economic
data, somebasicregressionswereestimatedtocheckwhetherlendingratesincountries
withlessdevelopedﬁnancialsystemsingeneralandhighmonitoringcostsinparticular
are high in average.
Table 2.10 shows a couple of regressions between the average level of lending rates
and ﬁnancial development (again measured by credit to private sector as a percentage
of GDP). The estimations are made only for the period 1990-2004 using both a sample
of all countries and a restricted sample of OECD countries.14,
14We only the period 1990-2004 because, unlike skewness, which is calculated using changes on
126Table 2.10: Lending rates average and ﬁnancial development
Dependent Variable 1990-2004
Lending rates average All countries OECD countries





* Signiﬁcant at 10%, ** Signiﬁcant at 5% and *** Signiﬁcant at 1%. Ro-
bust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
In general more developed ﬁnancial systems imply lower levels of lending rates.
In fact, an increase of 1% in credit to private sectors as a percentage of GDP implies a
reduction of around 0.2% in lending rates.
Table 2.11 is a mixture between Tables 2.4 and 2.5 but using as a dependent vari-
able average levels of lending rates. The goal is to measure more speciﬁcally the
relation between levels on lending rates and proxies for the health of the ﬁnancial sys-
tem and monitoring, enforcement and ﬂow of information costs. Variables not reported
(cost and time of bankruptcy and contract enforcement days), even when having the
correct sign, are not statistically signiﬁcant.
An important drawback is that, unlike regressions to explain skewness, compar-
isons of lending rate levels across countries may be capturing important differences in
methodologies and deﬁnitions from the dataset.
lending rates along time for each country, averages of lending rates are highly dependent on the used
measurement methodology. IMF’s information for the nineties is more standardized across countries,
making comparisons more reliable. for the same reason we took out most of African countries, restrict-
ing the same to OECD countries rather than non-African ones.





Legal protection to ﬁnancial assets -5.63
(0.98)∗∗∗
Sophistication of ﬁnancial markets -3.71
(1.00)∗∗∗
Health of banking systems -2.76
(0.90)∗∗∗
Constant 32.11 44.31 32.24 30.44
(4.31)∗∗∗ (5.45)∗∗∗ (4.98)∗∗∗ (5.20)∗∗∗
Observations 49 29 29 29
* Signiﬁcant at 10%, ** Signiﬁcant at 5% and *** Signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
128All in all, even when we have to be more careful with these regressions than
those explaining skewness, results seem consistent with the particular prediction of
the model. Agency costs seem to increase lending rates, leading to under-investment
and slower generation of signals necessary to fuel booms.
2.3.4.2 A higher asymmetry on lending rates is related to slower booms rather
than to sharper crashes
The model also predicts that big asymmetries generated by high monitoring costs are
characterized by slower booms rather than by sharper crashes. The intuition is that, in
good times investors become very conﬁdent about the probability of success. In this
context monitoring costs lose importance to determine the number of signals in the
economy. Hence, when a crash occurs, it is based on similar conditions, no matter the
magnitude of agency costs.
Contrarily, when times are bad, monitoring costs introduce serious borrowing con-
straints and reduce importantly the signals in the economy. If times change, booms
are slower the fewer the number of signals. In this sense ﬁnancial frictions introduce a
sharper effect in booms rather than in crashes.
To show this formally, consider a country A with monitoring costs (cA), higher than
those on country B (cB). It is possible to obtain the difference in the number of signals
by the difference on cutoffs from equation (2.6).











< 0. For example, if θt = 1 (very good times) there is no difference in cut-
offs, which means agency costs do not affect at all the construction of signals in the
economy. Contrarily, if θt = 0 (very bad times) the difference in cutoffs is inﬁnite.
129Given crashes occur after good times (where θt is high), the difference in their
magnitude between the two countries is almost unaffected by differences in monitoring
costs since the number of signals are very similar. Contrarily, booms occur after bad
times when θt is low and monitoring costs reduce the number of signals a lot. In this
context booms in country A will be slower than booms in country B. In other words,
recoveries are slower in countries with high monitoring costs and ﬁnancial frictions.
To test this particular prediction from the model we generate an indicator per coun-
try called Booms duration that measures the proportion of periods the economy is be-
low the trend, recovering from a crash.
The trend of lending rates is obtained using a standard HP ﬁlter on the series of the
changes on lending rates (ln(ρt+1)−ln(ρt)). We deﬁne recovery periods as those in
which lending rates decrease in comparison to the trend. Other periods are considered
crash periods. Since there is not a standard measure in the literature for this concept
we propose just a ratio between numbers of recovery periods over the total periods in
the sample.
Table 2.12 presents OLS regressions between skewness on lending rates and the
Booms duration for the samples used before. A positive coefﬁcient means countries
with high asymmetry on lending rates are characterized by booms and recoveries that
take in average more time to occur than crashes.
As can be seen it is possible to ﬁnd a positive relation between the magnitude
of the skewness and the duration of booms. Furthermore, this relation is statistically
signiﬁcant in the whole sample. This means high asymmetry is mostly characterized
by slower booms rather than by sharper crashes.
130Table 2.12: Asymmetry on lending rates and duration of booms
Dependent Variable All countries OECD countries
Lending rates skewness 1960-1990 1990-2004 1960-1990 1990-2004
Booms duration 7.69 6.89 2.03 3.03
(2.47)∗∗∗ (2.22)∗∗∗ (2.37) (1.68)∗
Constant -1.87 -1.82 0.80 -0.28
(1.20) (1.03)∗ (1.29) (0.60)
Observations 67 57 15 12
* Signiﬁcant at 10%, ** Signiﬁcant at 5% and *** Signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 2.13: Parameters used in the simulation
θg θb λ r w N
0.97 0.95 0.027 0.0042 1 25
2.4 Simulations
In this section an endogenous information economy with agency costs, as the one
discussed above, will be calibrated to see if the model is able to replicate the magnitude
of differences in skewness found in the data.
When possible, simulations are performed using the same calibration parameters
than Veldkamp [2005] in order to make our results comparable with hers. Table 2.13
summarizes the list of parameters.
Veldkamp [2005] obtained θg and θb from default rates on US speculative grade
bonds given the unavailability of default data for emerging markets bond. The prob-
ability of a state transition λ was obtained using World GDP from the Penn World
131Table 2.14: Montecarlo results
Monitoring Costs (c) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Skewness of (ln(ρt)−ln(ρt−1)) 1.60 1.79 2.08 2.56 3.49
MonteCarlo S.E. 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.12
tables. The largest potential number of independent observable signals N was sharply
overcame measuring the speed of price adjustments in the US. Parameters r and w only
affect the scale of the lending rate and skewness is invariant in scale15. The same num-
bers can be used as benchmark in this exercise, even when trying to match a greater
number and diversity of countries, given the parameters are obtained either from US
or from the whole world.
Ten thousand repeated simulations, each with 10,000 periods, produce average
skewness estimates depending on monitoring costs. Monte Carlo standard errors are
also reported for each case. Since we assumed the initiation cost for each venture is
1, a monitoring or bankruptcy cost given, for example, by c = 0.3 represents a cost of
30% of total asset values. Table 2.14 shows the asymmetry implied by the model for
different monitoring costs possibilities.
As formally shown above, the greater the monitoring costs in this simulated econ-
omy the greater the skewness of changes in lending rates. Even more, Monte Carlo
standard errors show that differences in asymmetry caused by different monitoring
costs are statistically signiﬁcant at standard conﬁdence levels.
The result without monitoring costs (skewness=1.60) is the same as in Veldkamp
[2005] when using uniformly distributed investment payoffs. One of the drawbacks in
that paper is the difﬁculty to match successfully the data about asymmetry on lending
rates for 13 emerging markets she analyzes (skewness=2.9).
15Skewness is independent on r and w since the support of vi is [v,v], where v = 1+w+r
θ , v = 1+w+r
θ ,
θ is the most optimistic probability of success and θ the most pessimistic one.
132At this point Veldkamp experimented with different parameters to match the data.
She was able to increase the simulated skewness, for example, by decreasing the prob-
ability of state switching (by reducing λ), generating clearer signals (by increasing
θg −θb) or changing the assumed distribution of potential proﬁts νi. However these
changes imply countries with a very stable state or those with clearer signals are those
with higher asymmetry. Since these characteristics are more common in developed
countries than in developing ones, Veldkamp [2005] results seem contradictory with
the data.
Introducing monitoring costs, and without modifying the parameters calibrated
from real information, the skewness based on Veldkamp’s 13 emerging markets (2.9)
is consistent with bankruptcy costs of 35% over total asset values.
Nowwecanface, asshownbyFigure2.1and2.2, therelationbetweentheseresults
and the fact that less developed countries can present either high or low skewness
levels. By introducing monitoring costs we are introducing a compensating force to
more volatile states or noisy signals in developing countries, which tend to reduce
asymmetry levels. Considering the high dispersion of parameters such as λ, θg and θb
among developing countries in comparison with developed ones, developing countries
high monitoring costs, but also with unstable states and noisy signals, can in fact show
low relative skewness.
This is exactly why in Table 2.2 and Figures 2.3 and 2.4 we controlled skewness
by the volatility of GDP per capita, lending rates and consumer prices, raw estimations
for λ in each country.
An interesting question we can answer from these exercises is: What is the mag-
nitude of monitoring costs consistent with skewness differences reported in Section
2.2?. The idea is to obtain from this very basic and rustic model an idea of differences
in agency costs across countries. This is a straightforward application of the model to
133Table 2.15: Implied monitoring costs to match real data on lending rates asymmetry
Countries classiﬁcation Real Cost of Consistent c (in %)
Skewness Bankrupt Point Range
Income Group 1 1.66 7.1 7 2−11
Income Group 2 2.37 18.5 25 22−28
Income Group 3 2.55 18.6 31 28−33
Income Group 4 3.49 23.6 39 37−41
OECD 1.61 9.0 7 2−11
non-OECD 2.95 20.1 33 30−36
High contract enforcement 1.00 6.5 0 0
Low contract enforcement 2.67 16.8 26 24−30
Private Bureau 1.95 11.6 15 12−18
non-Private Bureau 3.05 20.3 34 32−36
Countries classiﬁcation and Real Skewness columns are taken from columns 1 and 5 of
Table 2.3. Bankruptcy costs are taken from Djankov et al. [2005]. ”Consistent c” refers to
monitoring costs that, given the parameters, allows to match real skewness. The range is
determined using two Montecarlo standard deviation at each side of the point estimation.
offer an, surprisingly missing, information about the magnitude of monitoring costs
differentials across countries.
Table 2.15 shows the results. Monitoring costs consistent with skewness in each
classiﬁcation group and the range within two Montecarlo standard deviations are re-
ported. As can be seen estimations are signiﬁcant since ranges do not intersect.
Table 2.15 also shows bankruptcy costs indicators used in Section 2.2. The reason
to include them in the Table is to compare the monitoring costs implied by the model
with the subjective measure of foreclosure costs offered by Djankov et al. [2005].
As can be seen, even when bankruptcy costs obtained from surveys by Djankov
134et al. [2005] (column 3) and consistent c obtained from a simulation of our model
(column 4) are two imprecise measures of monitoring costs, it is impressive the high
correlation between them. In fact monitoring costs delivered by the calibration are
consistently higher than bankruptcy costs reported by Djankov et al. [2005]. This
sustained bias can be rationalized at least in two ways.
First, monitoring costs from the model replicate skewness measured for the period
1960-2004 while bankruptcy costs from Djankov et al. [2005] is measured for the year
2004. As discussed in Section 2.2, technologic improvements and an easier ﬂow of
informationimplythatmodernmeasuresofbankruptcycostsarelowerthanolderones.
Doing the same exercise for the period 1990-2004 closes the gap between columns 3
and 4 for poorer countries but delivers zero monitoring costs for richer ones.
Second, bankruptcy costs as measured by Djankov et al. [2005] exclude bribes,
which can raise monitoring costs considerably. Even more, this will be true funda-
mentally for poorer countries with low contract enforcement. This may be the reason
why the gap between monitoring costs implied by the model are bankruptcy costs by
Djankov et al. [2005] is not only positive but also increasing as countries become less
ﬁnancially developed.
At this point it is important to put these results into context with a brief discussion
about the literature on monitoring technology and bankruptcy costs, where a great
debate exists about the correct way to measure them.
One of the ﬁrst attempts to estimate bankruptcy costs was done by Warner [1977]
who, considering only direct costs of bankruptcies, and using data on the railroad in-
dustry, found a cost of around 4% of total ﬁrm’s assets. Altman [1984] included also
indirect costs, raising the estimation at about 20% of total ﬁrm’s assets. Indirect costs
include ﬁnancial distress, such as lost sales and lost proﬁts. Another way bankruptcy
costs were estimated in the literature is due to Alderson and Betker [1995], by com-
135paring the value of the ﬁrm as a going concern with the liquidation value of the ﬁrm.
This calculation of bankruptcy costs accounts for approximately 36% of ﬁrm’s assets.
As can be seen, the possible range for bankruptcy costs given by the literature
is very wide and imprecise. Furthermore, the few available estimations are typically
based on the US or another developed country. This controversy lies fundamentally
on differences in deﬁnitions. The interpretation most closely related to the concept of
bankruptcy costs used here is the one that only considers direct costs, as Warner did.
This is because no indirect cost can arise in the environment described by the model
and no liquidation value of the ﬁrm can be obtained.
The model seems very successful in matching the magnitude of asymmetry from
the data not only with previous estimations of monitoring technology but also with new
subjectiveindicatorsacrosscountries. Evenwhenthemodelisverybasicandsimple, it
can offer common-sense consistent bankruptcy costs, with sensible differences among
various countries’ classiﬁcations. This is particularly important given the nonexistence
of direct estimations of this type for developing countries.
All in all, this exercise can offer an idea of monitoring costs in developing coun-
tries. Even when the method to obtain them is very indirect and based on a very
limited and simple model, the results in fact make a lot of sense and seem to be robust
to different speciﬁcations.
2.4.1 What about levels?
A natural question at this point is whether monitoring costs are able to explain the big
differences we observe in levels of lending rates across countries. This is not an easy
task for a simple model such as the one proposed in this paper, mostly considering that
lending rates in countries with poor ﬁnancial systems almost double those existing in
136developed markets 16.
In our model, levels on lending rates depend exclusively on free risk interest rates,








This means lending rates can be expressed as the sum of three terms: A risk free
interest rate, a risk premium (which depends on the risk free interest rate adjusted by
default rates) and costs that arise from ﬁnancial frictions and costly state veriﬁcations.
From this formula, our model can explain big differences on lending rates only by
a combination of big differences on risk free interest rates, on probabilities of success
and on monitoring costs. In this subsection we show that most of the differences in
levelsinfactcomesfromdifferencesin”riskfreeinterestrates”, (astypicallymeasured
by the literature), which affect levels but not skewness.
Up to this point, to make the skewness simulations we just considered the US risk
free interest rate, we used default rates from the riskiest speculative-grade US bonds
to obtain probabilities of success and, from there, we estimated consistent monitoring
costs. Now it’s important to discuss the role of each one of these components before
simulating levels.
First, in the previous calibration we used as a risk free interest rate (r) the average
of 3-month US Treasury Bills Yields from 1990 to 2005. Since in our model skewness
is invariant in scale, the speciﬁc number used did not matter for skewness comparisons
and for the determination of consistent monitoring costs. However, to simulate levels
we need to obtain risk free interest rates for other economies as well. In this sense
we use 3-month Treasury Bills Yields for the countries in the sample 17. We ﬁnd
16See for example the ﬁrst column in Table 2.16
17This information was obtained from the Global Financial Dataset, taking averages per country
between 1990 and 2005 when available.
137surprising disparities among them, as shown in column 3 of Table 2.16, which suggests
government bonds in developing countries are not really ”risk free” since they include
default risks, country risks, exchange volatility risks, etc.
Second, default rates are obtained from Moody’s bonds information from 1970-
2000. In skewness simulations, probabilities of success are US speculative-grade
bonds and not ”all corporate” ﬁgures, since emerging markets bonds (whose default
rates are not available) are likely to be riskier than typical US corporate bonds. Hence,
tosimulateskewnessweuseda5%probabilityofdefaultinrecessionyears(θb =0.95)
and 3% in non-recession years (θg =0.97). Even when this may be a good assumption
for developing countries, this is not necessarily true for developed ones. Hence to do
the simulations about levels for developed countries we obtain default rates from US
”all corporate” bonds (θb = 0.97 and θg = 0.98)18.
Finally, to simulate levels we use the monitoring costs that make the model con-
sistent with skewness data, as shown in column 4 of Table 2.15. Results from the
simulations as well as the three components of lending rates from equation (2.18) are
displayed in Table 2.16.
As can be seen, the importance of monitoring costs on levels of lending rates are
lowwhencomparedwiththeimportanceofdifferencesinriskfreeinterestratesandthe
multiplicative effects of default rates (through θ). However, it’s important to recognize
thatmonitoringcostsaccountsformorethan20%oflendingratesspreadindeveloping
countries (1.7/7.6 for income group 4) and less than 5% in developed ones (0.1/3.0
for income group 1).
All in all, even when it seems monitoring costs are not very important to explain
differences on lending rates levels, their importance to explain the spread decreases as
18These default rates reduce the estimation of monitoring costs for developed countries in the pre-
vious exercises when skewness was simulated. However this reduction was not very important since
monitoring costs were already low.
138Table 2.16: Real vs. Estimated lending rates







Income Group 1 9.6 9.4 6.6 2.7 0.1
Income Group 2 18.5 19.2 13.5 4.7 1.0
Income Group 3 18.5 18.0 12.0 4.7 1.3
Income Group 4 24.4 23.4 16.8 4.9 1.7
OECD 10.8 11.2 8.4 2.7 0.1
non-OECD 20.9 20.4 14.3 4.7 1.4
High contract enforcement 8.4 8.8 6.0 2.0 0.0
Low contract enforcement 20.7 22.3 16.3 4.9 1.1
Private Bureau 14.3 16.9 11.6 4.7 0.6
non-Private Bureau 23.2 21.4 15.2 5.8 1.4
139ﬁnancial systems become more developed.
In Appendix 2.6.3 we also discuss the capacity of the model to deliver the big
differences in volatility of real lending rates across countries. However we show, as
in this section, most of the action comes directly from risk free interest rates, about
which the model does not have much to say.
Since the model assumes ﬁxed risk free interest rates, the fact that they are much
higher and much more volatile in underdeveloped countries, reduces the magnitude
in which the model may contribute to match the data. Even when differences across
countries in the ﬁrst and second moments of lending rates seem to be led by the differ-
ences in the ﬁrst and second moments of risk free interest rates, this does not seem to
be the case for the third moment of changes.
Asymmetry in changes of risk free interest rates do not differ signiﬁcantly across
countries. Hence monitoring costs are very important in understanding the differences
in asymmetry we show exists across countries.
2.5 Conclusions
A well documented characteristic of ﬁnancial markets is their asymmetry in changes
over cycles. While booms are slow and gradual, crashes are sudden and sharp. This
feature represents a non trivial fact to countries since it may generate economic prob-
lems such as ﬁnancial distress, banking crisis and costly reallocation of resources.
But, aside from the existence of asymmetry in a country along time, an interesting
characteristic that surges from the data is that less ﬁnancially developed systems, with
high monitoring and bankruptcy costs, show in average higher levels of asymmetry.
While a diverse and rich literature tries to explain why asymmetry exists, this is the
ﬁrst attempt to understand why asymmetry differs across countries.
140We introduce agency costs into an endogenous information model (which has the
property of generating unconditional asymmetry) to replicate differences observed in
the data. The idea of a model with endogenous ﬂow of information is that, in good
times there is more economic activity than in bad times, generating a greater number
of signals and more information. The asymmetry in the rate of transmission of in-
formation across states is the origin of the asymmetry on lending rates. Booms and
recoveries are gradual because agents learn slowly about better conditions when few
signals are available. Contrarily, crashes are sharp because agents learn quickly that
worse conditions arose since a lot of information is available.
When agency costs are introduced in this environment it is possible to generate
even more asymmetry. The main reason is that agency costs reduce investment (the
number of signals), but their impact is not the same across states. These costs are
more restrictive in bad times since an agency problem is more likely to arise. After
a crises high monitoring costs prevent a fast renew of economic activity, slowing the
generation of signals, making harder for agents to learn about the new conditions and
slowing down recoveries.
Even when strikingly simple, the simulation of this model delivers an estimation
of cross-country differences in monitoring costs that match observed skewness differ-
ences.
Direct monitoring costs of around 5% match the data for developed countries while
monitoring costs of around 30% match the data for developing countries. These ﬁgures
are consistent with some new ”survey-based” evidence of differences in bankruptcy
costs across economies. Furthermore the model is able to match differences on levels
of lending spreads across countries.
1412.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Sample of Countries
The sample of countries used, based on the classiﬁcation by income levels, is shown
in the following table. We also report the skewness of log changes of lending rates for
each country considering the period 1990-2005.
Table 2.17: Countries included in classiﬁcation by income
 
UNITED STATES -1.11 CANADA 0.27
UNITED KINGDOM -1.01 SPAIN 0.40
JAPAN -0.42 NORWAY 0.41
GREECE -0.42 KUWAIT 0.54
CHINA,P.R.:HONG KONG -0.38 SLOVENIA 0.69
PORTUGAL -0.12 NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 0.70
BELGIUM 0.06 CHINA,P.R.:MACAO 0.85
FRANCE 0.09 ISRAEL 1.30
FINLAND 0.16 KOREA 3.96
BARBADOS -1.49 CROATIA 1.35
VENEZUELA, REP. BOL. 0.17 ARGENTINA 1.55
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 0.39 MEXICO 1.55
URUGUAY 0.60 BRAZIL 2.54
HUNGARY 1.02 CZECH REPUBLIC 3.42
SOUTH AFRICA 1.19 GABON 6.12
THAILAND -1.15 SRI LANKA 0.76
EL SALVADOR -1.01 JORDAN 1.54
EGYPT -0.62 JAMAICA 1.97
SWAZILAND -0.02 GUYANA 2.75
PHILIPPINES 0.12 INDONESIA 4.80
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 0.12 BOTSWANA 6.95
COLOMBIA 0.13 CAPE VERDE 6.99
PARAGUAY 0.76
KENYA -1.42 ANGOLA 1.39
NEPAL -1.01 BANGLADESH 1.68
LAO PEOPLE S DEM.REP -0.44 MADAGASCAR 1.75
SIERRA LEONE -0.05 ZIMBABWE 1.91
UGANDA 0.05 HONDURAS 2.19
ARMENIA 0.17 MALAWI 3.25
BURUNDI 0.38 CAMEROON 3.82
HAITI 0.45 CHAD 4.94
INDIA 0.46 CONGO, REPUBLIC OF 5.10
CAMBODIA 0.55 CENTRAL AFRICAN REP. 5.14
ZAMBIA 0.74 ALBANIA 8.24
NICARAGUA 0.88 ETHIOPIA 8.41
TANZANIA 1.36
Income Group 4 Poorest)
LR Skewness (1990-2005) by Country Classification
Income Group 1 (Richest)
Income Group 2
Income Group 3
142The countries included in the other classiﬁcations we use are the following.
Table 2.18: Countries included in other classiﬁcations
 
 
OECD (15 countries)  Non-OECD Countries (55 countries) 
Belgium, Canada, Czech Rep., Finland, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, UK, US. 
Albania, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, CAR, Chad, Colombia, 
Congo, Croatia, Dominican Rep., Egypt, El 
Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao, Macao, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Nepal, Netherlands Ant., 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Philippines, Sierra Leone, 
Slovak Rep., Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
High Contract Enforcement (10 countries)  Low Contract Enforcement (16 countries) 
Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Japan, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, UK, US. 
 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Greece, India, Israel, 
Kenya, Korea, Mexico, Philippines, South Africa, 
Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Zimbabwe. 
 
Private Bureau (27 countries)  Non-Private Bureau (33 countries) 
Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, 
Czech Rep., El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Hong 
Kong, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Korea, 
Kuwait, Mexico, Norway, Paraguay, Philippines, 
Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, UK, 
Uruguay, US. 
 
Albania, Angola, Armenia, Bangladesh, Belgium, 
Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, 
Congo, Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Haiti, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Lao, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Nepal, Nicaragua, Sierra 





2.6.2 Robustness on Skewness Classiﬁcation
In the main text we analyze the differences in skewness in log changes of real lend-
ing rates across countries, using several classiﬁcation related to ﬁnancial development.
In this Section of the Appendix we extend that exercise following two alternative ap-
proaches.
First, we use the same classiﬁcation but we obtain skewness in the distribution of
log deviations from trend. Trends of lending rates for each country are obtained using
an HP ﬁlter. For each month we obtain the difference between the log of lending rates
and the log of the trend. The skewness is calculated over such distribution per country.
143Table 2.19: Asymmetry on lending rates by country classiﬁcation (using differences in
the log deviation from trend)
Countries classiﬁcation 1960-1990 1990-2004 1960-2004
Income Group 1 (Richest) 2.49 1.00 1.74
Income Group 2 2.82 1.97 2.40
Income Group 3 2.60 2.14 2.37
Income Group 4 (Poorest) 4.32 2.46 3.39
OECD 2.05 1.25 2.15
non-OECD 3.66 2.11 2.89
High contract enforcement 1.84 0.32 1.08
Low contract enforcement 4.00 1.22 2.61
Private Bureau 2.37 1.51 1.94
non-Private Bureau 4.93 2.14 3.54
Following this approach we are able to discuss whether the results depend or not
on speciﬁc properties of the trend across countries. Table 2.19 shows that the results
are basically the same than the obtained in the main text using log changes of lending
rates along time.
Second, the model in this paper is in fact a model of lending rates spreads rather
than a model of lending rates levels since we do not discuss the determination of risk
free interest rates. Hence, in the next Table we analyze cross country differences in
skewness of log changes in spreads rather than levels. As above, we use the same
classiﬁcations than in the main text in order to easy comparisons.
Lending rates spreads are obtained subtracting risk free interest rates (measured
by the average of 3-month Treasury Bills Yields for each country from the Global
144Financial Dataset in the period 1990-2005) from the real lending rate, using as a base
the year 1995. The skewness information is obtained from the log changes distribution
of this spread variable.
Table 2.20 shows the results are consistent with the ones obtained in the main text.
Spread Asymmetry seems to be higher among poor, non-OECD countries with low
enforcement of contracts. However we should be cautious with the conclusions since
dataaboutriskfreeinterestratesisnotavailablewithahighqualityforunderdeveloped
countries.
Since the main point of the paper is to compare developed and underdeveloped
countries, the analysis of spreads is seriously hindered. However, for the 37 countries
we have consistent information about risk free interest rates, the correlation between
skewness based on levels of lending rates and skewness based on spreads of lending
rates is positive (0.84) and statistically signiﬁcant at 1% of conﬁdence. This is the main
reason we focus directly in analyzing levels of lending rates in the main text rather than
spreads.
2.6.3 Volatility of Lending Rates
As discussed in the main text, the model is a model of spread of lending rates rather
than a model of levels of lending rates. This is because the model just takes risk free
interest rates as ﬁxed. Hence, in the case of levels we assigned the corresponding risk
free interest rates to each country and obtained spread levels in the data. As shown, the
model cannot match the level of lending rates but it can match the levels of spreads in
lending rates.
We follow a similar procedure for volatilities. In Table 2.21 we can see that lend-
ing rates are more volatile in poor countries, with underdeveloped ﬁnancial systems.
However this seems to be due to higher volatility in risk free interest rates rather than
145Table 2.20: Asymmetry on lending rates spread by country classiﬁcation
Countries classiﬁcation 1960-1990 1990-2004 1960-2004
Income Group 1 (Richest) NOT 0.48 0.48
Income Group 2 Enough 0.79 0.67
Income Group 3 Data 0.92 0.90
Income Group 4 (Poorest) 0.83 0.78
OECD 0.58 0.56
non-OECD 0.77 0.69
High contract enforcement 0.26 0.43
Low contract enforcement 1.15 1.16
Private Bureau 0.89 0.75
non-Private Bureau 0.72 0.75
by higher volatility in spreads. While the volatility in 3-month T-Bill yields is more
volatile in poorer countries this is not the case for spreads, which do not seem to follow
a clear pattern across countries. The data was obtained from the same sources as in the
exercise about levels and the period 1980-2004.
Even when the model is consistent with the data in terms of not not delivering any
patter of spread volatility across countries, it fails importantly in matching the level of
volatility.
Hence, differences in monitoring costs and ﬁnancial systems do not seem to have
an effect on volatility of spreads. The higher volatility of lending rates in poorer coun-
tries seem to be exclusively the result of higher volatility in risk free interest rates in
those countries.
Figure 2.6 shows the highly signiﬁcant (economically and statistically) positive
146Table 2.21: Data vs. Estimated Volatility in changes of lending rates
Country Volatility (in % - St. Dev.)
classiﬁcation Data Model
Lending T-Bill Spread Spread
Rates Rates
Income Group 1 4.2 10.8 29.3 1.1
Income Group 2 4.4 6.6 28.2 1.0
Income Group 3 9.6 12.2 32.3 0.9
Income Group 4 6.3 12.4 31.9 0.9
OECD 4.5 7.2 32.9 0.9
non-OECD 6.9 12.2 28.1 0.9
High contract enforcement 3.5 7.2 32.4 0.9
Low contract enforcement 8.6 10.3 29.9 0.8
Private Bureau 6.1 10.4 29.5 0.7
non-Private Bureau 7.1 13.5 33.7 0.7
147relation between volatilities of lending rates and risk free interest rates. Countries with
high volatility of lending rates are also countries with high volatility of T-Bills rates.
This relation suggests the high volatility of lending rates in poor countries are mostly
due to high volatility of risk free interest rates, not high volatility of spreads. This
last result is consistent with the model. However, the model is completely unable to
explain the high magnitude of spread volatility.
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151CHAPTER 3
Why are Wages Smoother than Productivity? An
Industry-Level Analysis
(with David Lagakos)
In this paper we document a new fact about the cyclical behavior of productivity
and wages. Using industry-level time series on wages and labor productivity, we show
that in high-wage industries, wages respond relatively little to industry productivity
shocks, whereas in low-wage industries, productivity movements result in relatively
large movements in wages. In other words, wages are substantially ”smoother” than
productivity over time in high-wage industries, while wages are comparatively less
smoothin low-wageindustries. Toexplain thisfact wedevelop avariant ofthe Thomas
and Worrall [1988] wage contracting model. The two key features of our model are
match speciﬁc skills, which serve to increase wage smoothing in the contract, and
exogenous match separations, which serve to reduce smoothing. We show that, empir-
ically, a higher fraction of the skills of the high-wage workers are match-speciﬁc than
the skills of the low-wage workers, and that job separation rates are lower for high-
wage workers than low-wage workers. A calibrated version of the model accounts
quite well for the facts at hand.
1523.1 Introduction
In this paper we document a new fact about the cyclical behavior of productivity and
wages. Using industry-level time series on wages and labor productivity, we show that
in high-wage industries, wages respond relatively little to innovations in industry pro-
ductivity, whereas in low-wage industries, productivity movements result in relatively
large movements in wages. In other words, wages are substantially ”smoother” than
productivity over time in high-wage industries, while wages are comparatively less
smooth in low-wage industries. We show that this ﬁnding is robust within manufac-
turing and service industries, and in both the US and the majority of OECD countries
for which we have data. To the best of our knowledge we are the ﬁrst to document this
fact.
Weﬁndthisfactpuzzlinginlightofstandardimplicit-contracttheory(Baily[1974]
and Azariadis [1975]). According to implicit-contract theory, workers and ﬁrms agree
to a wage contract in which the worker receives wages that are smoother over time
than the worker’s marginal product, and in return the ﬁrm pays the worker wages that
are on average lower than the worker would earn in spot markets. The key assumption
in this theory is that workers are more risk averse than ﬁrm owners. This assump-
tion is typically justiﬁed by arguing that workers have worse access to asset markets
than ﬁrm owners, and hence have less means of otherwise smoothing their consump-
tion. However, since low-wage workers generally have less access to asset markets
than high-wage workers, the theory suggests that low-wage workers would have the
smoother wages rather than high-wage workers. Our ﬁndings show exactly the oppo-
site.
To help resolve this puzzle, we develop a variant of the Thomas and Worrall [1988]
wage contracting model, in which a risk-neutral ﬁrm and risk-averse worker agree
upon an optimal wage contract under limited commitment. The limited commitment
153is two-sided: both the worker and the ﬁrm can renege on the contract after any history.
The state of the world in each period is characterized by the worker’s productivity,
which evolves exogenously. Following Thomas and Worrall [1988], we restrict our
study to wage contracts that are self-enforcing, meaning that neither party has an in-
centive to renege on the contract in any state of the world.
The optimal contract in this environment speciﬁes wage smoothing: wages move
as little as possible after any productivity realization to keep both parties at least in-
different to remaining in the match. The amount of wage smoothing sustainable in
equilibrium depends on the outside options of the worker and ﬁrm. The better the out-
side options, the less smoothing can be sustained. In our model, the ﬁrm and worker
have the option of leaving the match and going to spot markets in any period. If the
worker goes to spot markets she earns her marginal product in every subsequent pe-
riod. If the ﬁrm ﬁres its current worker, it may match up with another worker, but
competition among ﬁrms leads to zero expected proﬁts from any given match.
We depart from Thomas and Worrall [1988] by adding two new features into the
environment, each of which qualitatively affects the amount of wage smoothing sus-
tainable in the optimal wage contract. The ﬁrst feature is match-speciﬁc skills, which
are lost if either party leaves the match. In the model, wage smoothing is increasing
in the fraction of the worker’s skills that are match speciﬁc, since the worker can take
fewer of her skills to a new ﬁrm, and hence is less productive in any new ﬁrm. The
second feature we add is the possibility of an idiosyncratic, exogenous job separation.
In the model, smoothing is decreasing in the probability of a separation to the match.
Intuitively, the more likely the worker and ﬁrm are to separate, the less either party will
value promises of higher future payoffs in exchange for lower payoffs in the present,
as is required in order to smooth wages.
Ourhypothesisaboutwhythehigh-wageindustriesgetrelativelymorewagesmooth-
154ing is as follows. First, a higher fraction of the skills of high-wage workers are match-
speciﬁc compared to low-wage workers. In other words, high-wage workers stand to
loose relatively more from leaving their current job, and hence have relatively worse
outside options than low-wage workers. Second, the probability of a job separation is
higher for low-wage workers. In our model, both of these features lead qualitatively to
smoother wages for high-wage workers.
Since our theory rests on these two differences between high and low-wage jobs,
we document that both components are in line with empirical evidence. The more
well-known of the two is the differences in separation rates across the two sectors. In
the literature on job turnover, numerous studies document higher separation rates for
low-wage industries; two recent examples include Davis et al. [2006] and Fallick and
Fleischman [2004]. Regarding industry average wages and the fraction of skills that
are match speciﬁc, we provide our own supporting evidence using estimates of wage
losses for workers separated in mass layoffs as a proxy for match-speciﬁc skills. Car-
rington and Zaman [1994] estimate the average wage losses for displaced workers by
detailed industry, which we match with our own measures of industry average wages.
We show that workers in high-wage industries tend to lose a higher fraction of their
wages than low-wage workers after a large layoff, which we interpret as evidence that
a higher fraction of the skills of high-wage workers are match-speciﬁc.
As a test of our theory, we ask whether a calibrated version of our model can
match the degree of wage smoothing we observe in the the cross section of industries.
Speciﬁcally, we calibrate two versions of our model: one to represent a typical high-
wage industry and one to represent a typical low-wage industry. We treat the empirical
match-speciﬁcity of skills and separation rates as exogenous characteristics of the two
sectors. We ﬁnd that the two calibrated versions of our model predict degrees of wage
smoothing that are quite similar to their empirical counterparts.
155Our paper contributes to two distinct literatures. The ﬁrst is the recent labor search
and matching literature in macroeconomics, which seeks to explain equilibrium un-
employment through matching frictions. A major challenge in this literature has been
to explain how relatively small exogenous productivity shocks translate into relatively
large movements in hiring, and hence equally large movements in the unemployment
rate. 1 One potential resolution of the puzzle, explored by Hall [2005], Menzio [2005]
and Rudanko [2006], among others, centers around wage contracts in which wages
move little in response to a productivity shock, giving ﬁrms large incentives to hire
new workers after small exogenous increases in productivity. 2
Our paper contributes to this literature in two ways. First, we document the cross-
industry variation in the response of wages to productivity, which can be used to test
among existing theories of why wages respond little to productivity shocks, such as
those described above. Second, we propose an alternative mechanism for the response
of wages to productivity that is grounded in the empirical response observed in the
cross section of industries. Our paper contrasts with those of Hall and others in that
wefocusspeciﬁcallyonexplaininghowandwhywagesrespondtoproductivityshocks
rather than the implications for unemployment volatility. In a related paper (Lagakos
and Ordonez [2007]) we relate our empirical ﬁndings directly to the unemployment
volatility puzzle using an industry version of Shimer [2005].
The second literature to which our paper is related is the one on risk sharing among
private agents in the economy. This literature has focused in large part on impediments
to risk sharing and the welfare implications of imperfect risk sharing. Recent papers
by Krueger and Perri [2005], and Heathcote et al. [2004] have demonstrated that the
1Using a stochastic version of the Mortensen and Pissarides [1994] model calibrated to match im-
portant moments of the US labor productivity series, Shimer [2005] ﬁnds that the model predicts just
10% of the volatility of unemployment and vacancy postings seen in the data.
2This literature describes the unresponsiveness of wages to productivity as ”wage rigidity” or ”wage
stickiness.”
156wage volatility has ﬁrst order effects on consumption volatility and large effects on
welfare more generally. Our paper contributes to this literature by analyzing how wage
volatility arises in the ﬁrst place for employed workers. Since the ﬁrm is an important
vehicle for sharing risk, it is important to understand the impediments to risk sharing
between ﬁrms and workers. Our paper highlights two speciﬁc impediments: a lack
of match-speciﬁc skills for the worker, which forces wages to respond to changes in
either party’s outside option, and the likelihood of an exogenous separation, which
serves to discount the future of the match.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 3.2 we discuss our industry-
level wage and productivity data, our measure of wage smoothing, and our empirical
ﬁndings about the pattern of wage smoothing across industries. In Section 3.3 we
present our wage contracting model, and in Section 3.4 we calibrate the model and
describe our quantitative ﬁndings. In Section 3.5 we conclude.
3.2 Wage Smoothing: The Industry-Level Facts
3.2.1 Description of data
We use two main sources of data on industry productivity and wages in the study. The
ﬁrst source, available for the US, is the value-added by industry data constructed by the
US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We use two different BEA data sets, each
with annual industry-level measures of value added, employment, and compensation
of labor. Our longest data set uses the 1972 Standard Industry Classiﬁcation (SIC)
codes, covers the entire private economy, and is available annually from 1947-1987.
The second uses the 1987 SIC codes, and covers the shorter period from 1987-1997.3
3Unfortunately we cannot conduct a similar analysis for the North American Industrial Classiﬁcation
System(NAICS),whichistheBEA’spreferredindustrydeﬁnition, becausetheBEAhasnotyetreleased
historical employment data by NAICS industries.
157We could not combine these time series into one long panel of industries, since several
important industries changed deﬁnitions in 1987.
Our second data source is the OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) database, which
is constructed using the national accounts of major OECD nations, including the US,
and supplemented with data from national surveys of ﬁrms. For each country, our data
set contains annual industry-level measures of value added, employment, and compen-
sation of employees. The data is available from 1970 or later to 2000, depending on
the country. The industries comprise all sectors of the economy, and are standardized
across countries according to 2-digit International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation
(ISIC) codes.4
The two main variables of interest are labor productivity and average compensation
of labor. In each of our data sets, total compensation of labor consists of all salaries,
bonuses, contributions to medical and pension plans, and any other compensation that
is not in-kind. Our measure of average compensation per employee is total industry
laborcompensationdividedbyfull-time-equivalent(FTE)employees. Throughout, we
use the term ’wages’ to mean ’average compensation of employees’ for expositional
purposes. Our measure of labor productivity is real industry value added divided by
FTE employees.5 Employees consist of both production and non-production workers.
For all countries we create real wage and value added data by deﬂating nominal values
by a national consumer price index or its closest equivalent. To capture the relatively
high-frequencycomponentinourvariableswede-trendproductivityandwagesineach
industry, in each country, using an HP ﬁlter with smoothing parameter λ = 100.
4The STAN dataset is available for purchase online directly from the OECD at
http://www.oecd.org/sti/stan/. Documentation can be freely downloaded from the
same site. The list of industries comprising the STAN database can be found at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/19/1830838.html.
5For countries in which FTE employment is not available, we use the total number of employees
instead. The choice of labor measure does not seem to drive any of our results: for countries with both
labor input measures the results were very similar under the two measures.
158Valueaddedisdifﬁculttomeasureinindustriesthatdonothavemarket-determined
output prices. For this reason we drop any industry that consists of non-market activi-
ties, or in which market prices are not readily available.6 In particular, we drop public
administration, defense, and compulsory social security; education; health and social
work; real-estate activities; other community, social, personal services; and private
household employees. We also drop agriculture since problems in measuring employ-
ment (particularly for non-paid family workers) exist in several countries.
3.2.2 Our Measure of Wage Smoothing
We measure the amount of smoothing in industry j as εj in the linear model:
wj,t = εjpj,t +uj,t (3.1)
where wj,t and pj,t are average wages and labor productivity in industry j at time
t, each expressed in log deviation from trend, and uj,t is an error term. Our wage-
smoothing measure εj has the interpretation of the elasticity of wages in deviation
from trend with respect to productivity in deviation from trend.7 We refer to this elas-
ticity as the wage-productivity elasticity throughout the paper. Industries with wage-
productivity elasticities close to one are industries with little wage smoothing, and
industries with elasticities close to zero have a high degree of smoothing.
To illustrate this measure of wage smoothing, we plot de-trended wages and pro-
ductivity in two select US industries in Figure 3.1. Each plot in the ﬁgure shows value
added per worker (green lines with +’s) and compensation per worker (blue lines with
x’s) expressed in log deviations from trend. For expositional purposes we selected
two industries that display clear differences in their degrees of wage smoothing. The
6Here we follow the STAN documentation. See pages 6-9.
7We omit the constant term in this regression under the assumption that when productivity is at trend,
then wages will be at trend as well.
159Figure 3.1: Wage-Productivity Elasticities in Two Select US Industries.
Wage-Productivity Elasticities in Select Industries
18 . 0
, =
p w ε 51 . 0
, =
p w ε
wage-productivity elasticity in Rubber & Plastics manufacturing is 0.18, indicating a
high degree of smoothing, while in Textile manufacturing, the wage-productivity elas-
ticity is 0.51.8 As is apparent in the ﬁgure, wages in textiles are considerably more
responsive to a change in productivity than in Rubber & Plastics.
Figure 3.1 presents summary statistics for these elasticities for all industries, as
well as for just service industries and just manufacturing industries. We deﬁne services
here to be all industries in our data set that do not constitute manufacturing, mining,
or mining-related industries. The statistics are all weighted by industry employment,
which is crucial since industry sizes vary substantially.9 The ﬁrst thing to take away
8We omit the standard errors of industry elasticities here and elsewhere. We ﬁnd that they are
relatively small: on the order of 0.05 or smaller in almost all cases, without substantial variation across
industries.
9To save space we omit summary statistics for US industries in the OECD STAN database and for
160from this table is that mean (and median) elasticities are roughly comparable across
manufacturing and services, with services above the overall average at around 0.5,
and manufacturing below at around 0.3.10 The second ﬁnding, and perhaps the more
interesting one, is that both services and manufacturing exhibit large variation in elas-
ticities, with standard deviations of around 0.15 and 90-percentile ranges from around
0 to 0.5 in manufacturing and from around 0 to 0.8 in services. These results show that
there have been vast differences in wage smoothing across industries of all types over
the post-war period. We now turn to the question of which types of industries tend to
have the highest degrees of smoothing.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for US Wage-Productivity Elasticities, 1947-1987.
Industry Type Mean Median Standard Deviation 5th Percentile 95th Percentile
All 0.41 0.39 0.18 0.06 0.73
Manufacturing 0.28 0.27 0.12 0.05 0.51
Services 0.47 0.46 0.17 0.07 0.79
3.2.3 High-Wage Industries Have the Most Smoothing
In this section we detail our main empirical ﬁnding with regard to wage-productivity
elasticities, namely that elasticities tend to be lower in industries with high average
the SIC 1987 industry deﬁnition. These statistics were extremely similar.
10Theﬁrstpaperweareawareoftomeasurethewage-productivityelasticityintheUSisbyHagedorn
and Manovskii [2006], who arrive at an estimate 0.45 for aggregate BLS data. This estimate is entirely
in line with our ﬁndings for the average US industry in each of our data sets.
161wages. We document this pattern ﬁrst for US industries, using our three different data
sets, and then for industries in OECD countries, using the STAN data set. Within the
US, we show that this pattern shows up within manufacturing industries as well as
within service industries.
Figure 3.2 displays our main result for the US, using the BEA time series from
1947-1987. Each ”bubble” on the ﬁgure represents one industry, where the size of
each bubble is the industry employment weight. The y-axis represents the wage-
productivity elasticity and the x-axis represents the industry average wages in 1987
in thousands of 2005 dollars.11 The main feature of the graph is the strong negative re-
lationship between industry average wages and elasticities, demonstrating that higher
wage industries tend to getthe most smoothing. The employment-weighted correlation
across industries is -0.53, indicating a robust negative relationship between the indus-
try average wage and the wage-productivity elasticity. We obtained similar results in
the STAN dataset for the US, with a correlation of -0.66, and in the shorter BEA series,
with a correlation of -0.38.
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Figure 2.2: Wage-Productivity Elasticities and Average Wages in US Industries.
salient industry characteristics, using our entire sample of industries as observations.
Table 2.3 shows the results of this regression, where the independent variables are
a manufacturing dummy plus (the logs of) industry average wages, the volatility of
industry productivity, the autocorrelation of industry productivity, and the industry’s
labor share in value added. As is evident from the regression results, the only industry
characteristicthatturns outtobe statisticallysigniﬁcant fromzero istheindustry wage.
Furthermore, it has an economically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient. A hypothetical doubling
of an industry’s average wage holding all else constant yields an elasticity that is lower
by 0.19, which constitutes roughly 25% of the entire range in elasticities we see in the
data. We conclude from the regression results that whatever drives wage smoothing is
63
11We choose 1987 because it is the latest year of our series.
162We explore the robustness of this result in two ways. First, we show that the nega-
tive correlation between the average wage and the wage-productivity elasticity appears
within both manufacturing and service industries. Table 3.2 shows the correlations in
each data set for just the manufacturing industries, and just the service industries (as
well as for the whole economy). In all cases the correlation between the wage produc-
tivity elasticity and average wage is negative.
Table 3.2: Correlations of Wage-Productivity Elasticities and Average Wages in US
Industries.
Data Source Industry Deﬁnition Industries Correlation of εw,p and w
OECD STAN, 1970-2000 ISIC, Rev 3. All -0.66
Manufacturing -0.48
Services -0.58
US BEA, 1947-1987 SIC 1972 deﬁnition All -0.53
Manufacturing -0.48
Services -0.42
US BEA, 1987-1997 SIC 1987 deﬁnition All -0.38
Manufacturing -0.27
Services -0.33
The second way we check robustness is to regress the wage-productivity elastic-
ity on the industry average wage and other salient industry characteristics, using our
163entire sample of industries as observations. Table 3.3 shows the results of this regres-
sion, where the independent variables are a manufacturing dummy plus (the logs of)
industry average wages, the volatility of industry productivity, the autocorrelation of
industry productivity, and the industry’s labor share in value added. As is evident from
the regression results, the only industry characteristic that turns out to be statistically
signiﬁcant from zero is the industry wage. Furthermore, it has an economically sig-
niﬁcant coefﬁcient. A hypothetical doubling of an industry’s average wage holding all
else constant yields an elasticity that is lower by 0.19, which constitutes roughly 25%
of the entire range in elasticities we see in the data. We conclude from the regression
results that whatever drives wage smoothing is closely related to the average industry
wage.
Next we examine whether this result holds in other OECD countries. Table 3.4
showsthesamecorrelationsoverotherOECDcountriesinoursample, usingtheSTAN
data. Just as for the US, we compute the correlations weighing each industry by total
employment in the last year in which data is available. Due to short samples in some
countries for some industries, we drop any industry whose elasticity standard error was
greater than 0.1. Next, we drop any country with less than 10 industries, so as not to
generalize about too few particular industries.12
The results for OECD countries largely mimic the US in that there is a negative
correlation between the wage level and the wage-productivity elasticity. For 8 coun-
tries out of 17, the correlation is below -0.2, indicating a reasonably strong negative
relationship, for an additional 6 countries the relationship is weaker, but still negative,
and for just 3 of the 17 countries the relationship is positive. The main limitation of
this analysis is that the time series are relatively short for most countries, with just 20
12While these choices are fairly arbitrary, we ﬁnd that the results do not change in any important way
for other similar choices. For instance when taking 0.05 as our cutoff for the standard error, and 20 for
our cutoff on the number of industries, we end up with more industries and fewer countries but the same
overall result.
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years of data or less available in most cases.13. Even so, at the very least our ﬁnd-
ings suggest that the negative relationship between elasticities and wage levels is not
idiosyncratic to the US, but in fact exists in a number of modern economies.
13A more comprehensive comparison of results across OECD and developing countries, using longer
time series, would be both useful and interesting, although it is outside of the scope of this paper.
In particular, it would be interesting to relate this correlation and the elasticities more generally to
differences in labor regulations and unionization rates across these countries, which are likely to play
an important role.
165Table 3.4: Cross-Industry Correlations of Wage-Productivity Elasticities and Average
Wages, OECD Countries.
Country Time Period Correlation of εw,p and w
US 1970 - 2001 -0.66
Spain 1986 - 2000 -0.61
Belgium 1980 - 1999 -0.45
Netherlands 1980 - 2000 -0.44
Sweden 1980 - 1999 -0.43
Germany 1991 - 2000 -0.39
Luxembourg 1985 - 2001 -0.36
Austria 1980 - 1999 -0.24
Portugal 1988 - 1999 -0.18
Finland 1975 - 2001 -0.18
Norway 1980 - 1997 -0.13
France 1980 - 2000 -0.08
Japan 1980 - 1998 -0.08
Korea 1980 - 1997 -0.01
Australia 1980 - 1999 0.10
Italy 1980 - 2001 0.11
Denmark 1980 - 2001 0.33
3.2.4 Characteristics of High and Low-Wage Industries
In this section we explore further the characteristics of high-wage industries and low-
wage industries. In particular, we show that there are two important dimensions along
166which high-wage and low-wage industries differ: separation rates, and the extent to
which human capital is match speciﬁc.
First, separation rates are lower in high-wage jobs. This could be because of the na-
ture of the work, or perhaps that low-wage industries jobs tend to be disproportionately
in smaller ﬁrms, which have relatively high exit rates. Cite a couple of sources.
Second, a higher fraction of skills are match-speciﬁc in high-wage jobs (Jacobson
et al. [1993] and Carrington and Zaman [1994]).
Figure3.3showsourresults. Theyareforaworkerwiththeeconomy-wideaverage
tenure and experience in Carrington and Zaman [1994]’s sample. The graph shows
that industries with higher average wages have higher average displacement costs. It
is important to note one of the major limitations of the Carrington and Zaman [1994]
ﬁndings is that the elasticities tend to be very imprecisely measured for any given
industry. For example the average industry in their sample had a standard error roughly
the same size as the point estimate of displacement costs. We should therefore take
great caution when interpreting the coefﬁcient of any individual industry.
Finally, it is worth noting that the goal of this paper is not to analyze too deeply
the origins of higher separation rates and match-speciﬁc capital for high-wage indus-
tries, but rather just to take them as given and consider their implications for wage
smoothing.
3.3 Model
In this section we develop a model of wage contracting between a worker and ﬁrm,
and we use the model to demonstrate how match-speciﬁc capital and separation rates
inﬂuence the degree of wage smoothing present in the optimal wage contract. We
show that a higher degree of match-speciﬁc skills leads to smoother wages, as does a
167lower probability of an exogenous separation. In the calibration section to follow, we
document empirically that a higher fraction of the skills of the high-wage workers are
match-speciﬁc than the skills of low-wage workers, and that job separation rates are
lower for high-wage workers than low-wage workers. The model therefore predicts
that high-wage workers will have smoother wages than low-wage workers.
3.3.1 Environment
A risk-averse worker and risk-neutral ﬁrm are matched. We assume that the worker






where E0 is the expected value operator at time 0, ct is consumption, and β ∈ (0,1)
is the worker’s discount factor. The utility function u(·) is assumed to be strictly in-
creasing and strictly concave. Workers are endowed with one unit of labor each period
which they supply inelastically to the ﬁrms for wage wt. We abstract from asset mar-
kets or storage possibilities, and so the worker’s consumption each period equals her
wage: ct = wt.
The ﬁrm operates a constant-returns technology that uses labor from one worker
as the sole input to produce output yt. The ﬁrm keeps the output, which it sells for a







A worker matched to a ﬁrm can either be skilled in the match, or unskilled in the
match. We let θ ∈ {0,1} represent the possession of skill in the match, where θ = 1
represents a worker possessing match-speciﬁc skills and θ = 0 represents a worker
without match-speciﬁc skills. We let m ∈ [0,1] represent the fraction of a worker’s
skills that are match-speciﬁc. Finally, let p ∈ R+ represent the current realization of
168productivity in the match; we will explain how productivity evolves in detail below.
The production function is given by:
y = F(p,m,θ) = p(1−m(1−θ)) (3.4)
In other words when the worker possesses match-speciﬁc skills, output from the match





p if θ = 1
p(1−m) if θ = 0
(3.5)
where m represents match-speciﬁc capital and τ represents the amount of tenure re-
quired to acquire the capital. We assume that the ﬁrm keeps all the output from pro-
duction and pays the worker a wage in each period. Productivity p is stochastic and
takes on one value each period in the set P ≡ {p1,p2,...,pS} where pi < pj for i < j.
We assume that productivity evolves as a ﬁrst-order Markov chain, where αp0,p is the
probability of transitioning to state p0 from state p.
At the beginning of each period t the productivity state pt is realized. If they both
decide to stay in the match then output yt is produced, and the worker gets wage wt.
Either party may leave the match after pt realizes, however, in which case they both
get their respective outside options. Let P(p) denote the value of the ﬁrm’s outside
option in productivity state p. We assume that if the ﬁrm breaks the match it can match
up with a new worker, but the new worker does not trust the ﬁrm and will only accept
a wage equal to her output in each period. In this case the ﬁrm will earn zero proﬁts in
each period. So P(p) = 0 ∀p ∈ P.
The worker’s outside option is to join another ﬁrm. Let V(p) denote the worker’s
outside option in state p. We assume that if the worker leaves the match she becomes
unskilled in the new match for n periods, and only afterwards does she gain match-
speciﬁc skills in the new match. In addition, the new ﬁrm will not trust the worker
169and will pay her a wage each period exactly equal to her output. We can express her













The ﬁnal component of the environment is the possibility of an exogenous separa-
tion, which we assume occurs with probability s ∈ [0,1) each period. If an exogenous
separation occurs in productivity state p then the worker gets V(p) and the ﬁrm gets
P(p).
3.3.2 Wage Contracting Problem
We now consider the optimal wage contracting problem in this environment. For now
assume that at the initial period the worker is entitled to a particular utility promise v,
and the worker begins as skilled in the match. Following Thomas and Worrall [1988]
we consider only contracts that are self-enforcing, in the sense that in no state of the
world does either party have incentive to break the contract.
Let P(v,p) be the ﬁrm’s value function given a promised utility v for a worker in
productivity state p, which represents the maximized expected discounted proﬁts from













to worker self-enforcement constraints for every future state:
v0(p0) ≥V(p0) ∀p0, (3.9)
170and to ﬁrm self-enforcement constraints
P(v0(p0),p0) ≥ P(p0) ∀p0 (3.10)
The self enforcing constraints guarantee that neither party ever wants to leave the con-
tract. Separations only occur exogenously. As in Thomas and Worrall [1988], the
optimal wages in the contract will be functions of current and one-period-prior pro-
ductivities (p,p−1), and the optimal wages will move as little as possible to satisfy the
self-enforcing constraints.
Proposition 21 Thomas and Worrall [1988] Let (p−1,p,p0) be any productivity his-
tory in P×P×P, and let w ≡ w(p,p−1) and w0 ≡ w(p0,p) be the optimal wage after
history (p,p−1) and (p0,p). Then w0 and w satisfy
1. w0 > w ⇒ v(p0) =V(p0)
2. w0 = w ⇒ v(p0) >V(p0) and P(v,p0) > P(p)
3. w0 < w ⇒ P(v,p0) = P(p)
Proof See Appendix 3.6.1. Q.E.D.
Proposition 22 Thomas and Worrall [1988]. Let (p−1,p,p0) be any productivity his-
tory in P×P×P, and let w ≡ w(p,p−1) and w0 ≡ w(p0,p) be the optimal wage after
history (p,p−1) and (p0,p). Then
1. if w0 > w then v(p0) =V(p0)
2. if w0 = w then v(p0) >V(p0) and P(v,p0) > P(p)
3. if w0 < w then P(v,p0) = P(p)
171Proof See Appendix 3.6.1. Q.E.D.
The proposition says that if wages rise from one period to the next, they do so just
to the point where the worker is indifferent between staying in the match. Similarly, if
wages fall they do so until the ﬁrm is indifferent. Finally, if wages stay the same then
it must be the case that both parties strictly prefer the match to their respective outside
options. In short, wages are smoothed as much as possible such that both parties are
willing to stay in the match. This result highlights the fact that the amount of wage
smoothing will depend in large part on the outside options for each party.
Also just as in Thomas and Worrall [1988] we have the following corollary about
the domain on which optimal wages must lie.
Proposition 23 For all p ∈ P there exists an interval [wp,wp] such that
1. w(p,p−1) ∈ [wp,wp] ∀p−1
2. when w(p,p−1) = wp then v =V(p), and
3. when w(p,p−1) = wp then P(v,p) = P(p)
This result says that the range of optimal wage always lives in an interval where
the worker is indifferent between staying in the contract or not at the lowest wage in
the interval, and the ﬁrm is indifferent at the highest wage in the interval. This result
will be used to greatly simplify the quantitative analysis to come later.
3.3.3 Two-state Version
For the remainder of the paper we consider a two-state version of the model. As we
will show below, two features of the productivity process in the model have direct im-
plications for the amount of wage smoothing present in the optimal contract. These are
the volatility and autocorrelation of the productivity series. We note that the two-state
172version of the model will not restrict our quantitative analysis with regards to autocor-
relation and volatility: both can be captured with a 2-state Markov chain representing
the productivity process.
In this version we consider the set of productivity states to be P = {pL,pH} where
pL < pH. Let α be the persistence parameter in the transition matrix. Denote the two
intervals described in Proposition 23 by [wL,wL] and [wH,wH] in states pL and pH. We
immediately get the following two corollaries, which depend on whether or not the
two intervals [wL,wL] and [wH,wH] overlap or not.
Corollary 24 If wL ≥ wH then the optimal wages are constant after the ﬁrst time pro-
ductivity switches states.
To see this result, let wL >wH, and take an arbitrary initial state (for exposition say pL)
and an arbitrary initial wage w0 that satisﬁes Proposition 23. Once the state switches to
pH, we know by Proposition 22 that if w0 < wH then the wage rises until the worker’s
self-enforcement constraint binds, i.e. until w = wH. But this wage is now incentive
compatible in both states, and hence by Proposition 22 it remains constant for all future
periods. If on the other hand w0 ≥ wH then it is incentive compatible to both parties in
both states to begin with, and hence it remains constant.
Corollary 25 If wL < wH then the optimal wages (wL,wH) after the ﬁrst time produc-
tivity switches states are given by wL = wL and wH = wH for all remaining periods.
The intuition for this corollary is seen as follows. Take an arbitrary initial state (for
exposition again say pL) and an arbitrary wage that satisﬁes Proposition 23. Once the
state switches to pH, we know by Proposition 22 that the wage rises until the worker’s
constraint binds, i.e. until w = wH. By Proposition 22 again we know that while at
pH the wage remains constant. When pL realizes the wage must fall until the ﬁrm’s
173constraint binds, i.e. until w = wL. Similarly, wages remain constant while in pL.
When pH realizes again we have w = wH.
These corollaries describe the two possible types of wage dynamics in the model:
perfect smoothing and imperfect smoothing. So far we have said nothing about the
initial wage, or alternatively the initial utility promise to the worker. However, the
initial split of the surplus is not of particular importance in this model, since the wage
dynamics are set as soon as the productivity switches states. Therefore, we focus on
the long-run implications of the wage contract, which we deﬁne to be after the state
has switched at least once. We also focus on the case of imperfect wage smoothing
(i.e. wL < wH), since this is the empirically relevant case. Now, by Corollary 25, we
conclude the wages in the optimal contract are wL = wL and wH = wH in all periods.
Let VL(wL,wH) ∈ R+ and VH(wL,wH) ∈ R+ be the worker’s expected discounted
utilities in states pL and pH under wages (wL,wH). Similarly, let PL(wL,wH) ∈ R+
andPH(wL,wH)∈R+betheﬁrm’sexpecteddiscountedproﬁtsintheoptimalcontract
in states pL and pH. The optimal contract can then be pinned down by the following
system of two equations and two unknowns, wL and wH:.
VH(wL,wH) = ¯ V(pH) (3.11)
PL(wL,wH) = ¯ P(pL) = 0. (3.12)
We now turn to how wages in the optimal contract depend on fundamentals of the
environment, in particular the match-speciﬁc capital m, separation rate s, and volatility
and autocorrelation of the productivity process.
Proposition 26 Wage smoothing is increasing in m, i.e. ∂wH
∂m < 0 < ∂wL
∂m .
The intuition for this result is that losing match speciﬁc skills has a ﬁrst-order
negative effect on the value of the worker’s outside option in all states. Reducing this
outside option allows the ﬁrm to obtain lower average wages that are smoother.
174Proposition 27 Wage smoothing is decreasing in s, i.e. ∂wL
∂s < 0 < ∂wH
∂s .
The separation rate acts to discount future utility promises for both parties, since
there is less expected future in the match. But discounting the future of the match more
heavily reduces the willingness of either party to sacriﬁce in the present in exchange
for future payoffs. Hence, the worker and ﬁrm can only agree upon wages that are
relatively close to the worker’s marginal product.
The ﬁnal proposition gives the model’s implications for the autocorrelation and
volatility of productivity on wage smoothing.
Proposition 28 Wage smoothing is decreasing in the autocorrelation of productivity
(α), i.e ∂wL
∂α < 0 < ∂wH
∂α , and increasing in the volatility of productivity (pH/pL).
The intuition for the autocorrelation result is that the higher the autocorrelation,
the higher is the worker’s value from deviating in the high state, since she can expect
to be in the high state for longer. Thus her wage in the high state must be higher to
keep her in the contract, and her low-state wage lower to keep the ﬁrm in the contract.
The volatility result is straightforward: the higher is the volatility of shocks, the worse
the value of the worker’s outside option relative to the contract, which allows for more
smoothing.
Recall that our theory about why high-wage industries had smoother wages than
low-wage industries is that high-wage industries have a higher degrees of match-
speciﬁc skills and lower separation rates than low-wage industries. Our theory pre-
dicts that these two differences between high and low-wage industries will result in
more wage smoothing in high-wage industries. In the following section we provide
empirical support for these two differences between high and low wage industries,
and we compare the quantitative implications of the model to the facts documented in
Section 3.2.
1753.4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section we parameterize the model developed above and assess its quantita-
tive predictions. In parameterizing the model, we also document directly that high-
wage industries have a higher degree of match speciﬁc capital than low-wage indus-
tries and lower separation rates than low-wage industries. While the previous section
demonstratedthatmatch-speciﬁccapital andseparationrateslead qualitatively tomore
smoothing in high-wage industries, this section assess whether the model can match
the quantitative degrees of wage smoothing found in the data. In particular, we quan-
tify two versions of our model, one to represent the average high-wage industry and
one to represent the average low-wage industry. We allow three key differences be-
tween these two sectors: to the fraction of skills that are match-speciﬁc m, to the sep-
aration rate s, and to the productivity series themselves. Quantitative success will be
if the calibrated versions can match the average wage-productivity elasticity for low-
wage industries, which is 0.34, and the average elasticity for high-wage industries,
which is 0.59.
3.4.1 Differences Between High and Low-Wage Industries
The ﬁrst part of our hypothesis is that a higher fraction of the skills of high-wage
workers are match-speciﬁc than the skills of low-wage workers. However, measuring
the extent to which skills are match speciﬁc is not a straightforward exercise. How
does one distinguish between match-speciﬁc and general skills? A seminal paper by
Jacobson et al. [1993] uses worker wage loss after a mass layoff as a proxy for the
value of skills that are match speciﬁc. They treat mass layoffs as an event unrelated
to worker ability, and compare the post-layoff wages of workers that were laid off
(leavers) to those that stayed with their respective companies (stayers). If all skills
176were general, rather than speciﬁc to the match, there is little reason to expect that the
leavers would have substantial wage reductions after a layoff – they could simply take
their (general) skills to a new match and earn a comparable wage as in their old match.
In fact Jacobson et al. [1993] ﬁnd that wages of stayers and leavers, while al-
most indistinguishable before the layoff period, depart drastically after the layoff. The
wages of stayers stay roughly constant while the wages of leavers fall by around 40%
or more. Furthermore, the wages of leavers stay depressed for a long period after their
layoff, returning to their pre-layoff wage only after around 4 years. The authors con-
clude that these drastic layoffs provide direct evidence that match-speciﬁc skills form
a very large fraction of a worker’s total human capital. One caveat here is that the au-
thors consider only the losses of workers with 6 years of tenure or more, who are much
more likely to have acquired match-speciﬁc skills than workers with lower tenure. In
a similar study using different data and a different period, Schoeni and Dardia [1996]
corroborate almost all of the ﬁndings of Jacobson et al. [1993].14
Following the work of Carrington and Zaman [1994] measure the costs of job dis-
placement by industry, using the percentage wage loss after a mass layoff as a mea-
sure of match-speciﬁc portion of a worker’s overall human capital. Fortunately for
our study, Carrington and Zaman [1994] conduct their analysis using the same 2-digit
industry classiﬁcation as ours, which allows us to compare their displacement cost es-
timates to our industry characteristics, especially average industry wages. We present
these ﬁndings in Figure 3.3. As can be seen on the graph, there is a signiﬁcant positive
correlation between Carrington and Zaman [1994]’s estimates of displacement costs
(in percentage terms) by industry and the industry average wage. For low-wage in-
dustries, displacement costs run from around 6% to 18% of average wages. On the
other hand workers in high-wage industries tend to lose between 10% to 26% of their
14For an engaging overview of the literature on worker displacement see Kletzer [1998].
177average wage. This ﬁnding suggests that the skills of high-wage workers are generally
more match speciﬁc than low-wage workers.
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Regarding separation rates, recent estimates by Davis et al. [2006] provide evi-
dence that separation rates are indeed higher in low-wage industries. They construct
industry measures of job separation rates using micro data from the Job Opening and
Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) for 2001-2005, which contains detailed measures of
job separations by broad industry groups. They ﬁnd that the highest separation rates
occur in industries with the lowest average wages, such as retail trade and hospital-
ity & leisure. Retailing for example has a monthly separation rate of 3.9%, which is
equivalent to a 41% annual rate of separation. On the other hand, high wage industries
have relatively lower rates of separation. In manufacturing, for example, the monthly
separation rate is 2.7%, which is a yearly rate of 28%.
1783.4.2 Calibration & Simulation
We begin our calibration with our measures of match speciﬁc capital and separation
rates, which correspond to m and s in the model. For m, rather than picking one
particular value for high-wage industries and a second value for low-wage industries,
we solve each version of the model over the ranges of m observed in the data. The
empirically-observed ranges of m are 6% to 18% for low-wage industries and 10% to
26% for high-wage industries. For separation rates, for the low-wage-industry version
we take the observed 41% annual rate of separation in retail trade, an industry which
had an average wage in 1987 of around 50% of the average industry. For our high-
wage-industry version we take the 28% rate of separation observed in manufacturing,
which has average wages roughly 50% higher than average in our sample of industries.
Other parameters are calibrated as follows. For the household’s preferences we
choose CRRA utility with risk-aversion equal to 1, and for the discount factor β we
choose 0.95 as is typical in annual data. We choose the length of time the worker is
unskilled in a new match following separation to be 4 years as a benchmark, which
is consistent with the ﬁndings of Jacobson et al and Schoeni and Dardia mentioned
above. For the productivity series we estimate, for each industry, an AR(1) process for
productivity of the form
pi,t = φipi,t−1+ui,t (3.13)
where we assume that ui,t ∼ N(0,σ2
i ), and where pi,t is the logarithm of detrended
productivity in industry i. We take the average ˆ φi and ˆ σi for low-wage industries
and high-wage industries and approximate each sector by a 2-state Markov chain.
Normalizing long-run productivity to be 1, we end up with states of pH,LW = 1.042
and pL,LW = 0.958 for the low-wage sector and pH,HW = 1.063 and pL,HW = 0.937
for the high-wage sector. The persistence parameters for the transition matrices are
αLW = 0.71 for the low-wage sector and αHW = 0.69 for the high-wage industries.
179For each sector, we simulate the model over the range of m values described above.
For each m, we simulate 10,000 paths for productivity. Each path consists of 1,040
periods where the ﬁrst 1,000 are discarded to avoid any inﬂuence of the initial state,
and the next 40 (representing 1947-1987) are kept. For these 40 periods we calculate
the wage-productivity elasticity in the same way as in our empirical analysis, and we
take the mean elasticity over all 10,000 simulations.
3.4.3 Simulation Results
Our simulations results are shown in ﬁgures 3.4 and 3.5. Figure 3.4 shows the results
for the low-wage sector. The x-axis represents m and the y-axis represents the elastic-
ities generated by the model and in the data. The blue horizontal line (at εw,p = 0.59)
is the average low-wage elasticity. The thicker downward-sloping blue line is the elas-
ticity generated by the model for each given m. At m = 0 the elasticity is 1, meaning
that the worker earns his marginal product in every period. At m = 0.22 we get an
elasticity of 0, or perfect wage smoothing. For intermediate m values we get imper-
fect smoothing. The red shaded box on the x-axis represent the empirically relevant
range of match speciﬁc skills taken from Carrington and Zaman [1994]. For the em-
pirically plausible range of m we get elasticities of between 0.2 and 0.75, which are
distinguished by the red box along the y-axis. These elasticities are largely in line with
the range of low-wage elasticities seen in the data.15 The median low-wage industry
(retail trade) has an estimated m of 0.12 – for this value the model yields an elasticity
of 0.5 (shown as a red dotted line), which is close to the true value of 0.59 but too
much smooth relative to the data. We will return to this sector shortly.
For the high-wage sector (Figure 3.5) we have an empirically plausible range of
m of 10% to 26%, which the model maps into elasticities of 0 to 0.6. These are also
15This can be seen in Figure 3.2.
180Figure 3.4: Simulated Wage-Productivity Elasticities, Low Wage Sector, n=4.
Simulation Results – Low Wage Sector, n=4
empirical range of ‘m’
for low-wage industries median low-wage industry
very much in line with the elasticities found in the data for high-wage industries. The
median high-wage industry has m of around 16%, which gives an elasticity of 0.37
(shown as a red dotted line), almost exactly the 0.35 seen in the data. We conclude that
this baseline version of the model does very well in matching the high-wage sector but
predicts a bit too much smoothing in the low-wage sector.
How can we decrease the smoothing in the model low-wage sector? A natural
choice is to reduce n, the number of years for which the low-wage work is not skilled
in a match. This seems sensible, since low-wage jobs generally require lower (speciﬁc
and general) human capital levels than high-wage jobs. When we decrease n to 3 years,
we do much better in matching the data. In this case the median low-wage m of 12%
implies an elasticity of 0.62, which is closer to the empirical value of 0.59. A lower n
works just as expected.
181Figure 3.5: Simulated Wage-Productivity Elasticities, High Wage Sector, n=4.
Simulation Results – High Wage Sector, n=4
empirical range of ‘m’
for high-wage industries median high-wage industry
We conclude from the quantitative portion of the paper that this simple wage con-
tracting model does surprisingly well in matching the facts documented in the empir-
ical section of the paper. This suggests that wage smoothing in the cross-section of
industries is well explained by differences in the degree of match speciﬁc skills and
separation rates.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper we document a new fact about the cyclical behavior of wages and pro-
ductivity: in high-wage industries, average wages move relatively little in response to
a change in labor productivity, whereas the opposite is true in low-wage industries. In
other words, wages are substantially smoother than productivity in high wage industry
182and considerably less so in lower-wage industries. This ﬁnding appears for the US
within both manufacturing and service industries and in a majority of OECD countries
for which we had data. The ﬁnding also appears robust to controlling for other im-
portant industry characteristics such as the volatility of industry productivity and the
industry labor share in value-added.
Our explanation of this fact is that the response of wages to productivity is de-
termined by an optimal wage contract between a worker and ﬁrm under two-sided
limited commitment. In high wage industries, high levels of match-speciﬁc capital
and low separation rates lead to a greater degree of wage smoothing in the optimal
contract. We provide direct empirical support for our hypothesis using industry-level
data on displacement costs and separation rates, and we formalize our hypothesis in a
model based on the Thomas and Worrall [1988] study of wage contracting under lim-
ited commitment. We ﬁnd that the calibrated model performs quite well in explaining
the facts at hand, using empirically justiﬁable measures of match-speciﬁc skills and
separation rates by industry. Future work will explore the quantitative performance of
the model in greater detail.
1833.6 Appendix - Proofs of Propositions
3.6.1 Proof of Proposition 22
Fix a state (v,p) and let η be the Langrange multiplier on the promise keeping con-
straint (3.8). For the worker and ﬁrm self-enforcing constraints (3.9) and (3.10) let the
multipliers be βαp0|pλe(p0) and βαp0|pλf(p0). The ﬁrst order conditions are for choice









If w0 = w then it must be true that λf(p0) = λe(p0) = 0, which implies that v(p0) >
V(p0) and P(v,p0) > P(p). If w0 > w then uw(w0) < uw(w) by concavity, which by
(3.14) implies that λe(p0) > 0 and hence v(p0) =V(p0). By a similar argument w0 < w
implies that λf(p0) > 0, and hence P(v,p0) = P(p). Q.E.D.
3.6.2 Proof of Proposition 26
First we establish that ∂P
∂m > 0. Note that increasing m has a ﬁrst-order negative effect
on the outside options:
∂ ¯ V(pH)
∂m < 0 and
∂ ¯ V(pL)
∂m < 0. With this in mind, imagine that m
increases but that the contract wages wH and wL stayed the same. Then VH(wH,wL)
would remain the same while ¯ V(pH) would fall, implying that (3.11) would no longer
hold. On the other hand it would still be true that PL(wH,wL) = 0, in other words
(3.12) would still hold. It follows that leaving that leaving wL and wH the same is
clearly not optimal when m increases, and more importantly that the ﬁrm could reduce
average wages in order to reduce VH(wH,wL) and make (3.11) hold once again. With
lower average wage, it follows then that ∂P
∂m > 0.
Now there are two logical possibilities to reduce average wages: (1) the ﬁrm could
reduce wH while increasing wL by a smaller magnitude , or (2) it could increase wH
184and reduce wL by a larger magnitude. We show that (1) is in fact the case. From the
















using the fact that ∂PL
∂m = 0 from (3.12). From this we conclude that ∂wL
∂m > 0. Using
















from which we conclude that ∂wH
∂m < 0 as we claimed would be the case. Q.E.D.
3.6.3 Proof of Proposition 27
First we show that ∂wL
∂s < 0. We start with the fact that PL = 0 in the optimal contract

























Again by the fact that 0 = PL = pL−wL+β(1−s)PH we have that











Combing (3.16) and (3.17) we get that
∂wL
∂s
= (β(1−α))−1[−PH −(wL− pL)/(1−s)].
Since PH ≥ 0 and wL− pL > 0 the left-hand side must be negative, which implies that
∂wL
∂s < 0 as well.
Second, we show that ∂wH
∂s >0. Using the fact thatVH = ¯ VH in the optimal contract
for any s, it follows that ∂VH

























which can be combined with (3.18) to give







for γ ≡ (1−(1−s)αβ)/((1−α)(1−s)β). It can be shown that γ > 1, which implies
that the left-hand side of (3.19) is greater than or equal to zero. Using our result that
∂wL
∂s < 0 it follows that in order to satisfy (3.19) that ∂wH
∂s must be > 0. Q.E.D.
3.6.4 Proof of Proposition 28
We start with the proof that ∂wH
∂α > 0 > ∂wL
∂α under imperfect smoothing. Note that





∂α <0. As in the proof of Proposition 26, consider an increase in α while the
ﬁrm hypothetically keep contract wages the same. ThenVH(wH,wL) would remain the
same while ¯ V(pH) would increase, and on the other hand PL(wH,wL) = 0. So (3.11)
would fail to hold while (3.12) would still hold. It follows that leaving that leaving wL
and wH the same is not the optimal, and that that the ﬁrm would need to raise average
wages in order to increaseVH(wH,wL) to make (3.11) satisﬁed. With a higher average
wage, it follows then that ∂P
∂α < 0.








which tells us that ∂wH













Since PH ≥ 0 we conclude that ∂wL
∂α < 0, which completes the proof.
Finally, we argue that wage smoothing is increasing in the volatility of shocks,
which we capture by pH/pL. For brevity we keep this argument short and informal as
it follows almost identically the logic of the proof of Proposition 26. Increasing the
volatility reduces the worker’s outside options in both states, which allows the ﬁrm to
reap higher proﬁts from the match. Proﬁts are higher the smoother the wages, which
means that wH falls and wL rises, rather than the other way around. Q.E.D.
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189CHAPTER 4
On Scapegoats, Nested Activities and Incentives
Scapegoating is often said to be a source of inefﬁciency in organizations. In this paper
we analyze the consequences of scapegoating within a ﬁrm in a model where reputa-
tion concerns drive the actions of superiors. Consider delegation choices, for example.
The hiring of efﬁcient workers may be a good idea if successful production is the
only way to build reputation. But if successful scapegoating also increases reputation,
superiors will tend to hire less efﬁcient workers and eventually blame them easily.
We discuss scapegoating as an activity ”nested” after failures. Its results do not
directly affect the welfare of society but indirectly affect the decisions governing the
probability of success in production. We also examine how activities ”nested” after
good results may increase efﬁciency without relying on costly incentives and why in
good times superiors tend to hire better workers than in bad times.
1904.1 Introduction
A quick review of newspapers in many countries shows that people condemn scape-
goating behavior. This attitude is not only due to its unfairness but also to its negative
effects on efﬁciency and performance in organizations. In fact, this general view has
been widely used to justify recent institutional reforms designed to improve efﬁciency
by reducing superior’s scapegoating1. However, no model has been developed so far
to formalize this conventional and seemingly well-accepted wisdom.
In this paper we attempt to understand the impact of scapegoating on efﬁciency by
focusing on delegation decisions made by reputation-concerned superiors. We offer
a novel interpretation of scapegoating as an irrelevant activity that only happens after
failures and that may be used by reputation-concerned superiors as an additional way
to signal their competence.
Giventhesepropertiesofscapegoatingweintroduce theideaof”nestedreputation”
games as an environment where potentially irrelevant stages can be achieved only after
certain situations, helping to build reputation2. The existence of these activities will
change not only superior’s incentives to make decisions but also the outcome of the
game.
We introduce both delegation and scapegoating into the reputation environment
developed by Mailath and Samuelson [2001]. In the model superiors can be either
competents or inepts. Production outcomes are useful elements for consumers to infer
1The assignment of more responsibility to superiors has been a main goal of OECD institutional
changes over the past decade. Examples are ”Next Steps” and ”Outcome-Output” programs of the UK
and New Zealand. Art. 25 (RCSS) of the Rome Conference for an International Criminal Court also
criticizes scapegoating from civilian superiors. (Martin [1997]; Polidano [1999]).
2To my knowledge, nested reputation models do not exist, constituting this work an initial effort to
understand how the results in a standard reputation game change when introducing ”nested” activities
as substitutes or complements to the original activity that generates reputation. Even when this paper
shares some features with the literature on ”reputation spillover” (as in Cole and Kehoe [1996]), the
logic is not the same. Spillovers deal with different and multiple types of reputation. Here reputation is
based on a single aspect, but constructed through several nested stages and steps.
191the superior’s type. Scapegoating is introduced as an additional alternative superiors
can use to signal their capability. If blaming is a clearer way to signal competence than
production, superiors will prefer to make decisions that exploit blaming, not caring if
only production matters to society. In this way superiors will make delegation deci-
sions not only thinking on the way production affects reputation but also on potential
scapegoating.
Conditions for an efﬁcient equilibrium with and without scapegoating are com-
pared, concluding that in the former case it is more difﬁcult, and sometimes even
impossible, to achieve efﬁciency as an equilibrium.
The main force driving this result is that hiring experts becomes less attractive
when scapegoating is a possibility. First, scapegoating avoids a big decrease in reputa-
tion after a failure, reducing the expected gains from working with efﬁcient employees.
Second, hiring experts hinders the use of scapegoating to maintain reputation after a
failure (since it is harder to blame experts than nonexperts), reducing the expected
reputation losses from working with inefﬁcient employees.
Even when focusing on how scapegoating, an activity after failures, negatively af-
fects efﬁciency, we also extend the logic to study how irrelevant activities that only
occur after successes increase the probabilities of achieving efﬁciency by exploiting
reputation forces in the right direction, without requiring monetary resources or costly
incentives. Many examples, from areas so diverse as sports and universities, are dis-
cussed in the paper.
Finally, we show that considering nested reputation games it is possible to recover
a ”Machiavellian Effect”3, which says ”Superiors tend to hire nonexperts in bad times
3In his famous book ”The Prince”, Machiavelli wrote, ”Princes should delegate to others the enact-
ment of unpopular measures and keep in their own hands the distribution of favours”. Machiavelli’s
argument was that princes should delegate when the probability of having a good outcome is low and
work by themselves if it is high. In this way princes would be able to blame others if something goes
wrong, maintaining their reputation. More recently, Alesina and Tabellini [2005], Alesina and Tabellini
192and experts in good times”.
Literature on reputation is very large4 but literature on scapegoating is almost non-
existent. Despite the recognition of strategic reasons for scapegoating in the social-
psychology literature, (Bell and Tetlock [1989]; Douglas [1995]), formal economic
studies of this behavior are new and sparse. Dezso [2004] analyzes the conditions
under which random ﬁring of potential innocents (scapegoats) is a reaction to failures
in order to maintain reputation. He focuses in ﬁring and not in hiring, without being
able to analyze the impact on efﬁciency. Segendorff [2000] analyzes the possible hir-
ing of scapegoats using a signalling game, without analyzing efﬁciency consequences
either. Winter [2001] ﬁnds that, under some circumstances, in order to provide better
incentives to top levels in an organization, it may be optimal for middle levels to bear
more responsibility, an aspect he labels ”scapegoating”. He did not consider reputation
effects nor hiring decisions though.5
In Section 4.2 we present the basic model of reputation with delegation and scape-
goating, being an special application of the ”nested reputation” environment we are
proposing. In Section 4.3 we analyze the conditions for an efﬁcient equilibrium to
exist, showing how and when scapegoating leads to inefﬁciency and to ”Machiavellian
Effects”. In Section 4.4 we propose a way to induce efﬁciency by exploiting reputation
concerns, without relying on the use of costly incentives. Section 4.5 concludes.
[2007a] and Alesina and Tabellini [2007b] formally modeled this pattern among politicians.
4Starting with Kreps and Wilson [1982] and Milgrom and Roberts [1982], important contributions
on reputation models have been Fudenberg and Levine [1989], Fudenberg and Levine [1992], Mailath
and Samuelson [2001] and Cripps et al. [2004].
5Empirical studies about scapegoating are even less common. An exception is Huson et al. [2004]
who developed a moral hazard-driven scapegoat hypothesis based on agency models to study the impact
of managerial succession on ﬁrm performance.
1934.2 The Model
4.2.1 Description
This model extends Mailath and Samuelson [2001] by introducing delegation and
scapegoating as a nested activity.
Assume a superior (a country president, a minister, the owner of a ﬁrm or a CEO)
who is responsible for providing a service, selling a good or in general achieving a
target that generates utility to ”consumers” (who can also be citizens, stockholders, or
even upper-level superiors in the hierarchy).
Eachperiodthesuperiorhastomakeanunobservabledelegationdecisiontoachieve
the target. He can be one of two possible types, Competent (C) or Inept (I). Compe-
tents have two possible choices: To hire experts (E), paying a wage w > 0, or to hire
nonexperts (N), paying 0. Inepts can only delegate to nonexperts (N)6.
There are several ways we can rationalize the existence of these two types. The
simplest one is to assume workers are able to observe the superior’s type and experts
just do not work with inepts (who may generate some disutility, such as difﬁculties
for professional improvements). Another possibility is to assume competents have the
skills to perfectly identify who is an expert and who is a nonexpert, while inepts do not
have access to this screening (or interview) technology7.
Before deciding, superiors observe the state of the nature, good (G) or bad (B),
which affects the probability of success in achieving the target.
6It is important to note here that employees in this model will be just dummies who don’t take any
particular action, behaving basically as machines. Hence, to assume the rent of machines instead of
delegation does not change the analysis.
7In the latter case, inepts may prefer to hire employees at random (by offering a wage w) if the
proportion of experts in the workers’ population is high enough. Even in the case they eventually hire
experts by following this strategy, the model’s conclusions remain unchanged provided some positive
proportion of nonexperts exists (the reasons will be clariﬁed below while discussing the model). Hence,
for expositional purposes, we will just assume inepts do not have the possibility to attract experts.
194After the decision is made, production happens and a non-deterministic output,
which can be good (g) or bad (b), is obtained. When competents hire experts the
probability of a good result in good times is (1−ρ)> 1
2 and in bad times α < 1
2. Hiring
nonexperts allows them to obtain good results with a probability (1−α) in good times
and ρ in bad times (where α > ρ)8. An important assumption is that (α −ρ) > w > 0,
whichmeansitisefﬁcientforsocietythatcompetentsalwayshireexperts, bothingood
andbadtimes. Itbasicallysaysthat, if”consumers”knewagents’delegationdecisions,
they would be willing to pay a premium for competents to always hire experts.
When the outcome is ﬁnally observed and the result is a failure, the superior has
to make a report about its causes, deciding the intensity and amount of evidence to be
presented against workers (scapegoating). This is a nested second stage in the game
that occurs only after failures in production, not after successes. Once the report is
done, a non-deterministic decision about the credibility of the evidence is taken, by a
”court” for example, that concludes whether the employee (ec) or the superior (sc) has
to be considered the culprit of the failure.9
Deciding the intensity of the blaming and the amount of evidence displayed, supe-
riors choose directly the probability of the ”court” blaming the worker10. For exam-
ple, inepts decide a probability x the ”court” pronounces against subordinates such that
x ∈ [0,x] where x ≤ 1. This means there can be a maximum capacity to successfully
blame workers, or which is the same, maximum blaming intensities do not necessarily
guarantee the ”court” deciding against subordinates.
8The assumption of symmetry in probabilities does not change the main conclusions but allows the
use of just two parameters (α and ρ) instead of four, eliminating awkward expressions.
9When referring to a ”court” we are not only thinking on a judiciary court but also in a ”Court
of public opinion”, a board of directors or in general any group that decides about the assignment of
responsibility by considering the existing evidence.
10A nil blaming intensity and no evidence, for example, makes it impossible for the ”court” to decide
against the worker. Increasing blaming efforts also increases the probability the ”court” pronounces
against employees.
195When competents choose a probability the ”court” decides in his favor, they know
if the blamed employee is an expert or a nonexpert. If competents worked with experts,
they decide a probability y and if they worked with nonexperts they may choose a
different one, z. These probabilities will be y ∈ [0,y] and z ∈ [0,z] where y ≤ z ≤ 1.
The maximum probabilities of successful blaming in all cases (x, y and z) are ex-
ogenous parameters known by everybody in the economy. These parameters basically
describe blaming capabilities under maximum blaming intensities.
Finally, at the end of the period, the superior may be replaced by another with a
ﬁxed probability λ. The substitute is competent with a probability θ ∈ (0,1) 11.
”Consumers” (continuum of identical persons of unit mass such that no single in-
dividual can affect the future play of the game) repeatedly receive the output generated
under superior’s commands (e.g, consumers purchase a good, citizens receive a ser-
vice and stockholders obtain dividends). This generates two possible utility levels in
each period, 1 if the result is a good outcome (u(g) = 1) and 0 if it is a bad outcome
(u(b)= 0). Each ”consumer” receives the same public result (or signal). ”Consumers”
do not get any utility from scapegoating.
Even when ”consumers” know the probability of being in a good state is Pr(G)=γ,
they are not able to see if the economy is in good or bad times nor if the superior hired
experts or nonexperts. ”Consumers” can only see the results from production activities
(success or failure) and from blaming activities after failures (superior or employee
considered culprit).
From this information they update the probability that the superior is competent,
Pr(C) = φ, (i.e. his or her reputation). This is of the utmost importance to superiors
since we assume each ”consumer” has to buy the good or service before production
11This assumption is needed to sustain an efﬁcient equilibrium in the long run, as discussed in Mailath
and Samuelson [2001] and Cripps et al. [2007].
196takes place, hence paying the expected utility and not the real utility it delivers.
The greater the reputation (probability of the superior being competent), the greater
the probability assigned by ”consumers” to obtain good outcomes and the more pay-
ments they will be willing to make for the good or service. This is the reason superiors
are so concerned about reputation while ”consumers” are only concerned about the
utility derived from production.
4.2.2 Timing
The timing of the model is:
0) The superior receives the payment for period t, before the production takes
place, which only depends on his reputation and not on his period t0s true type, dele-
gation decision or production result.
1) The superior observes φ, w and the environment state (G or B). Compe-
tents decide to hire experts or nonexperts. Inepts can only attract and hire nonexperts.
”Consumers” do not observe this decision, nor whether there are good or bad times.
2) Output is produced and both ”consumers” and the superior observe the true
utility given by a good (g) or bad (b) outcome (1 or 0 respectively). All ”consumers”
receive the same public realization of utility outcome.
3) The superior has to report the cause of the failure in case of a bad outcome,
deciding blaming intensities and how much evidence to present against employees (i.e.
x, y or z depending on the type of superior and employee).
4) A ”court” decides if the employee was the culprit (ec) or if the superior was
the culprit (sc) of the failure.
5) With probability λ the superior is replaced by another one, who is competent
with a probability θ.
1974.2.3 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
Under uncertainty about superior’s type, the state variable is just the probability as-
signed by ”consumers” to the superior being competent (i.e. the reputation denoted as
φ). Before production, a Markov strategy for competents is a mapping τk : [0,1] →
[0,1], where τk(φ) is the probability of hiring an expert when reputation is φ ∈ [0,1]
and the state of nature is k ∈ {B,G}. Inepts make no choice, having then a trivial
strategy of hiring nonexperts12.
After a bad result in production, a Markov strategy for competents that hired ex-
perts is a mapping y : [0,1] → [0,y], where y(φ) is the probability the ”court” decides
against the employee when reputation is φ ∈[0,1]. We will call this strategy just blam-
ing intensities. The same strategy is available for inepts (x(φ)) and competents who
hired nonexperts (z(φ)).
Thebehaviorof”consumers”isdescribedbytheMarkovbelieffunction p:[0,1]→
[0,1] where p(φ) is the probability ”consumers” assign to receiving a good outcome,
given a reputation φ ∈ [0,1] (recall utilities from good and bad results have been nor-
malized to 1).
In a Markov perfect equilibrium superiors maximize proﬁts, ”consumers”’ expec-
tations are correct and ”consumers” use a Bayes’ rule to update their posterior proba-
bilities.
Since the state variable is the reputation φ, the model relies importantly on the
updating of beliefs about the competence of the superior. There are two rounds of
updating that follow a Bayes rule: The update after production (Pr(C|g) and Pr(C|b))
andthepotentialupdateONLYafterabadoutcome(Pr(C|b,ec)andPr(C|b,sc)), which
is based on the observation of ”court”’s decisions after scapegoating.
12As noted in Mailath and Samuelson [2001], by restricting attention to strategies that only depend on
consumers’ posteriors, in equilibrium different superiors will behave identically in identical situations.








Pr(b|I) = γα +(1−γ)(1−ρ)
Before deﬁning the equilibrium, we need to deﬁne the value function for the supe-




where k = {B,G} and expectation is constructed over possible states of nature






Deﬁnition 29 A Markov perfect equilibrium13 is: Probabilities of hiring experts both
in good and bad times (τG(φ) and τB(φ)), blaming intensities (y(φ), x(φ) and z(φ)),
probabilities ”consumers” assign to receiving a good outcome (p(φ)) given a repu-
tation prior φ = Pr(C), and posterior beliefs ϕ = Pr(C|R,φ) where R are the three
possible results R ∈ {g;(b,ec);(b,sc)}, such that:
1) Delegation decisions by competent superiors
13We require behavior to be Markov in order to eliminate equilibriums that depend on implausible
degrees of coordination between the superior behavior and ”consumers” belief’s about that superior
behavior. (See discussion in Mailath and Samuelson [1998]).
199τG(φ) (in good times) and τB(φ) (in bad times) maximize the value function V(φ)
(eq. 4.2) for all possible reputation values φ
2) Blaming intensities by superiors
x(φ), y(φ) and z(φ) maximize the value function V(φ) (eq. 4.2 and 4.3) for all
feasible φ
3) Expected utility (and payments) of ”consumers”
Probabilities ”consumers” assign to receiving a good outcome given a reputation
prior φ (i.e. Proﬁts for the superior)
p(φ) = Pr(g|φ) = Pr(g|C)φ +Pr(g|I)(1−φ) (4.4)
4) Beliefs about competence (updated using Bayes rule).
a) Update after a good outcome (g)
ϕ(φ|g) = φg = (1−λ)Pr(C|g)+λθ (4.5)




b = (1−λ)Pr(C|b,ec)+λθ (4.6)




b = (1−λ)Pr(C|b,sc)+λθ (4.7)
A strategy for superiors uniquely determines the equilibrium updating rule that
”consumers” must use if their beliefs are to be correct.
2004.3 Efﬁcient Equilibrium, Inefﬁcient Scapegoating
This paper has a fundamental question. Does scapegoating really reduce the probabil-
ity of achieving an efﬁcient outcome?
With this question in mind we focus on the conditions for an efﬁcient situation
to be sustained as an equilibrium14. Considering the assumption (α −ρ) > w > 0,
efﬁciency is achieved when competents always hire experts, regardless of their current
reputation or whether times are good or bad (i.e. τG(φ) = τB(φ) = 1, for all feasible
φ).
The condition for this efﬁcient situation to be sustained as an equilibrium is ex-
pressed by a cutoff D, such that wages w have to be smaller than D. This cutoff
is obtained both in good and bad times with scapegoating possibilities (DS
G and DS
B)
and without scapegoating possibilities (DNS
G and DNS
B ). The last case is used just as a
benchmark to see how results differ when superiors are allowed to blame workers with
impunity.
Whenever y > x and the capabilities of competents to blame nonexperts are high








These simple inequalities, which are in fact typically strict, summarize the main
conclusions of the paper. Given wages in the economy, the ﬁrst inequality says that
scapegoating makes the condition for an efﬁcient equilibrium D≥w>0 more difﬁcult
to hold. Furthermore it will be shown that DNS
G = DNS
B > 0, which means that without
14This model has multiple equilibria, including a very inefﬁcient one that may arise without condi-
tions, in which competents only hire nonexperts. Intuitively, if ”consumers” think competents will hire
nonexperts they will not update beliefs and competents will optimally prefer never to hire experts, who
charge higher wages and, given beliefs, do not represent any additional beneﬁt in terms of reputation.
201scapegoating it is always possible to ﬁnd a positive wage differential that sustains
efﬁciency, which is not necessarily the case with scapegoating.
The second inequality says that it is even more difﬁcult to achieve efﬁciency with
scapegoating in bad times than in good times. This will be called ”Machiavellian
Effect”, a feature consistent with many real examples.
4.3.1 Conditions for Efﬁcient Equilibrium
As a ﬁrst step we present the condition for the existence of an efﬁcient equilibrium
without scapegoating, which is not only easier to interpret but also helps to build on
intuition.
In this case there are only two possible states (g and b) since there is no blaming
activity allowed after a failure (nobody asks why things went wrong!). The reputation
after a bad draw would be φb directly. In a similar vein, the reputation after two
consecutive bad results (ϕ(ϕ(φ|b)|b)) will be denoted as φbb. The proof is in the
Appendix.
Proposition 30 Efﬁcient Equilibrium without Scapegoating
Suppose λ ∈ (0,1), φ0 ∈ [λθ,1−λ(1−θ)], δ ∈ (0,1) and θ ∈ (0,1) In case the
report about the causes of the failure is not allowed (no ”blaming” stage), then both









such that, for all wages DNS ≥ w > 0, the efﬁcient pure strategy proﬁle in which
competents always hire experts is a Markov perfect equilibrium.
where
Vf = Pr(g|E)Yg+Pr(b|E)Yb
202X = (α −ρ)[p(φg)− p(φb)]
Yi = (α −ρ)[V(φgi)−V(φbi)] for i ∈ {g,b}
withV(φ) deﬁned in equation (4.2)
Since our objective is to compare this benchmark with the extended model that
allows for blaming activities, the next proposition presents the conditions to have an
efﬁcient equilibrium when scapegoating is a possibility (people ask why things went
wrong!). The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 31 Efﬁcient Equilibrium with Scapegoating
Suppose λ ∈ (0,1), φ0 ∈ [λθ,1−λ(1−θ)], δ ∈ (0,1) and θ ∈ (0,1). In case the
report about the causes of the failure is allowed (scapegoating),
a) If y ≤ x, conditions for an efﬁcient equilibrium are exactly the same as the case
without scapegoating (Proposition 30).











such that, for all wages DS
k ≥ w > 0, the efﬁcient pure strategy proﬁle in which








XB = (α −ρ)p(φg)+(1−α)p(φb,E)−(1−ρ)p(φb,N)

































A couple of features are worth noting before going to the main proposition of
the paper. First, it’s necessary to emphasize that the non-scapegoating case is just a
particular example of the scapegoating case. When y ≤ x both cases are in fact exactly
the same. When y > x, as x, y, z → 0 (maintaining the relation z ≥ y > x) always
φb,N → φb,E → φb (as can be checked easily from equations (4.6), (4.7), (4.11) and
(4.12)). Hence XB → XG → X = (α −ρ)[p(φg)− p(φb)], and VB
f →VG
f →Vf. This
is the same as saying that cutoffs in all situations approach each other (DS
B → DS
G →
DNS), or that Proposition 31 approaches Proposition 30 as the importance of blaming
disappears.
Second, in the differing case (y > x), since w is positive by assumption and there
is no way to know the sign of DS
k, it can only be said that whenever DS
k < 0, no wage
can possibly support an efﬁcient equilibrium. Even when in the absence of scapegoat-
ing there is always a positive wage that supports an efﬁcient equilibrium, this is not
necessarily true under scapegoating possibilities. This naturally goes in the proposed
direction that scapegoating is harmful for efﬁciency, which will be formalized in the
next subsections.
In the remainder of the paper, and unless stated otherwise, when referring to the
scapegoating case we will be referring speciﬁcally to the case where y > x, the only
interesting case in which scapegoating is a problem.
2044.3.2 Scapegoating Inefﬁciency
Here, the most important conclusion of the paper, the negative impact of scapegoating
inachievingefﬁciency, isderived. Thestrategyistoprovethatconditionsforefﬁciency
with scapegoating (when y > x from Proposition 31) are more difﬁcult to hold than
conditions for efﬁciency without scapegoating (from Proposition 30).
Proposition 32 Scapegoating Inefﬁciency
Suppose λ ∈ (0,1), φ0 ∈ [λθ,1−λ(1−θ)], δ ∈ (0,1), θ ∈ (0,1) and competents
have better blaming capabilities than inepts (y > x). It is always possible to ﬁnd a
z ≥ z∗ = 1−
ρ
α(1−y) such that the range of wages w > 0 that supports an efﬁcient
situation is smaller with scapegoating than without it.
Proof We need to prove that DNS ≥ DS
G for all φ ∈ (0,1). This is enough since the
”Machiavellian Effect” Theorem (Proposition 35) ahead will show that always DS
G ≥
DS
B. This proof is based on the simpler case in which scapegoating is not a possibility
in the future, only in the current period. The conclusion for the more general case does
not varies but it is characterized by awkward statements (shown in the Appendix).
We consider only the relevant case in which y > x and there is a separating blaming
equilibrium such that φ
ec
b > φb > φ
sc
b
We will proceed in three steps. First we will show that φb,N ≥ φb,E, second that
φb,E ≥ φb (as deﬁned in Proposition 31) and ﬁnally that DNS ≥ DS
G by proving that
X +δ(1−λ)Vf ≥ XG+δ(1−λ)VG
f for all feasible φ.
Step 1: (φb,N ≥ φb,E)
Consider beliefs about decision rules in the efﬁcient equilibrium (τG(φ)=τB(φ)=








































































which cannot be negative since z ≥ y > x and φ
pb
b ∈ [0,1].
Step 2: (φb,E ≥ φb)






































which cannot be negative since φ
pb
b ∈ [0,1].
Step 3: (DNS ≥ DS
G for all φ ∈ (0,1))
By equations (4.9) and (4.10), it is sufﬁcient to show the following two claims.
15Recall φ
pb
b = Pr(C|b) represents the standard Bayes updating after a bad outcome and before any
blaming activity, (superscrip pb denotes ”pre blaming”). This is an update not adjusted by λ because it
happens before the period ends and a replacement occurs.
206Claim 1) X ≥ XG for all φ.
Subtracting these expressions
X −XG = α[p(φb,N)− p(φb)]−ρ[p(φb,E)− p(φb)]
whichisnon-negativesinceα >ρ byassumptionand p(φb,N)≥ p(φb,E)forallfeasible
φ by step 1 (equation 4.13) and monotonicity of p(φ).
Claim 2)Vf ≥VG




















bi ) ≥ V(φbi). A sufﬁcient condition for non-negativity is then (αz−ρy) ≥
(α −ρ), or which is the same,






α is a measure of the relative capability of experts to achieve good produc-
tion results when compared to nonexperts.
Hence, whenever the sufﬁcient condition z≥z∗ holds, regardless of the value func-
tion, the likelihood of having an efﬁcient situation reaches its maximum without scape-
goating. Q.E.D.
The intuition behind this general result is that reports after a failure when y > x
represent a way for competents to further signal their competence. If this is the case,
207competents can exploit differences in the blaming capacity as an additional channel to
distinguish themselves from inepts.
This can be done in two ways. First by the difference between competents and
inepts in maximum blaming capabilities (y−x), which reduces reputation losses after
bad results. Second, by the assumed difference between blaming experts and nonex-
perts (z−y), which may introduce an additional gain from hiring nonexperts (addi-
tional to low wages), by increasing the probability that the ”court” assigns the respon-
sibility of the failure to the employee.
Now, it is important to put into context the sufﬁcient condition for the inefﬁciency
of scapegoating, z ≥ z∗.16 As can be seen, z∗ depends on
ρ
α, a measure of the relative
capability of experts to achieve good results in production when compared to nonex-
perts. If hiring experts almost guarantees success in good times (ρ → 0), then z∗ → 1.
If hiring experts does not add much to the probability of success (ρ →α), then z∗ →y.
This implies that the sufﬁcient condition z≥z∗ is more difﬁcult to hold when hiring
experts is really beneﬁcial from a productive point of view, which means superiors can
signal their competence directly in the ﬁrst stage, without the need to go to ”court”. On
the other hand, when hiring experts does not make an important difference in produc-
tion, competents tend to rely more on the use of scapegoating to signal competence,
leading heavily towards inefﬁciency.
Conditions for an efﬁcient equilibrium in the three cases discussed previously,
without scapegoating (both in good and bad times, given by DNS), with scapegoating
in good times (given by DS
G ) and with scapegoating in bad times (given by DS
B ) can
be easily seen in Figure 4.1. In this case we assumed that Vf =VG
f =VB
f = 0, which
easy computations conservatively biasing results in favor of hiring experts. Even in
16This is relevant because we do not know the behavior of the value function. But, for example, if the
value function were linear, both Yg and Yb would behave exactly as X and scapegoating would always
imply inefﬁciency, regardless of the speciﬁc value of z.
208this conservative situation, not allowing for scapegoating (not asking why things went
wrong!) increases the incentives to efﬁciently hire experts.17.
Figure 4.1: Example of conditions for Efﬁcient Equilibrium
Figure 1
Example of conditions for E¢ cient Equilibrium
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S = - 0.072
3.3 The intuition lying behind scapegoating ine¢ ciency
The importance of the blaming report for e¢ ciency resides both in its value
to competents to further signal their competence and in its irrelevance to
"consumers". Since by assumption superiors only care about reputation,
decisions will react more to activities that better help them to signal com-
petence. If those activities only occur after particular situations, such as
scapegoating only happens after failures, superiors will make decisions try-
ing to achieve these nodes, even when detrimental to activities that really
matter to society. This e⁄ect will be even more important in the case supe-
riors value reputation beyond the impact on pro￿ts (for example, reputation
as a career booster).
Assume for example the extreme case x = 0 and y = z = 1 (i.e. inepts
cannot convince anybody about the blame of employees while competents
can always blame convincingly). In this situation, if "consumers" see that af-
ter a failure the "court" decides against subordinates, they learn for sure the
18
4.3.3 The intuition Behind the Inefﬁciency of Scapegoating
The importance of the blaming report for efﬁciency resides both in its value to compe-
tents to further signal their competence and in its irrelevance to ”consumers”. Since by
assumption superiors only care about reputation, decisions will react more to activities
that better help them to signal competence. If those activities only occur after partic-
ular situations, such as scapegoating only happens after failures, superiors will make
decisions trying to achieve these nodes, even when detrimental to activities that really
matter to society. This effect will be even more important in the case superiors value
reputation beyond the impact on proﬁts (for example, reputation as a career booster).
17Parameters used: λ = 0.1, θ = 0.6, δ = 0.99, ρ = 0.1, α = 0.4, γ = 0.5, x = 0.15, y = 0.3 and
z = 0.85. The sufﬁcient condition from equation (4.15) holds because in this case z > z∗ = 0.825
209Assume for example the extreme case x = 0 and y = z = 1 (i.e. inepts cannot
convince anybody about the blame of employees while competents can always blame
convincingly). In this situation, if ”consumers” see that after a failure the ”court” de-
cides against subordinates, they learn for sure the superior is competent, increasing
immediately the reputation. Here blaming is better than production for competents to
signal their competence. In fact they will prefer to have a failure in order to show their
capabilities more effectively through ”court” rather than through production perfor-
mance, a possibility clearly not allowed after a success. In this very extreme example,
competents will never hire experts since nonexperts are not only less expensive but
also increase the probability of going to ”court”.
Naturally, the previous extreme example is consistent with the case y>x. But what
happens if y ≤ x? As shown formally, in this case blaming is useless to signal com-
petence and competents will not behave differently than without scapegoating. This
result is a version of a cheap talk game. Inepts always want to pool with competents’
strategies, adjusting his blaming efforts downwards (say not presenting proofs, burning
evidence against employees, etc.)18. Potentially, competents can always be imitated by
inepts, not being an equilibrium the use of the blaming report to impose a new updating
round after production.
The whole action in previous propositions and proofs comes from the comparison
of reputation competents expect to obtain from hiring experts as opposed to hiring
nonexperts.
Without scapegoating, the reputation conditional on ﬁrst round’s results is known
and given by φg after a success and φb after a failure.
With scapegoating, while the expected reputation after a good outcome is also
18Blaming is an activity, as are many others, where the success probability can be easily adjusted
downwards (just being lazy) but not upwards.
210independent of the hiring decision, φg (because the game ends after a success), the
expected reputation after bad results depends on the hiring decision (since it’s easier
to blame nonexperts).
The expected reputation after a failure when hiring experts is E(Pr(C|b)|E) =
φb,E = Pr(ec|E)ϕ(φ|b,ec)+Pr(sc|E)ϕ(φ|b,sc) which is the expression in equation
(4.11). Similarly, the expected reputation after a failure when hiring nonexperts, φb,N,
was deﬁned in equation (4.12).
The differential gains in reputation expected from good results in production can
be seen as a measure of the incentives to hire experts, since this decision increases the
probabilities of success. These gains can be represented by (φg −φb) without scape-
goating (regardless of the hiring decision), by (φg −φb,E) with scapegoating if the
decision is to hire experts and by (φg −φb,N) with scapegoating if the decision is to
hire nonexperts.
Hence, to understand how incentives to efﬁciently hire experts behave we need to
understand how φb,N, φb,E and φb relate to each other.
As was shown in steps 1 and 2 of Proposition 35’s proof, there is a clear ordering
between these expressions when z > y > x.
φg > φb,N > φb,E > φb (4.16)
Graphically, Figure 4.2 shows the updated reputation value for each case and for
each possible reputation prior φ.
It is straightforward to check that all possible beliefs’ updates are equal when φ is
either zero or one. If the prior is φ = 0, the update in all cases is λθ. If the prior is
φ = 1, the update is 1−λ(1−θ). For all other values φ ∈ (0,1), reputation updates
have the ordering shown by relation (4.16) and Figure 4.2.
The difference (φb,E −φb) in equation (4.13) can be interpreted as the reduction in
211Figure 4.2: Expected reputation after the ﬁrst round (with and without scapegoating)
duction can be seen as a measure of the incentives to hire experts, since this
decision increases the probabilities of success. These gains can be repre-
sented by (￿g ￿￿b) without scapegoating (regardless of the hiring decision),
by (￿g ￿ ￿b;E) with scapegoating if the decision is to hire experts and by
(￿g ￿ ￿b;N) with scapegoating if the decision is to hire nonexperts.
Hence, to understand how incentives to e¢ ciently hire experts behave
we need to understand how ￿b;N, ￿b;E and ￿b relate to each other.
As was shown in steps 1 and 2 of Proposition 7￿ s proof, there is a clear
ordering between these expressions when z > y > x.
￿g > ￿b;N > ￿b;E > ￿b (16)
Graphically, Figure 2 shows the updated reputation value for each case
and for each possible reputation prior ￿.
Figure 2
Expected reputation after the ￿rst round










It is straightforward to check that all possible beliefs￿updates are equal
when ￿ is either zero or one. If the prior is ￿ = 0, the update in all cases
20
the incentives to hire experts and the difference (φb,N −φb,E) in equation (4.14) can be
seen as the increase in the incentives to hire nonexperts.
While the expression (y−x) in the numerator of equations (4.13) and (4.14) shows
the magnitude of reputation maintenance due to scapegoating, the expression (z−y) on
the numerator of (4.13) shows the additional beneﬁts from hiring nonexperts by taking
advantage of scapegoating after a failure.
The following lemmas show that both (φb,N −φb,E) and (φb,E −φb), not only are
positive(asshowninsteps1and2ofProposition32’sproof)butalsodependpositively
on the blaming abilities’ gaps.
Lemma 33 The difference between expected reputation after a failure from hiring ex-
perts versus hiring nonexperts (φb,N −φb,E) is non-decreasing in (z−y) nor in (y−x)
Proof Taking the derivative of expression (φb,N −φb,E) in equation (4.13) with
































The two expressions are strictly positive when z > y > x and φ
pb
b ∈ (0,1). Q.E.D.
Lemma 34 The difference between expected reputation after a failure in cases with
and without scapegoating, (φb,E −φb) is non-decreasing in (y−x)
Proof For this proof just consider the difference φb,E −φb in equation (4.14) since,
as shown in Lemma 33,
∂[φb,N−φb,E]



















which is non-negative because in the numerator, (1−x) ≥ (y−x) ≥ φ
pb
b (y−x).
This is also strictly positive whenever z > y > x and φ
pb
b ∈ (0,1). Q.E.D.
The difference in the blaming abilities between competents and inepts (y−x) basi-
cally measures the drop in expected reputation that, thanks to scapegoating, does NOT
occur after a failure. Hence, an increase in (y−x) not only reduces the incentives to
hire experts (by increasing φb,E−φb) but also makes more beneﬁcial to hire nonexperts
(by increasing φb,N −φb,E).
Similarly, the difference in the abilities between blaming experts and nonexperts
(z−y) measures the greater probability of having a positive ”court” decision against
employees from hiring nonexperts. Hence an increase in (z−y) makes even more
beneﬁcial to hire nonexperts (by further increasing φb,N −φb,E).
2134.3.4 Machiavellian Effect
The next proposition shows that in bad times an efﬁcient outcome is more difﬁcult to
arise than in good times.
Proposition 35 ”Machiavellian Effect”
Suppose λ ∈ (0,1), φ0 ∈ [λθ,1−λ(1−θ)], δ ∈ (0,1) and θ ∈ (0,1), blaming
reports are allowed and competents have better blaming capabilities than inepts (y >
x). If there exist some w > 0 such that competents decide to hire experts in bad times,
then they also decide to hire experts in good times, while the contrary is not necessarily
true.
Proof We need to show that DS
G ≥ DS
B by proving XG+δ(1−λ)VG
f ≥ XB+δ(1−
λ)VB
f for all φ ∈ (0,1). Considering equation (4.10) it sufﬁces to show the following
two claims,
Claim 1) XG ≥ XB for all φ.
Subtracting these expressions
XG−XB = (1−α −ρ)[p(φb,N)− p(φb,E)]
which is non-negative since α +ρ < 1 by assumption; p(φ) is monotonic in φ and by
equation (4.13) φb,N ≥ φb,E.
Claim 2)VG
f ≥VB
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214Assuming scapegoating also in the future does not change the conclusion.
Hence, in good times experts are hired for a wider range of wages w than in bad
times. This does not imply a positive cutoff DS
k, but it does imply it is more likely to
have DS
G > 0 rather than DS
B > 0 and then, that efﬁciency be achieved in good times but
not in bad times. This is what we called ”Machiavellian Effect”. Q.E.D.
Reputationconcernsandscapegoatingrationalizethis”MachiavellianEffect”since
in bad times superiors are more worried about potential reputation losses rather than
potential reputation gains. The intuition behind the Proposition is that, even when in
good and bad times differences in probabilities to obtain a good outcome (α −ρ) are
the same19, the probability of having a bad outcome is greater in bad times than in
good times (in our model, greater than half). Furthermore, ”consumers” do not know
the state of the nature Under scapegoating this is important because of the possibility
to avoid a big reduction in reputation if a failure in fact occurs, hence making more
attractive the hiring of nonexperts who can be blamed easily, exactly as proposed by
Machiavelli.
4.4 Waystoincreasethelikelihoodofanefﬁcientequilibrium(with-
out spending more money!)
Up to this point we conclude that scapegoating generates inefﬁciencies because of its
location after bad results in the nested reputation game. Then, a natural question arises.
What happens with activities nested after successes?
Many examples of this kind of situations can be found in real life. In the sporting
arena, All-Star Games, national teams and international championships (such as the
19This is just an assumption to clarify the ”Machiavellian Effect” as much as possible. To assume
otherwise does not change the main conclusion.
215Soccer World Cup) are organized for the best players to participate. In organizations,
corporations and public ofﬁces, additional funds and responsibilities are assigned to
divisions that outperform. In academic environments, round tables and plenary ses-
sions at professional meetings are held by top researchers. In the show business, TV
shows invite successful music and movie stars to exhibit their charisma or being funny.
All these situations share the characteristic that persons who are successful at their
main professions gain access to additional activities in order to signal their competence
even further. Even when society cares more on their main activities and not so much
on these additional events, activities nested after successes may be very important to
introduce the right incentives, increasing the likelihood to reach efﬁciency.
4.4.1 Efﬁciency of nested activities after successes.
The model can be easily reinterpreted and modiﬁed to introduce nested activities after
successes. Assume that instead of an irrelevant activity nested after a failure, such as
scapegoating, the game is characterized by an irrelevant activity nested after successes
(think about any of the previous examples). The structure of probabilities, timing and
parameters for the production stage have the same interpretation as before.
The difference appears in the second stage. After bad results the game ends but
after good results there is a nested activity, which at the time can be a success (g,s) or a
failure (g, f) (these have basically the same spirit than (b,ec) and (b,sc) in the original
model). Using the same notation as before we can write Pr(s|I,g,N) = xg ∈ [0,xg],
Pr(s|C,g,E) = yg ∈ [0,yg], Pr(s|C,g,N) = zg ∈ [0,zg], which means some differences
in the capabilities of being successful at the nested activity may exist20.
20Many of the examples discussed do not need delegation. In fact, in a better description competents
would decide between exerting high or low efforts while inepts would only be able to exert low efforts.
This alternative environment, even the same in spirit, is different in that superiors would need to choose
the effort level both before the ﬁrst and second rounds and pay twice the effort costs. Introducing this
modiﬁcation does not substantially change the main conclusion, though.
216For example, if yg > zg, hiring experts not only increases the probability of be-
ing successful at producing but also at the additional nested activity. Superiors may
choose the probabilities of being successful at the nested activity by eventually boy-
cotting worker’s efforts. If there is no boycott, the probability of success would be the
maximum achievable (say yg = yg if the employee is an expert) and a maximum boy-
cott intensity by the superior would eliminate the probability of success in the nested
activity (yg = 0). This decision about the boycotting intensity has the same logic that
decisions about blaming intensities in the original model with scapegoating.
The equilibrium deﬁnition in this environment is the same as before with the dif-
ference that the three possible updating (in place of equations (4.5)-(4.7)) are now φb
(after a bad outcome), φs
g (after successes both in the ﬁrst and second rounds) and φ
f
g
(after success in production and failure in the nested unproductive activity).
After a good outcome, two updates can occur, either Pr(C|g,s) or Pr(C|g, f). It
is straightforward to show that in the efﬁcient equilibrium, for all φ, after the ﬁrst
round Pr(C|g) > Pr(C) > Pr(C|b) and after the potential second round Pr(C|g,s) > (<
)Pr(C|g) > (<)Pr(C|g, f) if yg > (<)xg
As in the scapegoating situation, only when yg > xg may the nested stage gener-
ate a new reputation updating and affect efﬁciency21. In what follows, unless stated
otherwise, we consider only the relevant case yg > xg.
As in equations (4.13) and (4.14) it’s also possible to deﬁne expected reputation
after good results in case of hiring experts and in case of hiring nonexperts. Equations













21If yg ≤ xg inepts prefer to boycott the probability of success at the nested activity, imitating compe-
tents in order to be confused with them. In this way inepts would not signal their own ineptitude (this is




































A clear ordering exists among these expressions when yg > xg, as drawn also in
Figure 4.3 (similar to Figure 4.2).
φg,E > φg,N > φb and φg,E > φg > φb (4.20)
and, even when not relevant for our results,




Hence hiring experts increases expected reputation after good results ((4.18) is
positive). Furthermore, hiring nonexperts decreases expected reputation after good
results ((4.19) is negative) for relative high reputation levels. The ﬁnal effect is always
an increase in gains from hiring experts.
The obvious difference between nested activities after failures (such as scapegoat-
ing) and the situation explained here is that, while the former reduces the expected
reputation gains from successes (from (φg −φb) to (φg −φb,E)) and decreases the in-
centives to hire experts, the later increases the expected reputation gains from suc-
cesses (from (φg −φb) to (φg,E −φb)) and increases the incentives to efﬁciently hire
experts. Even more, while the former increases the incentives to hire nonexperts (by
(φb,N −φb,E)), the later decreases them (by (φg,E −φg,N)).
218Figure 4.3: Expected reputation after the ﬁrst round (with and without activities after
successes)
and increases the incentives to e¢ ciently hire experts. Even more, while the
former increases the incentives to hire nonexperts (by (￿b;N ￿ ￿b;E)), the
later decreases them (by (￿g;E ￿ ￿g;N)).
Figure 3
Expected reputation after the ￿rst round










While Figure 3 delivers the basic intuition that sustains e¢ ciency from
nested activities after good results when yg > xg, formal proofs are very
similar to Propositions 2 and 3￿ s proofs. Since, contrary to the scapegoating
case, here it makes more sense to assume yg > zg, the unproductive stage
after a good outcome will always increase the likelihood of achieving an
e¢ cient equilibrium, without requiring a su¢ cient condition.
Finally, it is very interesting to note that "Machiavellian E⁄ects" persist
also in this case, meaning there are more incentives to hire experts in good
times than in bad times. The probability of being successful and reaching
the nested activity is, in absolute terms, greater in good times than in bad
times, increasing even more the incentives to hire experts.
In these sections we have shown the importance of nested activities in
in￿ uencing incentives, to understand superiors￿decisions and to explain ef-
￿ciency consequences. In general, the introduction of nested activities after
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While Figure 4.3 delivers the basic intuition that sustains efﬁciency from nested
activities after good results when yg > xg, formal proofs are very similar to Propo-
sitions 30 and 31’s proofs. Since, contrary to the scapegoating case, here it makes
more sense to assume yg > zg, the unproductive stage after a good outcome will al-
ways increase the likelihood of achieving an efﬁcient equilibrium, without requiring a
sufﬁcient condition.
Finally, it is very interesting to note that ”Machiavellian Effects” persist also in
this case, meaning there are more incentives to hire experts in good times than in
bad times. The probability of being successful and reaching the nested activity is,
in absolute terms, greater in good times than in bad times, increasing even more the
incentives to hire experts.
In these sections we have shown the importance of nested activities in inﬂuencing
incentives, to understand superiors’ decisions and to explain efﬁciency consequences.
In general, the introduction of nested activities after successes seems to be better than
219after failures in order to promote efﬁcient decisions. The only condition is a posi-
tive correlation between abilities to be successful, both in the productive and not so
productive nested activities.
Many real life situations can be rationalized from this point of view, which means
it is not only a theoretical curiosity. Furthermore it is possible to think about extremely
irrelevant activities that may be useful to promote efﬁcient results just by exploiting
reputation concerns, without requiring costly incentives or monetary resources.22
4.5 Conclusions
Scapegoating is a common behavior in public institutions, ﬁrms, sports and even in the
Army. The problem is not only the redistribution effects unfair blaming may generate
but also the inefﬁciencies in the performance of organizations it may introduce. In
fact, this conventional wisdom has been the main argument for last decade’s reforms
designed to assign more responsibility to superiors, reducing their chances to blame
subordinates.
Inefﬁciencies may arise because of imperfect information. Reputation concerns
mayaligninterests, makingsuperiorstodecideactionsthatarepreferredbythesociety,
achieving the best possible outcome at the lowest possible cost.
However, scapegoating corrupt the nice features of reputation, making harder to
achieve efﬁciency since it attenuates potential losses of reputation after failures, re-
ducing the incentives to make costly decisions conducive to obtaining good results,
such as hiring experts. Furthermore, scapegoating in fact increases the incentives to
hire nonexperts in order to blame them easily if something goes wrong.
22An extreme but funny example is the following one. Suppose that hiring experts is efﬁcient but in-
centives from production are not enough for superiors to do it. Assume also experts heavily outperform
nonexperts at playing chess. A cheap way to achieve efﬁciency would be to introduce a chess game
right after successes in production !
220To formalize this idea, we deﬁned scapegoating as a non-productive blaming ac-
tivity ”nested” after a bad result and introduced it as an extension of a reputation
model. This ”nested” activity may represent an additional way for superiors to signal
their competence. Depending on whether production or blaming is a better reputation
builder, incentivestohireefﬁcientworkerswillbeaffected. Ifblamingisamoresecure
way to build reputation, scapegoating reduces the incentives to hire experts, making
the efﬁcient situation more difﬁcult to be sustained as an equilibrium.
Exploiting this nested reasoning, it may be better to locate activities after successes
rather than after failures. If society only cares about the results in the ﬁrst stage, it can
be a good idea to introduce, right after positive results, activities in which competents
outperform inepts. This will give superiors more incentives to achieve good results
in the ﬁrst stage in order to obtain the right to access next stages and signal their
competence even better.
The model also delivers an interesting feature observed in reality, named here as
”Machiavellian Effect”, in which competents tend to hire experts more in good times
than in bad times.
Since our interest in this model is to present the signaling features of scapegoating
by the interaction between superiors and consumers, we abstract from the more subtle
interaction between superior and employee. Even when out of the scope of this paper,
we think it is important to fully understand the scapegoating phenomena.
Obviously these conclusions should be taken carefully. This model just focuses
on one particular delegation motive, which is reputation, leaving out other important
reasons such as specialization and scale. This is why conclusions are biased towards
the assignment of complete responsibility to superiors. A more comprehensive model,
considering all determinants, would be necessary to obtain the optimal allocation of
responsibility and accountability to superiors.
2214.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Proof Proposition 30
Fix φ and suppose an efﬁcient situation (i.e., competent superiors always choose to
hire experts both in good and bad times (τG(φ) = τB(φ) = 1)). It is straightforward to
show that for all φ, after the ﬁrst round Pr(C|g) > Pr(C) > Pr(C|b).
Hence, given any state k ∈ {B,G}, for all feasible φ, ϕ(ϕ(φ|g)|g) = φgg > φg >
φ > φb > φbb and φgi > φbi for i ∈ {g,b}
If k = B, competent’s value function when hiring experts is,
V(φ,E) = p(φ)−w+δ(1−λ)[Pr(g|E,B)V(φg)+Pr(b|E,B)V(φb)]
V(φ,E) = p(φ)−w+δ(1−λ)[αV(φg)+(1−α)V(φb)]
The payoff from deviating by hiring a nonexpert and thereafter playing the equi-







X = (α −ρ)[p(φg)− p(φb)]
Yi = (α −ρ)[V(φgi)−V(φbi)] for i ∈ {g,b}
Pr(g|E) = α +γ(1−ρ −α) = 1−Pr(b|E)
In orderV(φ,E)−V(φ;N) ≥ 0, it’s necessary that
w≤ δ(1−λ)[X +δ(1−λ)V f]; for all φ ∈ [λθ,1−λ(1−θ)]
222whereVf = Pr(g|E)Yg+Pr(b|E)Yb
Then we can deﬁne DNS
B as the minimum value of the expression δ(1−λ)[X +








If k = G, the condition for competents to hire experts is the same than (4.21). This
is because φg and φb do not change and (α −ρ) is by assumption the same. Then, it’s
always possible to ﬁnd some DNS ≥ w > 0 such that DNS = DNS
G = DNS
B and competents
hire experts for all φ.
Finally it’s necessary to show that δ(1−λ)[X +δ(1−λ)V f] is positive for all
φ ∈ (0,1), such that DNS > 0.
a) δ(1−λ) > 0 since δ > 0 and λ < 1.
b) X =(α−ρ)[p(φg)−p(φb)]>0 since α >ρ and p(φ) is monotonically increas-
ing in φ (
∂p(φ)
∂φ = α −ρ > 0).23
c) Vf > 0 because Yg> 0 and Yb > 0 since the value function V is monotonically
increasing in φ as well.24
Hence, DNS > 0 for all φ ∈ [λθ,1−λ(1−θ)]. Q.E.D.
4.6.2 Proof Proposition 31
hisproofproceedintwosteps. Firstwesolveforsuperiors’optimalblamingintensities
(x(φ), y(φ) and z(φ)) that are consistent with ”consumers” beliefs in equilibrium. Sec-
23More speciﬁcally, as in Mailath and Samuelson [2001], suppose F and G are two distributions
describing ”consumers” beliefs over the delegation decisions by competents in period t. If F ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominates G then superior’s revenues in period t under F is higher than under G.
24Following Mailath and Samuelson [2001], let ft(φ,φ0,t0) be the distribution of ”consumer” poste-
riors φ at time t > t0 induced by strategy τ given period-t0 posteriors φ0. Then, ft(φ,φ0,t0) ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominates ft(φ,φ0
0,t0) for all t >t0 and φ0 > φ0
0. The same idea is true for the distribution
of revenues. Hence,V(φ) is monotonic.
223ond, using these results from the blaming stage, we derive conditions for an efﬁcient
equilibrium.
Step 1: Blaming stage equilibrium
The strategy we follow in this part of the proof is: First, consider as given the
”consumers” beliefs about blaming intensities and determine optimal decisions by su-
periors(bothcompetents(y)andinepts(x))25. Second, consideringtheoptimalblaming
intensities, we check if beliefs are correct and consistent with those strategies.
Blaming decisions are made by superiors knowing their own type, their previous
delegation choices and the state of nature. For example, in bad times, when competents










b are given by ”consumers”’ beliefs about y and x.
For any deviation from y, say to y0, we can deﬁne,





1) Assume ”consumers” believe y = x.








b ) = 0, com-
petents are indifferent choosing any y0 ∈ [0,y] because, regardless of (y0−y), always
VD(y)=0. Similarly, inepts are indifferent choosing any x0 ∈[0,x] because, regardless
of (x0 −x), VD(x) = 0. Hence, ”consumers” beliefs y = x are correct and consistent
with equilibrium strategies, supporting multiple pooling equilibria in which no further
reputation update is obtained from the blaming activity.
25Recall at this point z is not relevant for ”consumers” to update beliefs since we are focusing only
on efﬁcient equilibria in which competents always hire experts.
2242) Assume ”consumers” believe y > x. Then φ
ec
b > φb > φ
sc





b ) > 0, competents choose y0 = y, which maximizesVD(y). Similarly, inepts will
choose x0 = x. Only ”consumers” beliefs y = y and x = x will be correct, which are
consistent with beliefs y > x solely when y > x being the only separating equilibrium
in which the blaming activity represents an additional reputation updating.
3) Assume ”consumers” believe y < x. Then φ
ec
b < φb < φ
sc





b ) < 0, competents choose y0 = 0 and inepts x0 = 0. Only ”consumers” beliefs
y = 0 and x = 0 will be correct, which is not consistent with beliefs in which y < x.
This case cannot be an equilibrium.26
Step 2: Delegation stage equilibrium
a) Let y ≤ x
Fix φ and suppose an efﬁcient situation (τG(φ) = τB(φ) = 1). Since the only pos-




b = φb, we have
exactly the same expressions used to obtain equilibrium conditions without scape-
goating (in Proposition 2’s proof). Hence, under y ≤ x scapegoating does not affect
efﬁciency conditions.
b) Let y > x
Even when pooling equilibria in blaming intensities that do not affect efﬁciency
conditions exist in this situation, we will focus on the unique separating equilibrium in
which y = y , x = x and z = z such that φ
ec
b > φb > φ
sc
b .
Fix φ and suppose an efﬁcient situation (τG(φ) = τB(φ) = 1). It is straightforward
to show that for all φ, after the ﬁrst round Pr(C|g) > Pr(C) > Pr(C|b) and after the
potential second round Pr(C|b,ec) > (<)Pr(C|g) > (<)Pr(C|b,sc) if y > (<)x. Given
26Because we are focusing on efﬁcient equilibria, we checked beliefs for x and y but a competent type
that deviated in the ﬁrst stage hiring nonexperts will also choose any z ∈ [0,z] in 1), z = z in 2) and z = 0
in 3).
225any state k ∈ {B,G}, for all feasible φ, ϕ(ϕ(φ|g)|g) = φgg > φg > φ > φb > φbb and
φgi > φb1i > φbi > φb2i for i ∈ {g,b1,b2}, with b1 = (b,ec) and b2 = (b,sc).












































for i ∈ {g,b1,b2}
and, as in the previous proof, Pr(g|E) = α +γ(1−ρ −α) = 1−Pr(b|E)














XB = (α −ρ)p(φg)+(1−α)p(φb,E)−(1−ρ)p(φb,N)
An equilibrium in which competents only hire experts when k = B requires that
V(φ,E)−V(φ;N) ≥ 0 for all feasible reputation measures φ. A necessary condition
is that cost differences w fulﬁll
w≤ δ(1−λ)[XB+δ(1−λ)V
B







Then we can deﬁne DS
B as the minimum value of the expression δ(1−λ)[XB +
δ(1−λ)V
B










To save notation it is possible to assume a case in which the future does not present
scapegoating possibilities, so there is just one current shot blaming. In this case, from
tomorrow on it would be possible to have only two possible states i ∈ {g,b}. It is





last expression is used in Proposition 31.
If k = G, the proof is identical to the previous one but having Pr(g|E,G) = (1−ρ)
and Pr(g|N,G) = (1−α) instead.
Then,
XG = (α −ρ)p(φg)+ρp(φb,E)−αp(φb,N)
27It is not possible to do the same forYB
i because we do not know the form of the value functions just
their monotonicity in φ, (recall we are not assuming linearity of V(φ)).
227YG









for i ∈ {g,b1,b2}
Hence the condition for competents to hire experts and to achieve the efﬁcient
outcome as an equilibrium is,
w≤ δ(1−λ)[XG+δ(1−λ)V
G







Then we can deﬁne DS
G as the minimum value of the expression δ(1−λ)[XG +
δ(1−λ)V
G















(4.25), which is used in Proposition 3. Q.E.D.
4.6.3 Extension Proof Proposition 32
Considering the existence of blaming activities in current and future periods, the only
difference arises in the deﬁnition of VG
f , after equation (4.25)
Hence we need to prove Vf −VG












This expression will be non-negative whenever Yg−YG
g ≥ 0 (proved in Proposition
3) andYb−yYG
b1 −(1−y)YG



















bb2)] ≥ (α −ρ)V(φbb)
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